concurring in the result.
I do not think that Taylor’s assignment of error properly raises for appellate review the issues relating to separation of powers and executive privilege. Hence, I cannot agree with the rationale employed by Justice Lacy in declaring that the Governor’s monthly billings for telephone service are exempt from disclosure because “a legislatively imposed disclosure requirement would constitute a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.”
I do concur, however, in the result Justice Lacy reaches. I think that under the rule requiring the courts to give statutory language its “plain meaning,” School Board v. State Board of Education, 219 Va. 244, 250, 247 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1978), the monthly billings at issue here are “[mjemoranda . . . held ... by the office of the Governor” and thus exempt from disclosure under Code § 2.1-342(B)(4). Accordingly, I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the petition for writ of mandamus dismissed.
JUSTICE HASSELL, with whom JUSTICE STEPHENSON and JUSTICE WHITING join, dissenting.
This Court has an obligation to apply its procedural rules impartially and uniformly to all litigants. Uniform application of procedural rules, regardless of the status of the litigant who appears before the bar of this Court, is an indispensable component of justice. I dissent because the plurality ignores this Court’s procedural rules and precedent and decides a constitutional issue that a majority of the Justices of this Court believe is not properly before this Court.* Furthermore, the words of Mr. Justice Oliver Holmes are most instructive here:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in *226shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1903) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The plurality opinion holds that the trial court’s application of Code § 2.1-342(B)(4) would place the General Assembly in violation of the separation of powers doctrine contained in Article I, § 5 of the Constitution of Virginia. The plurality should not have considered this issue because Taylor failed to raise this issue by proper assignment of error. Taylor’s sole assignment of error states:
The trial court erred in concluding that the itemized long-distance telephone bills of the Governor’s office are not ‘[mjemoranda, working papers [or] correspondence held or requested by’ that office, exempt from public disclosure under § 2.1-342(B)(4).
Likewise, Taylor’s Question Presented states:
Did the General Assembly intend itemized long-distance telephone bills of the Governor’s office, showing the date, time, place and telephone number called from each extension in the office, to be subject to disclosure under the Act, or are such records protected from disclosure pursuant to § 2.1-342(B)(4) of the Act, which exempts ‘[mjemoranda, working papers and correspondence held or requested by’ the Governor’s office?
Rule 5:17(c) of our Rules states, in part:
The petition for appeal shall contain assignments of error ... . Only errors assigned in the petition for appeal will be noticed by this Court.
*227Litigants are required to identify with some degree of specificity the error committed by the trial court. We have adhered to this mandatory rule with good reason.
The purpose of assignments of error is to point out the errors with reasonable certainty in order to direct this court and opposing counsel to the points on which appellant intends to ask a reversal of the judgment, and to limit discussion to these points. Without such assignments, appellee would be unable to prepare an effective brief in opposition to the granting of an appeal, to determine the material portions of the record to designate for printing, to assure himself of the correctness of the record while it is in the clerk’s office, or to file, in civil cases, assignments of cross-error.
Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 269, 271-72, 77 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1953).
Stated differently, the requirement for the assignment of error enables this Court and counsel to determine the precise issues upon which petitioner’s counsel relies in seeking a reversal of the judgment or decree of the trial court and to limit the discussions on appeal to those issues. Harlow, supra; Omohundro v. County of Arlington, 194 Va. 773, 778, 75 S.E.2d 496, 499 (1953); Hall v. Hall, 192 Va. 721, 725-26, 66 S.E.2d 595, 598 (1951); Avery v. County School Board, 192 Va. 329, 332, 64 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1951); Skeens v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 200, 204, 64 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1951); Puckett v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 574, 579, 113 S.E. 853, 854 (1922); Belmont v. McAllister, 116 Va. 285, 290, 81 S.E. 81, 83 (1914); see also Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. v. Bondurant, 107 Va. 515, 526, 59 S.E. 1091, 1095 (1907); First Nat. Bank of Richmond v. William R. Trigg Co., 106 Va. 327, 56 S.E. 158 (1907), writ of error dismissed, 218 U.S. 693 (1910). As we stated in Trigg Co., 106 Va. at 342, 56 S.E. at 163, counsel must “lay his finger on the error” and, as we added in Loughran v. Kincheloe, 160 Va. 292, 298, 168 S.E. 362, 364 (1933), we must decline invitations to “delve into the record and winnow the chaff from the wheat.”
