dissenting.
The majority correctly notes that, in juvenile proceedings, “the standard of proof on charges of a criminal nature is the same as that used in criminal proceedings against adults — proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cits.]” M. W. W. v. State of Ga., 136 Ga. App. 472, 474 (221 SE2d 669) (1975). In my opinion, however, the majority errs in holding that this standard was met in the two instant cases. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
As against J. T. M., there is no direct evidence that he ever entered or attempted to move the victim’s car. Stripped of its verbiage, the evidence cited by the majority would only authorize a finding that J. T. M. was seen knocking on the door to the victim’s house on the afternoon that an otherwise unidentified perpetrator may have attempted to steal the car. However, J. T. M. was a friend and classmate of the victim, so his presence at the scene was not necessarily suspicious. In fact, he himself freely acknowledged that he had gone to the house to invite the victim to play basketball. Moreover, even if J. T. M. had had no reasonable explanation for his visit to the victim’s house, “‘[presence at the scene of a crime and nothing more will not support a conviction.’ [Cit.]” M. W. W. v. State of Ga., supra at 475.
There is a dispute in the evidence as to the time that J. T. M. was present at the victim’s house. However, there is no dispute that his mere presence at the victim’s house is the only evidence purporting to authorize the finding of his delinquency. The contention that the evidence also showed that J. T. M. had obtained possession of a set of keys to the victim’s car some weeks before the apparent theft is without merit. His purported prior possession of the keys to the victim’s car is based upon nothing more than rank speculation and conjecture and there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would support such a finding. “A bare suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is not sufficient. [Cit.]” Diggs v. State, 90 Ga. App. 853, 857 (1) (84 SE2d 611) (1954). “Circumstances which would authorize a bare conjecture of guilt are not in any case sufficient to warrant a conviction.” Hammond v. State, 15 Ga. App. 471, 473 (83 SE 860) (1914). In the absence of any probative evidence that J. T. M. did anything other than knock on the victim’s door shortly before the automobile was *640discovered some distance down the driveway, his adjudication of delinquency for attempting to steal the automobile should not be allowed to stand. “Construing the evidence most strongly against the accused, a bare suspicion of his guilt may arise therefrom. Suspicion is not evidence, and a verdict based alone on suspicion is unauthorized by law.” Williams v. State, 13 Ga. App. 685 (79 SE 763) (1913).
Decided July 3, 1991 Reconsideration denied July 25, 1991 John P. Partin, for appellants. Douglas C. Pullen, District Attorney, Edward F. Berry, Assistant District Attorney, Andrew Prather II, Solicitor, Melvin E. Cooper, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.The case against M. B. J. is even weaker than that against J. T. M. The only purported evidence as against him is his own acknowledgment that he had accompanied J. T. M. to the house for the purpose of extending an invitation to the victim to play basketball. Accordingly, even if the evidence had authorized a finding of J. T. M.’s delinquency, the adjudication of M. B. J.’s delinquency would nevertheless have to be reversed. Smith v. State, 188 Ga. App. 415, 416 (1) (373 SE2d 97) (1988).
Every presumption and every inference to be drawn from the evidence is in favor of the juvenile court’s adjudication of appellants’ delinquency. However, an appellate court is not authorized to presume from the juvenile court’s adjudications of appellants’ delinquency that sufficient evidence in support thereof must necessarily exist. Construing the evidence most strongly against appellants, they were present at the victim’s house shortly before the victim’s mother discovered that the victim’s car was no longer parked in the carport. In my opinion, such evidence, no matter how suspicious, was not sufficient to authorize a finding of appellants’ delinquency for committing an attempted theft of the victim’s car before they were observed knocking on the door to the victim’s house. Presumably, the juvenile court and a majority of this court is of the opinion that appellants’ “suspicious” presence at the victim’s house would authorize a finding that they were necessarily responsible for any and every otherwise unexplained occurrence at the victim’s house which may have been discovered after their departure from the premises. I cannot subscribe to that analysis and must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Sognier, Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Cooper join in this dissent.