dissenting. ■ I do not regard the holding in this case to be a correct statement of the law.
*536As I view it, a defendant can be found negligent as a matter of law not only where his act has been declared so by a lawmaking body (negligence per se), but also where his conduct was so plain, palpable and indisputable that reasonable minds could not disagree as to his negligence. Illustration after illustration could be given where, in the absence of negligence per se, the facts show negligence so plain, palpable and indisputable that there could be no disagreement.
The rule in this State has'always been that the question of negligence is peculiarly a matter for a jury “except in plain and indisputable cases.” See Bussey v. Dawson, 224 Ga. 191 (160 SE2d 834); Blanton v. Doughty, 107 Ga. App. 91 (129 SE2d 376); 16 West’s Ga. Dig. 672, Negligence, § 136 (14b).
Following the exception stated in the foregoing rule, our courts have consistently recognized that in proper cases courts may determine as a matter of law that a person was negligent, not only when the issue was made upon the pleadings but also when it was made upon subsequent stages. See in this connection, Powell v. Berry, 145 Ga. 696, 701 (89 SE 753, LRA 1917A 306); Laseter v. Clark, 54 Ga. App. 669, 670 (189 SE 265).
In Dixon v. Dixon, 103 Ga. App. 166 (118 SE2d 713), this exception was acknowledged, although the majority did not find negligence as a matter of law. The controlling issue was whether the defendant was negligent in backing his automobile on his own property and running over the plaintiff’s child. Negligence per se was not involved. The jury found for the defendant, and the trial court overruled the plaintiff’s motion for new trial on the general grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Its headnote recited that “Questions of negligence are ordinarily peculiarly within the jury’s province unless the evidence is so plain, palpable and undisputable that a court can conclude that the facts show negligence as a matter of law.” (Emphasis supplied.) The headnote continued: “Under the facts of this case this court cannot say as a matter of law under the undisputed evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.” The dissent, by two judges, evaluated the evidence differently, stating that “The evidence in this case bearing upon the negligence of the defendant is so clear and *537indisputable as to demand as a matter of law a finding by the jury of liability. Accordingly, a verdict for the plaintiff in some amount was demanded as a matter of law.”
The cases hold that “A jury question is presented if reasonable minds might disagree as to whether specified conduct amounts to negligence and whether, if so, it was the proximate cause of the injury. [Citations.]” Mullis v. Chaika, 118 Ga. App. 11, 15 (162 SE2d 448). It follows, then, that if there is no room for such disagreement, there is no issue for the jury, but it is for the court.
The duty of the court in such eases to decide as a matter of law that a defendant was negligent, although no negligence per se was involved, is apparent from well known treatises and text writers. “Ordinarily, and in the absence of statute or ordinance making particular acts negligent as a matter of law, the question of negligence is one of fact for the jury, or is a mixed question of law and fact; but the circumstances of a given case may be such as to make the question of negligence one of law for the court.” 65A CJS 804, Negligence, § 252 (a). “The question of the defendant’s liability lawfully can be withdrawn from the jury and determined by the court as a question of law when, and only when, the facts are indisputable, being stipulated, found by the court or jury, established by evidence that is free from conflict, and raise an inference which is so certain that all reasonable men, in the exercise of a fair and impartial judgment, must agree upon it and draw the same conclusion.” 38 AmJur 1048, Negligence, § 345. “The most common statement is that if men of reasonable intelligence may differ as to the conclusion to be drawn, the issue must be left to the jury; otherwise it is for the court.” Prosser, Law of Torts (3rd Ed.), p. 209.
In the instant case the question of proof of the defendant’s negligence arose upon the plaintiff’s motion for new trial, the general grounds urging that the verdict was “contrary to evidence and without evidence to support it.”
Even though they contain some broad language, none of the first six cases relied upon by the majority negates negligence as a matter of law in the absence of negligence per se. Each of *538them involved a charge to the. jury that specified acts constituted negligence. That is not the situation here, where the issue arose upon the overruling of the plaintiff’s motion for new trial on the general grounds. The final citation of the majority, Dixon v. Dixon, 103 Ga. App. 106, dealt with above, supports the position taken in this dissent.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Felton joins in this dissent.