We have consistently declined to consider issues raised on appeal which were not properly preserved by the assignment of error. For example, in Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, 239 Va. 572, 579 n.l, 391 S.E.2d 322, 326 n.l (1990), we refused to con*228sider an appellant’s contention on appeal that the trial court should have resolved an issue of agency as a matter of law because error was not assigned to the court’s submission of that issue to the jury. Likewise, in Glens Falls Insurance Company v. Stephenson, 235 Va. 420, 423 n.3, 367 S.E.2d 722, 724 n.3 (1988), we refused to consider whether an alleged breach of an insurance contract had occurred because the appellant did not assign error to the trial court’s failure to find that the appellee’s breach avoided insurance coverage.
In Philip Morris Inc. v. Emerson, 235 Va. 380, 412, 368 S.E.2d 268, 285-86 (1988), we refused to consider an assignment of error because the assignment of error did not identify the alleged error with the required reasonable certainty. Philip Morris assigned as error that “the court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Philip Morris was actively negligent and was therefore not permitted to recover indemnification from Texaco, A-Line and Environmental.” Id. at 412, 368 S.E.2d at 285. The trial court held:
The contractual indemnity claim of Philip Morris against ALine and Environmental fails for lack of specificity in their written agreements .... The language in the contracts between Philip Morris and A-Line and Environmental lack such specific language and accordingly cannot properly be construed to impose a requirement of indemnification upon A-Line and Environmental for the negligence of Philip Morris.
Id. We held that Philip Morris’ assignment of error did not refer to any allegedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in construing the contract, but rather Philip Morris’ complaint was of an erroneous holding that it could not recover indemnification because it was actively negligent as a matter of law. Id. at 412, 368 S.E.2d at 285-86. In Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 134 n.l, 295 S.E.2d 643, 645 n.l (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983), rehearing denied, 461 U.S. 940 (1983), an appeal from a capital murder conviction, we refused to consider an issue argued on brief because it was neither properly preserved in the trial court nor raised by an assignment of error in this Court.
An examination of the record in this case reveals that Taylor’s separation of powers and executive privilege arguments were not seriously pursued by Taylor in the trial court or properly raised by *229assignment of error. The only responsive pleading that Taylor filed in the trial court was a motion to dismiss. The motion does not contain any allegations which relate to separation of powers or executive privilege. This case was litigated in the trial court solely on the basis of whether the exemption in Code § 2.1-342(B)(4) was applicable, as evidenced by statements Taylor’s counsel made to the trial court:
Your Honor, I am Roger Wiley, and I am appearing on behalf of Richard Taylor, special assistant to the Governor, who is the named defendant in this case and we have stipulated that he is, in fact, the custodian of the records that are being sought.
As Mr. Kohler [appellee’s counsel] has told the court, the sole issue in the case is whether these itemized telephone bill listings come within the exception in the Freedom of Information Act for memoranda, correspondence, and working papers of the Governor’s office.
The trial court’s final order did not decide any issues relating to separation of powers or executive privilege. Taylor’s counsel did not request the court to include a ruling on these issues in the final order. Taylor did not object to the entry of the final order on the basis that the order failed to address the separation of powers and executive privilege issues. Taylor concedes in his brief filed with this Court that “[b]oth parties agree that if the § 2.1-342(B) (4) exemption does not apply, the records must be produced and, conversely, that if it does apply, the Governor’s office (acting through Taylor) may refuse to produce the itemized bills.”
It is true that counsel for Taylor alluded to the separation of powers issue in three paragraphs of a nine-page trial memorandum. That issue, however, had not been raised by responsive pleading and was never seriously pursued by Taylor’s counsel. Indeed, during oral argument in the trial court his only comment on the subject was, “I think the separation of powers does come into play at some point.” Significantly, the trial memorandum completely fails to mention any argument about executive privilege.
The plurality, without explanation, ignores established precedent and reaches a constitutional question that is not properly before this Court.
*230The Virginia Freedom of Information Act was enacted by the Virginia General Assembly in 1968. The policy underlying the Act is set forth in Code § 2.1-340.1 A:
It is the purpose of the General Assembly by providing this chapter to ensure to the people of this Commonwealth ready access to records in the custody of public officials and free entry to meetings of public bodies wherein the business of the people is being conducted. This chapter recognizes that the affairs of government are not intended to be conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy since at all times the public is to be the beneficiary of any action taken at any level of government. To the end that the purposes of this chapter may be realized, it shall be liberally construed to promote an increased awareness by all persons of governmental activities and afford every opportunity to citizens to witness the operations of government. Any exception or exemption from applicability shall be narrowly construed in order that no thing which should be public may be hidden from any person.
(emphasis added). We have consistently held that the Act shall be liberally construed to enable citizens to observe the operations of government and that exemptions shall be narrowly construed. City of Danville v. Laird, 223 Va. 271, 276, 288 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1982); Marsh v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 223 Va. 245, 255, 288 S.E.2d 415, 420 (1982). In 1989, the General Assembly amended the Act and thus codified our previous holdings that the Act shall be liberally construed.
