dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which dismisses this appeal as interlocutory. I find that the order affects a substantial right, was certified as immediately appealable, and is not interlocutory.
I. Interlocutory
The majority’s opinion finds that the trial court did not state its reason for denying the motion to compel and states “Where no findings appear in the record, ‘we may presume that the trial court . . . recognized the absence of relevancy and materiality of the information [sought to be discovered].’ ” Neither party argues that the motion to compel should be denied because of “relevancy” or “materiality.” The basis of both arguments before the trial court was the applicability of the attorney-client privilege even when highly relevant and material information is sought through discovery. I would find that *264the trial court followed the arguments of counsel and decided the case based on the attorney-client privilege. This Court should not “presume that the trial court. .. recognized the absence of relevancy and materiality.”
“[W]hen, . . a party asserts a statutory privilege which directly relates to the matter to be disclosed under an interlocutory discovery order, and the assertion of such privilege is not otherwise frivolous or insubstantial, the challenged order affects a substantial right under sections 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(1).” Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 166, 522 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1999). In Evans v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 142 N.C. App. 18, 541 S.E.2d 782 (2001), this Court applied the reasoning of Sharpe to the assertion of the attorney-client privilege. 142 N.C. App. at 24, 541 S.E.2d at 786. I would apply that reasoning here.
Here, the trial court certified the case for immediate appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ l-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(1). While not binding on our Court, a certification by the trial court is “accorded great deference.” First Atl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 247, 507 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1998).
I would hold that when the attorney-client privilege is asserted, the assertion is not otherwise frivolous or insubstantial, and the trial court has certified the issue, the challenged order affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable. I address the merits of the appeal.
II. Issues
Caveators contend that the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel the testimony of Rountree and quashing the subpoena and argue that the testimony (1) falls within the testamentary exception to the attorney-client privilege and (2) does not concern confidential communications.
III. Testamentary Exception
“[I]t is well established that orders regarding discovery matters are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be upset on appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion.” Evans, 142 N.C. App. at 27, 541 S.E.2d at 788. A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an error of law.
At oral argument, caveators limited the scope of discovery to questions of Mr. Rountree regarding conversations at or near the time *265of the termination of the legal relationship between Mr. Rountree and the decedent. These questions are highly “relevant” and “material” to the issue of propounder’s alleged undue influence over the decedent. The evidence shows that propounder took decedent to a new attorney who drafted the will at issue. That new will contains provisions markedly more favorable to propounder and inconsistent with multiple prior wills drawn by Mr. Rountree, decedent’s long-time personal and business attorney. Caveators stated they no longer sought conversations surrounding the creation of the prior wills. The prior wills prepared by Mr. Rountree were provided to caveators, speak for themselves, and are admissible at trial. In re Will of Hall, 252 N.C. 70, 113 S.E.2d 1 (1960).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications.” Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 141 L. Ed. 2d 379, 384 (1998). The attorney-client privilege survives not only the end of the legal relationship between the attorney and his client but also the death of his client. Id. However, long recognized exceptions exist to the survival of the privilege after death. One such exception is the “testamentary exception.” Id. at 404, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 385.
The testamentary exception was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 41 L. Ed. 760 (1897). In Glover, the Court held:
[I]n a suit between devisees under a will, statements made by the deceased to counsel respecting the execution of the will, or other similar document, are not privileged. While such communications might be privileged, if offered by third persons to establish claims against an estate, they are not within the reason of the rule requiring their exclusion, when the contest is between the heirs or next of kin.
165 U.S. at 406, 41 L. Ed. at 767. The Supreme Court cited an earlier case which held that “a solicitor, by whom the will was drawn, should be allowed to testify what was said by the testator contemporaneously upon the subject.” Id. at 407, 41 L. Ed. at 767 (citing Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387, 392).
The Supreme Court restated the holding of Glover in Swidler & Berlin by explaining that “testamentary disclosure was permissible because the privilege, which normally protects the client’s interests, *266could be impliedly waived in order to fulfill the client’s testamentary intent.” Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 405, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 385. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) long ago stated “where the controversy is between claimants to the estate, both parties claiming as successors to the deceased client, neither can set up a claim of privilege against the other.” ABA Comm, on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 91 (8 March 1933).
North Carolina has recognized the testamentary exception to the common law rule that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client. In In re Will of Kemp, 236 N.C. 680, 73 S.E.2d 906 (1953), our Supreme Court stated:
“it is generally considered that the rule of privilege does not apply in litigation, after the client’s death, between parties, all of whom claim under the client; and so, where the controversy is to determine who shall take by succession the property of a deceased person and both parties claim under him, neither can set up a claim of privilege against the other as regards the communications of deceased with his attorney.”
236 N.C. at 684, 73 S.E.2d at 910 (quoting 70 C.J., Witnesses, § 587). In R.P.C. 206 (14 April 1995), the ABA ethics committee restated the reasons for the testamentary exception: “It is assumed that a client impliedly authorized the release of confidential information ... in order that the estate might be properly and thoroughly administered.”
Previous cases have allowed the testamentary exception only to the attorney who drafted the will propounded concerning confidential communications about the will. See e.g., In re Will of Kemp, supra.; RPC 206 (14 April 1995). Precedent recognizes that the testamentary exception may extend beyond the will in probate to “other similar documents].” Glover, 165 U.S. at 406, 41 L. Ed. at 767.
This caveat proceeding is limited to heirs and next of kin, all of whom claim through the decedent. The exception exists to ensure decedent’s estate is “properly and thoroughly administered.” RPC 206 (14 April 1995). None of the heirs is able to assert the privilege against the other.
IV. Other Confidential Communications
Although the heirs of the decedent may not assert the decedent’s privilege against each other, propounder, as well as decedent’s cor*267poration, were also clients of Mr. Rountree. Both the propounder and the corporation may waive or assert the attorney-client privilege regarding any confidential communications between them and Mr. Rountree. Caveators are free to question Mr. Rountree regarding his conversations with the decedent which occurred outside of or after termination of the attorney-client relationship.
V. Conclusion
The trial court did not state any other reason, such as “relevancy” or “materiality,” to support its denial of the motion to compel and to quash Mr. Rountree’s subpoena. The trial court erred by denying the motion to compel and quashing the subpoena based on the pro-pounder’s assertion of decedent’s attorney-client privilege. I would reverse and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. I respectfully dissent.