(dissenting)'—I dissent. The rule is well known that a statute which is plain on its face will generally mean exactly what it says. In such a case there is no room for construction or interpretation. State v. Roth, 78 Wn.2d 711, 479 P.2d 55 (1971). This rule has very few exceptions. However, one important exception exists. That is, the strict letter of a statute will not control over the obvious legislative intent and meaning. Cory v. Nethery, 19 Wn.2d 326, 142 P.2d 488 (1943); Howlett v. Cheetham, 17 Wash. 626, 50 P. 522 (1897); Yakima First Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Gray, 82 Wn.2d 295, 510 P.2d 243 (1973). If the legislative intent is obvious, that will control. Miller v. McCamish, 78 Wn.2d 821, 479 P.2d 919 (1971).
This litigation involves an exemption from the effect of a taxing statute. Such exemptions are to be strictly construed against the claim of exemption. Pacific Northwest Conf. v. *886Barlow, 77 Wn.2d 487, 463 P.2d 626 (1969); Yakima First Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Gray, supra.
In this case, each of the corporations who were parties plaintiff (respondents) received substantial income from investments. Such income was the result of engaging in “financial business.” It matters not that each of respondents had other business activities which in each instance was the primary or principal business of the corporation. It is not at all uncommon for the legislature to provide for different tax rates upon different parts of the business activity of one corporation. Rena-Ware Distribs., Inc. v. State, 77 Wn.2d 514, 463 P.2d 622 (1970). In this case it seems incredible that the legislature intended to exempt large corporations from paying the business and occupation tax on substantial income.
If the majority opinion herein prevails, then it certainly would seem appropriate for the legislature to examine this situation and clarify the legislative intent to the end that an unjust escape from taxation would be ended.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Wright, J.