This chapter shall be liberally construed to promote an increased awareness by all persons of governmental activities and afford every opportunity to citizens to witness the operations of government. Any exception or exemption from applicability shall be narrowly construed in order that no thing which should be public may be hidden from any person.
Code § 2.1-340.IB.
The Freedom of Information Act contains numerous exemptions. Included are those defined in Code § 2.1-342(B)(4) which states, in part:
*231The following records are excluded from the provisions of this chapter:
(4) Memoranda, working papers and correspondence held or requested by . . . the office of the Governor.
Memorandum is defined as:
An informal record, note or instrument embodying something that the parties desire to fix in memory by the aid of written evidence, or that is to serve as the basis of a future formal contract or deed. A brief written statement outlining the terms of an agreement or transaction. Informal interoffice communication.
Black’s Law Dictionary 984 (6th ed. 1990). Because we must narrowly construe the exemption and liberally construe the Act to enable citizens to observe the operations of government, I would hold that the telephone bills do not constitute memoranda.
The General Assembly has acquiesced in this narrow definition of memorandum as used in the exemption contained in Code § 2.1-342(B)(4). In 1976, the Attorney General of Virginia was asked by a member of the General Assembly to opine whether the disclosure of records of telephone calls charged to the Commonwealth on credit cards issued to members of the General Assembly are exempt from disclosure because of Code § 2.1-342(B) (4). The telephone records specified the telephone number to which charges were made, the date the telephone call was placed, the place called, including the telephone number and place from which the call was made, the telephone number called, and the charges for each call. The Attorney General concluded:
In considering the applicability of this specific exception I am governed by the provisions of § 2.1-340.1 which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
. . To the end that the purposes of this chapter may be realized, it shall be liberally construed to promote an increased awareness by all persons of governmental activities and afford every opportunity to citizens to witness the operations of government. Any exception or exemption from applicability [of the Act] *232shall be narrowly construed in order that no thing which should be public may be hidden from any person.’
Construing § 2.1-342(B)(4) pursuant to this direction, I cannot conclude that the telephone records fall within the purview of memoranda, working papers or correspondence held by legislative members. Indeed, I find no exemption from the Act which would be applicable. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the records in question are not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act.
Op. Att’y Gen. 311-12 (1976-77).
I quote this opinion of the Attorney General not as controlling authority but rather solely as an aid in ascertaining whether the General Assembly acquiesced in this opinion.
Without question, the General Assembly was well aware that the Attorney General had opined that itemized telephone bills do not fall within the scope of the exemption contained in Code § 2.1-342(B)(4). Even though the General Assembly has been aware of the Attorney General’s interpretation for 15 years, it has taken no action to correct or change that interpretation.
We have repeatedly held, without exception, that the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of statutes and that the General Assembly’s failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s interpretation. Browning-Ferris v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161, 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983); Deal v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 618, 622, 299 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1983); see Albemarle County v. Marshall, Clerk, 215 Va. 756, 762, 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975) (acquiescence for period of seven years).
The plurality, in its opinion, does not discuss whether the Governor’s telephone bills constitute memoranda and are, thus, exempt from disclosure. However, this Court does not decide constitutional issues if an appeal can be adjudicated on a statutory or common law basis. “One of the most firmly established doctrines in the field of constitutional law is that a court will pass upon the constitutionality of a statute only when it is necessary to the determination of the merits of the case.” Bissell v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 397, 400, 100 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1957) (citations omitted). *233Thus, applying this fundamental precept, even the plurality must agree that the Governor’s telephone bills do not constitute memoranda and that the exemption is not applicable.
The concurring opinion erroneously concludes that the telephone bills constitute memoranda and, thus, are exempt from disclosure by Code § 2.1-342(B)(4). The concurrence, just as the plurality, ignores this Court’s established precedent. Just as significant, the concurrence does not explain why it chose to ignore this Court’s prior decisions. For example, the concurring opinion ignores our decisions which require that we liberally construe the Act and narrowly construe exceptions to the Act. The concurring opinion ignores the plain language of the Act which requires that this Court narrowly construe the exemptions contained in the Act. Finally, the concurrence ignores established precedent related to our principles regarding legislative acquiescence in opinions of the Attorney General.
Unlike the plurality and the concurrence, I believe that this Court is required to follow its established precedent until such precedent is overruled. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Chief Justice Carrico and Justices Stephenson, Whiting and Hassell do not believe that the constitutional issue was preserved by proper assignment of error.