OPINION
BURKE, Justice.David Williams was convicted in the district court, at Kodiak, of the misdemeanor offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.1 His conviction followed a non-jury trial in which he was not represented by counsel. Previously, at the time of his arraignment, Williams had stated that he waived his constitutional right to counsel and to a jury trial.2 On appeal to the superior court Williams, there represented by counsel, claimed that such waiver was not knowledgeable and hence ineffective. The superior court, rejecting this claim, affirmed the conviction. The present appeal followed.
Williams was arrested on February 6, 1978, following a single-vehicle accident involving his truck. He was arraigned the following day. Several defendants were arraigned at once, and the arraigning judge began with a statement to the group. He informed them, among other things, of their right to counsel, to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to call witnesses, to testify on their own behalf or remain silent, and to put the prosecution to its burden of proof. Thereafter, during Williams’ individual arraignment, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: Mr. Williams, do you wish to be represented by an attorney in this matter?
MR. WILLIAMS: No, sir.
THE COURT: You understand what an attorney could do for you if you were represented by one?
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you understand with what you’re charged? [sic]
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, I am. [sic]
THE COURT: Are you prepared to enter a plea to the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor?
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And what is your plea?
MR. WILLIAMS: Not guilty.
THE COURT: All right. Do you wish a court trial or a jury trial?
MR. WILLIAMS: A court trial.
THE COURT: All right. You understand that you’re giving up a constitutional right which is guaranteed by waiving a jury?
MR. WILLIAMS: I guess.
THE COURT: Okay. Are you going to represent yourself at trial?
MR. WILLIAMS: Sure.
Williams’ trial took place on May 11. At the commencement Judge Madsen again questioned Williams about his decision to represent himself and to waive a jury trial:
THE COURT: You are going to be representing yourself in this matter?
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you have been advised that you have a right to be represented by an attorney?
MR. WILLIAMS: No, I don’t think so.
THE COURT: You have been advised have you not, Mr. Williams?
MR. WILLIAMS: Pardon me?
THE COURT: You have been advised that you have a right to be represented by an attorney, have you not?
MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
THE COURT: And you have . . .
MR. WILLIAMS: I didn’t have the money for one.
THE COURT: Well, have you been advised that you have a right-and that if you cannot afford the service of an attorney the court would appoint the public defender to represent you?
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you have still elected to represent yourself?
MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
*883THE COURT: And you were also advised that you have a right to a jury trial and it’s my understanding that we had a jury called for this trial but you indicated to the court that you were willing to waive your right to a jury trial.
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir. Well, I-to begin with I didn’t ask for a jury trial.
THE COURT: All right. As long as you understand you have a right to have a jury hear this matter.
MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
Williams was subsequently convicted.
Rule 39(b)(3), Alaska R.Crim.P., provides: In the absence of a request by a defendant, otherwise entitled to appointment of counsel, the court shall appoint counsel for him unless he demonstrates that he understands the benefits of counsel and knowingly waives the same.
The facts of this case are remarkably like those in O’Dell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 576 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1978). O’Dell had been convicted of failing to give information at the scene of an accident, in violation of an Anchorage municipal ordinance. At his arraignment, those defendants present were advised, en masse, of the same rights as was Williams here. When O’Dell was later addressed personally, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand all-that you have all the rights that I mentioned earlier to everybody?
MR. O’DELL: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. To the complaint, how do you wish to plead?
MR. O’DELL: Not guilty.
THE COURT: Okay. ... Do you want a jury trial?
MR. O’DELL: [no audible response]
THE COURT: Do you plan to get an attorney?
MR. O’DELL: Just a matter of clipped bumpers was all it was-
THE COURT: What?
MR. O’DELL: I said it was just a matter of clipped bumpers was all it is-there was no accident.
THE COURT: Okay-uh-non-jury. All right .
576 P.2d at 107. We held that:
[T]he record before the arraignment judge, as well as the trial judge, fails to reflect a clear waiver by O’Dell of the right to legal representation. Neither in his appearance before the arraignment judge nor at the outset of his trial two months later before another district court judge does the record show that O’Dell understood what he was giving up by declining the assistance of counsel. The standards for waiving assistance of counsel required by McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91-92 (Alaska 1974), were not met.
Id. at 108.
Unlike O’Dell we believe that the record in the case at bar adequately demonstrates that Williams understood what he was giving up by choosing to forego counsel and to waive his right to a jury trial. We recognized in O’Dell that for minor offenses an extensive inquiry regarding the defendant’s understanding of the advantages of counsel would not be necessary:
The degree of inquiry necessary should be tailored to the particular characteristics of the accused, such as his lack of education or language disability, and to the complexities of the legal issues raised by the charge against him. In many cases, this duty will be minimal. For instance, traffic misdemeanor cases are usually readily understood by lay persons and the consequences of a finding of guilt are typically not severe. The responsibility of the arraignment judge here would have been satisfied by an additional sentence or two clarifying O’Dell’s answer and assuring an intelligent waiver.
576 P.2d at 108 (footnote omitted).
The conviction is AFFIRMED.
. AS 28.35.030.
. U.S.Const., amend. VI; Alaska Const., art. I, § 11.