dissenting.
Although I accept the underlying facts as found by the trial court, I reach a different conclusion. A new agreement was made in 1972 when $65,000.00 was borrowed from the bank. By virtue of that loan Tucker was completely paid on the earlier contracts and in addition, held some $24,529.29 of Curry’s money. The account between the parties continued to be in Curry’s favor due to this surplus and Curry’s uncompensated employment by Tucker for which he was to receive credit on the sale price until the first part of 1974.
Curry was in default in 1974 and until the notice of default was served in July of 1975. However, during that 18 month period there was, understandably, a dispute as to the amount due. Further, in October of 1973, Tucker had filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act1 listing the property as his own, subject only to an option in Curry. Moreover, Tucker had in 1973, acting as the owner of the property, given a deed of trust covering the property to a bank as security for a $150,000.00 loan.
Curry’s equity in the property is said to be some $87,000.00.2 Given the magnitude of this amount and the clouded circumstances which existed during the 18 months in which Curry was in default, I believe a strict forfeiture is inappropriate. Instead, in accordance with our prior decisions3 the court should have given Curry a reasonable grace period in which to pay the amount owing Tucker. If such payment was not made the property would thereafter be re-conveyed to Tucker.
. Tucker’s testimony indicated that his 1973 financial crisis was the result of other business dealings. Further, Tucker’s own accounting records show that in October of 1973 when he filed for an arrangement and at the end of that year, the account which reflected his transactions with Curry had a credit balance. Exhibit 16. Therefore, the majority’s suggestion that Tucker supported Curry to the point of “endangering his own financial status” is not supported by the evidence.
. The majority’s suggestion that a secured lender, rather than the owner of the property, is entitled to the benefit of rising real estate values is not backed up by any authority. Our cases establish that the lender is entitled to be repaid, plus interest and costs, and the owner is entitled to his property. See Hagberg v. Alaska Nat. Bank, 585 P.2d 559, 561-62 (Alaska 1978); See generally McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d 210, 216 (Alaska 1978); Moran v. Kenai Towing and Salvage, Inc., 523 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Alaska 1974); Harris v. Alaska Title Guaranty Co., 510 P.2d 501, 505 (Alaska 1973); Moran v. Holman, 501 P.2d 769, 771 (Alaska 1972); Semlek v. National Bank of Alaska, 458 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Alaska 1969); Land Dev., Inc. v. Padgett, 369 P.2d 888, 889 (Alaska 1962).
. See Hagberg v. Alaska Nat. Bank, 585 P.2d at 561-62; Moran v. Holman, 501 P.2d at 770; Jameson v. Wurtz, 396 P.2d 68, 74 (Alaska 1964); Land Dev., Inc. v. Padgett, 369 P.2d at 889-90. See generally City of Valdez v. Valdez Dev. Co., 523 P.2d 177, 183 (Alaska 1974).