dissenting.
Since I conclude that the Lottery Act is a revenue bill that was not passed in accordance with constitutional mandates, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining plaintiffs should bear the costs of this action.
I. Revenue Bill
Article II, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution states in pertinent part:
No law shall be enacted to raise money on the credit of the State, or to pledge the faith of the State-directly or indirectly for the payment of any debt, or to impose any tax upon the people of the *225State, or to allow the counties, cities, or towns to do so, unless the bill for the purpose shall have been read three several times in each house of the General Assembly and passed three several readings, which readings shall have been on three different days, and shall have been agreed to by each house respectively, and unless the yeas and nays on the second and third readings of the bill shall have been entered on the journal.
N.C. Const, art. II, § 23.
The principles governing constitutional interpretation are generally the same as those “which control in ascertaining the meaning of all written instruments.” Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 370, 562 S.E.2d 377, 389 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). In determining the will or intent of the people as expressed in the North Carolina Constitution, “all cognate provisions are to be brought into view in their entirety and so interpreted as to effectuate the manifest purposes of the instrument.” State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989) (quoting State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 583, 31 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1944)). If the meaning of the language of Article II, § 23 is plain, then we must follow it. See Martin v. State of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 412, 416, 410 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1991) (“where the meaning is clear from the words used we will not search for a meaning elsewhere.”) (quotation omitted). In the case sub judice, the language regarding raising money on the credit of the State, pledging the faith of the State for payment of a debt, and not imposing a tax is straightforward. Yet, the majority incorrectly concludes the Lottery Act does not raise money on the credit of the State, does not pledge the faith of the State for the payment of a debt, and does not impose a tax, and therefore does not constitute a revenue bill.
The majority holds that because the Lottery Act establishes the Lottery Commission as an independent agency and pays prize winners from the pool of lottery revenues, that the State has not raised money on its credit or pledged its faith for payment of a debt. The relevant statutory provision states as follows:
§ 18C-162. Allocation of revenues
(a) To the extent practicable, the Commission shall allocate revenues to the North Carolina State Lottery Fund in the following manner:
*226(1) At least fifty percent (50%) of the total annual revenues, as described in this Chapter, shall be returned to the public in the form of prizes.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18C-162(a)(l) (2005) (emphasis supplied).
This provision makes it clear that while the State intends to pay lottery winners from lottery revenues, it has not expressly limited its liability to lottery revenues. Thus, although lottery proceeds are used to pay prize winners “to the'extent practicable,” there is no statutory provision prohibiting prize winners from asserting claims against other State funds in the event of a shortfall of lottery revenues. Id. The majority mistakenly asserts that a dedicated revenue stream alone is sufficient to insulate the State’s liability to that particular revenue stream, but such is not the case.
The State’s obligations created by the Lottery Act can be analogized to the sale of state bonds. The State at times finances projects with revenue bonds backed by a dedicated revenue stream, as the State has done with the creation of the Lottery Commission. Revenue bonds are not general obligations of the State when the State has taken care to limit its liability to the revenue stream identified to service the debt. See generally Turnpike Authority v. Pine Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 117, 143 S.E.2d 319, 325 (1965). Here, the State has failed to limit its liability in any way, although it certainly could have chosen to do so. Such a limitation of liability would have prevented the Lottery Act from raising money on the credit of the State or pledging its credit for the repayment of a debt, and would have successfully circumvented Art. II, § 23.
By selling lottery tickets, the State is contracting with purchasers for the opportunity to have a claim for State revenues, but it has neither dedicated an exclusive revenue stream from which they are to be paid nor has it limited its liability to such a revenue stream. As such, a prize winner may assert a claim generally against the State and thus the State has pledged its credit for payment of prizes. This fact alone makes the Lottery Act a revenue bill for purposes of Article II, § 23.
Contrast the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18C-162(a)(l), which does not require payment from lottery revenues to lottery winners, with the language enabling the sale of bonds by the North Carolina Housing Authority, which states:
An authority shall have power to issue bonds from time to time in its discretion for any of its corporate purposes. An authority shall *227also have power to issue or exchange refunding bonds for the purpose of paying, retiring, extending or renewing bonds previously issued by it. An authority may issue such types of bonds as it may determine, including (without limiting the generality of the foregoing) bonds on which the principal and interest are payable from income and revenues of the authority and from grants or contributions from the federal government or other source. Such income and revenues securing the bonds may be:
(1) Exclusively the income and revenues of the housing project financed in whole or in part with the proceeds of such bonds;
(2) Exclusively the income and revenues of certain designated housing projects, whether or not they are financed in whole or in part with the proceeds of such bonds; or
(3) The income and revenues of the authority generally.
