dissenting:
I most respectfully dissent. It is clear to me that the facility with which we are dealing is an arena and, therefore, originally within the jurisdiction of the Department of General Services. Calling it a stadium does not change its character. One is reminded again of the Bard when he says, “. . . .[a] rose by any other name. . . .” William W. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene ii.
I do recognize that the charter provision cited by the majority permits the mayor to transfer jurisdiction of a facility to a department other than that to which it is originally assigned by the charter and it does not disturb me that one department of the executive branch rather than another deals with the subject upon such assignment. But I read nothing in that assignment provision which permits the assignee department to thereupon ignore the restrictions upon which contracts dealing with that facility can be made by the original department. The charter requires bids to be called for by the General Services Department whenever practicable. I must point out that when the transfer was first authorized, the Department of Parks and Recreation did indeed call for bids on this very contract by order of the mayor. But now the department chooses to ignore the restriction requiring bids. I cannot agree that this is proper under the Charter of the City and County of Denver.
MR. JUSTICE LEE dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the district court correctly interpreted the Denver Charter as it relates to the management and control of the Denver Mile High Stadium. Article XII, Sec. A12.3-5. The quoted portion of the district court’s findings, as set forth in the majority opinion, persuasively demonstrates the reasons for the conclusion that the stadium falls within that class of facilities included in the charter provision, and which are under the management and control of the Department of General Services.
Reinforcing this conclusion is Sec. A12.3-6, which vests in the Department of General Services the “[exclusive power and authority to grant or refuse the license or privilege of operating concessions in or of selling goods and services in the facilities, structures and parts of *335structures * * (Emphasis added.) Executive and legislative interpretation to the contrary cannot, in my opinion, negate the clear intent of the framers as expressed in these charter provisions.
This conclusion, then, requires that the provisions of Article XII, relating to the letting of contracts and bidding, must be complied with. Sec. A 12.4 to A 12.4-3. They were not here complied with and the district court properly held the contract to be void.
I would affirm the judgment.
I am authorized to state that MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN joins in this dissent.