dissenting.
In the present case, I respectfully dissent from the majority because I conclude that although the initial approach of Trooper Ralston to the vehicle and his subsequent inquiry as to the appellant’s well-being did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, once the trooper ascertained that the appellant was physically well, the events following that initial questioning — the trooper’s request for and retention of appellant’s driver’s license and vehicle registration without indicating that appellant could request their return; the trooper’s involvement of the deputy trooper in the investigation; the repositioning of the patrol car perpendicular to appellant’s vehicle — “transformed what may have been a consensual exchange into a situation in which ‘ “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” ’ [Cit.] These combined actions by the trooper went well beyond what an average citizen would expect from a vehicle ‘safety check.’ ” United States v. Jefferson, 906 F2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1990). *835See also Schmidt v. State, 188 Ga. App. 85, 87 (372 SE2d 440) (1988). I reject the majority’s contention that appellant’s compliance with the trooper’s request for his driver’s license and vehicle registration was a gesture of voluntary cooperation. The transcript is void of any testimony which would suggest that Trooper Ralston offered the appellant the opportunity to cooperate before the trooper began his investigation. Therefore, I conclude that appellant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the trooper, after ascertaining the well-being of appellant, continued investigatory contact with appellant by requesting appellant’s driver’s license and vehicle registration.
Having determined that a seizure of appellant occurred, I further conclude that the seizure was not “justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. [Cits.]” Evans v. State, 183 Ga. App. 436 (2) (359 SE2d 174) (1987). The only basis presented at the suppression hearing for Trooper Ralston’s decision to request identification from appellant and investigate further the ownership of the vehicle, was the trooper’s belief that appellant manifested signs of nervousness, one of the general characteristics of a drug trafficker. I can find no testimony in the record which would provide an objective basis for Trooper Ralston’s belief that the vehicle in which appellant was traveling was stolen or that appellant was engaged in other unlawful activity. The majority states that upon determining that the vehicle was not registered to appellant, Trooper Ralston had articulated a reasonable suspicion to investigate further. However, I feel that the seizure occurred at the time Trooper Ralston requested appellant’s driver’s license and registration, and therefore the reasonableness of that seizure must be determined by the information the trooper possessed at that time. That Trooper Ralston may have developed an articulable suspicion after the initial seizure is merely an “exploitation” of the illegality. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (83 SC 407, 9 LE2d 441) (1963). Under the circumstances present here, I determine that there was an insufficient factual or evidentiary basis to give rise to probable cause or an articulable suspicion to justify the seizure of appellant. See Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853, 855 (363 SE2d 63) (1987); DiSanti v. State, supra at 334.
Mallarino v. State, 190 Ga. App. 398 (379 SE2d 210) (1989), cited by the majority is distinguishable from the present case because that case involved a stop incident to a traffic violation. This court concluded in Mallarino that Trooper Ralston’s decision to detain the defendant was justified because the defendant had been driving in excess of the speed limit on the interstate, and the trooper was clearly authorized to investigate the traffic violation. My review of other decisions by this court which uphold detentions by Trooper Ralston, reveals that in each case, this court affirmed the trooper’s decision to *836seize the defendant because each seizure was incident to the investigation of an alleged traffic violation. See, e.g., Lombardo v. State, 187 Ga. App. 440 (370 SE2d 503) (1988) (speeding); Partridge v. State, 187 Ga. App. 325 (370 SE2d 173) (1988) (speeding); Spencer v. State, 186 Ga. App. 54 (366 SE2d 390) (1988) (weaving); Whisnant v. State, 185 Ga. App. 51 (363 SE2d 341) (1987) (speeding); Steward v. State, 182 Ga. App. 659 (356 SE2d 890) (1987) (speeding).
Decided July 16, 1991 Reconsideration denied July 31, 1991 Cook & Palmour, Bobby Lee Cook, Bailey & Bearden, J. Lane Bearden, for appellant. Darrell E. Wilson, District Attorney, for appellee.Further, I agree with appellant’s contention that his voluntary consent to the search of the vehicle was tainted by the illegal stop and detention. “[I]n order to eliminate any taint from an involuntary seizure or arrest, there must be proof both that the consent was voluntary and that it was not the product of the illegal detention. Proof of a voluntary consent alone is not sufficient. The relevant factors include the temporal proximity of an illegal seizure and consent, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. [Cits.]” Brown v. State, 188 Ga. App. 184, 187 (372 SE2d 514) (1988).
I find that there was not a significant lapse of time between the unlawful detention and the appellant’s consent (approximately 23 minutes), that no intervening circumstances, dissipated the effect of the unlawful detention (although his driver’s license and the vehicle registration were returned to appellant after he came back from his trip to the rest room, appellant was never told that he was free to leave), and that Trooper Ralston’s conduct had no arguable legal basis. Accord Tarwid v. State, supra at 856; Brown v. State, supra at 187. Compare, Donner v. State, 191 Ga. App. 58 (380 SE2d 732) (1989), where the taint of a questionable detention was attenuated by the defendant’s voluntary decision to remain in the rest area for one hour and ten minutes after he was told that he was free to go. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s opinion. I conclude instead that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Sognier and Judge Carley join in this dissent.