Any such bonds may be additionally secured by a pledge of any income or revenues of the authority, or a mortgage of any housing project, projects or other property of the authority.
Neither the commissioners of an authority nor any person executing the bonds shall be liable personally on the bonds by reason of the issuance thereof. The bonds and other obligations of an authority (and such bonds and obligations shall so state in their face) shall not be a debt of any city or municipality and neither the State nor any such city or municipality shall be liable thereon, nor in any event shall such bonds or obligations be payable out of any funds or properties other than those of said authority. The bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation of the laws of the State. Bonds may be issued under this Article notwithstanding any debt or other limitation prescribed in any statute.
This Article without reference to other statutes of the State shall constitute full and complete authority for the authorization, issuance, delivery and sale of bonds hereunder and such authorization, issuance, delivery and sale shall not be subject to any conditions, restrictions or limitations imposed by any other law whether general, special or local.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 157-14 (2005) (emphasis supplied).
*228The State, in passing the Lottery Act, could have added similar language to the statute and limited lottery prizes to lottery revenues. However, it chose not to do so. Absent a limiting provision, the State has exposed itself to claims against general funds and thus has pledged the credit of the State of North Carolina.
In determining that the Lottery Act does not constitute a tax, the majority incorrectly focuses on the voluntary nature of purchasing a lottery ticket. This Court has adopted the balancing approach commonly called the San Juan Cellular test, first articulated by Judge Breyer of the First Circuit. Court of Appeals, in determining whether a government charge is a fee or tax. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Long, 129 N.C. App. 164, 168, 497 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1998). In State Farm, this Court specifically utilized the San Juan Cellular test:
In applying San Juan Cellular to determine whether a charge is a tax, courts have developed a three-part test considering (1) the entity that imposes the assessment; (2) the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed; and (3) whether the assessment is expended for general public purposes, or used for the regulation or benefit of the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed.
Id., 129 N.C. App. at 168, 497 S.E.2d at 453-54 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). The majority incorrectly states that because the Long Court applied the San Juan Cellular test to determine whether a government charge was a regulatory fee or tax, the test is “largely irrelevant” to the case sub judice. However, our opinion in Long did not restrict the San Juan Cellular test solely to cases where this Court must determine whether a charge is a regulatory fee or a tax.
Applying the San Juan Cellular test to the case sub judice leads to the conclusion that the thirty-five percent assessment is a tax. First, the General Assembly imposed the assessment, and such enactments favor the finding of a tax. See id., 129 N.C. App. at 168, 497 S.E.2d at 454. Second, the assessment is imposed on every purchaser of lottery tickets. Id. (“An assessment imposed upon a broad class of parties is more likely to be a tax ....”) (quoting Bidart Bros. v. California Apple Comm’n, 73 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 1996)). Third, the purpose of the assessment is to raise revenue for education programs which is a “general public purpose[].” Id.; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18C-102 (2005) (“The General Assembly declares that the pur*229pose of this Chapter is to establish a State-operated lottery to generate funds . . . .”). Unlike a fee, the assessment does not merely create incidental revenue used for education. Rather, the revenues generated are placed in a special state fund unrelated to gambling which indicates the assessment does not merely create incidental revenue used for education.
This Court has defined a tax as “a pecuniary charge or levy enforced by government to raise money for the maintenance and expense of government.” N.C. Association of ABC Boards v. Hunt, 76 N.C. App. 290, 292, 332 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1985). The majority analogizes lottery revenues to toll revenues, which we have held are not taxes. Turnpike Authority, 265 N.C. at 116-17, 143 S.E.2d at 325. Likewise, we have held that a surcharge on liquor is not a tax. N. C. Association of ABC Boards, 76 N.C. App. at 293, 332 S.E.2d at 695. However, in those cases we noted that the surcharge was a fee and not a tax because the revenue was used to support the administration and regulation of the facility or product, and was not used “to provide revenue for the maintenance and expense of government.” Id.
The toll revenue and liquor surcharge cases are distinguishable from the case sub judice because in those cases, the use of the fees is reasonably related to the facilities generating the fees. Although the revenue may find its way into the general fund coffers, the purpose of the facilities is not primarily to raise general revenues but to provide a service. As such, the surplus revenues are incidental to the operation of the facilities.
As in the toll revenue and liquor surcharge cases, the key point in the case sub judice is the purpose behind the fee. The majority focuses on whether a person voluntarily chooses to purchase a lottery ticket. Yet, it does not matter whether a person voluntarily chooses to purchase a lottery ticket or voluntarily chooses to pay a toll. Virtually every purchase is voluntary and the majority’s analysis would convert nearly every assessment, including a general sales tax, into a “fee.”
Rather than focusing on the voluntary nature of purchasing a lottery ticket, the focus must be on the purpose behind the fee. The purpose of a toll payment is to generate funds to pay for state highway expenses. However, the purpose of the lottery is to raise revenues for North Carolina’s education fund. As such, the revenues raised are not incidental to the game nor reasonably related to the maintenance and *230operation of the game, but are central to the game’s purpose; therefore the revenues from the lottery are taxes. The Lottery Act is unconstitutional because it is a revenue bill and was not passed in accordance with the constitutional mandates pursuant to Article II, § 23.
The majority opinion correctly states that all parties to the lawsuit agree that the Lottery Act was not passed in compliance with the constitutional requirements, outlined in Article II, § 23 of the North Carolina Constitution, as the Lottery Act did not receive the requisite three readings on three separate days, nor were the yeas and nays properly entered. Neither the trial court nor the majority opinion propose a solution to an act that is a legal nullity.
The trial court was faced with a case of first impression. Therefore, as a practical matter, the trial court found that the Lottery Commission was established and “hired employees, entered into contracts, collected application fees, expended large sums of money and engaged in other activities necessary for the establishment of a lottery.” The trial court also noted that “the money expended by the Lottery Commission cannot be unspent[;]” “the legal position and reliance of those who entered into contracts with the Lottery Commission cannot be dismissed[;]” “a large number of people (notably the employees of-the Lottery Commission) altered their economic, legal and planning positions in reliance on the Lottery Act[;]” and “it is doubtful that lottery employees could return to their former employment.” These are valid concerns, but they cannot be our only concerns. Constitutionally-mandated procedures are a concern of the highest order, and they may not be estopped by a hurry to sell lottery tickets.
If it is our Legislature’s will that there be a statewide lottery, it may gather and pass a measure that is constitutionally sound. This decision has a 20 day mandate. A twenty day period is ample time for the Legislature to cure the constitutional defects in the Lottery Act.
Our State legislators may not skirt our State’s constitutional mandates -simply because the Lottery Commission already is an established, ongoing business. This is not to suggest the Lottery Commission should refund or return any money that our State treasury previously transferred to it, nor to suggest halting the lottery. While there is nothing in our State’s Constitution prohibiting the enactment of a lottery, such an act must, as all our laws must, follow constitutional commands.
*231II. Attorneys’ Fees
The majority disagrees with the plaintiffs’ contention That the trial court erred by ordering plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors to pay the costs of this litigation. In affirming the trial court’s award of costs to plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors, the majority cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-263 (2005), which states, “In any proceeding under this article the court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.” The trial court’s award of costs will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See City of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven Co. Bd. of Educ., 338 N.C. 430, 450 S.E.2d 735 (1994). Specifically, “[a] trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason.” Castle McCulloch, Inc. v. Freedman, 169 N.C. App. 497, 504, 610 S.E.2d 416, 422 (2005).
In the case sub judice, the trial court found that plaintiffs’ allegations were “without merit and should be dismissed,” as well as that “no justification has been shown for the delay in initiating this litigation in December 2005.” I disagree that a valid constitutional challenge to enacted legislation with meritorious arguments should be dismissed. More importantly, there was a justification for the December 2005 litigation.
The trial court found that “the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors had actual or constructive knowledge both of their claims and of the efforts being made to implement the Lottery Act prior to the filing of their respective complaints.” However, the trial court’s reasoning for imposing costs to plaintiffs because of their “actual or constructive knowledge” is wrong. On 17 November 2005, plaintiffs hand delivered letters addressed to the Chairman of the Lottery Commission, Dr. Charles A. Sanders, State Treasurer, Richard H. Moore, and Attorney General Roy Cooper. Significantly, each letter notified the defendants of possible legal action to challenge the constitutionality of the Lottery Act and demanded that defendants refrain from carrying out the Lottery Act. On 15 December 2005, less than 30 days after notifying the defendants, plaintiffs filed suit.
In addition, although plaintiffs may have .been generally aware of the terms of the proposed lottery, they were unaware of its provisions until its enactment. Because plaintiffs were unaware of the Lottery Act’s specific provisions until the lottery was implemented, they could not allege a constitutional challenge to specific sections of the Lottery Act. Moreover, as plaintiffs note, this case is one of great *232complexity requiring extensive research due to multiple issues requiring constitutional interpretation.
In conclusion, Article II, § 23 is applicable to the Lottery Act. Imposing costs upon litigants who bring forth important constitutional challenges to legislation may have a chilling effect on such challenges in the future. It was not “equitable and just” to determine that plaintiffs bear the costs of this action. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-263. The plaintiffs’ allegations are meritorious. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors to pay the costs of litigation. Since there is no dispute that the Lottery Act was not passed in accordance with that constitutional provision, it is a legislative nullity. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.