(dissenting). We dissent to the majority opinion and to this disposition of the matter as being futile and useless as well as providing for, if not requiring, a vain and worthless thing, all at public expense and therefore constituting a waste of public funds of the state, and of the city of Sand Springs.
We respect the right of the majority to their view, but to us the record demonstrates there is no good reason for the promulgating of this majority opinion, or for the holding of a referendum election in Sand Springs, all with the attending expenditures of money necessarily entailed.
As supporting our dissenting view we point out the following details: The purpose of this referendum petition was to presently suspend, and to ultimately repeal, veto or invalidate city ordinance 6B providing for parking meters in the city of Sand Springs. The power reserved and to be exercised by the people in the referendum is the veto power, and nothing else. It is so stated in the law. 34 O.S. 1941 §1. When voting on the question whether to exercise the veto power, no law can be thereby enacted or re-enacted, no repealed law can be re-activated. If, pending consideration by this veto power, the legislation is fully repealed and nothing other or further is adopted, there exists nothing for the people to veto in referendum.
From the filing of this referendum petition in August or September, 1946, the ordinance was treated as suspended and wholly inoperative. Though the city clerk found the referendum petition to be insufficient and an appeal was purportedly lodged in this court, no one appeared to prosecute the appeal or proceed with a hearing until late in 1949. This inaction possibly resulted from the fact that ordinance 6B remained in a state of dormancy, or of suspended animation, "with no effort to enforce it and perhaps no desire to do so.
At any rate, an appearance was finally made in behalf of the proponents of the referendum petition and same was set .for a hearing before the referee. Thereupon it appeared and was observed that in August, 1949, the then board of commissioners of the city, evidently recognizing the public sentiment, had fully repealed ordinance 6B which had theretofore been the subject, of this referendum petition. And a mo*306tion to dismiss the purported appeal to this court w;as filed.
The referee was without authority to pass upon the motion and to order the dismissal, and he sought to proceed with the hearing of evidence as his assignment directed. But the city knew the objectionable ordinance had already been repealed, and of course lost interest in the referendum petition which the city clerk had found to be insufficient on his hearing of both sides of the matter. There was no reason to go to the expense of presenting evidence against the sufficiency of the petition. No such evidence was presented and there was nothing for the referee to do but find the petition was sufficient numerically, so far as that was concerned. This he did and submitted to the court the motion to dismiss, and his fact finding, all for proper action by the court.
We ought to dismiss the appeal. Perhaps it should have been dismissed as abandoned when the appellants and proponents let it lie dormant through nearly three years without appearance or prosecution in any manner. But we ought to dismiss it now because the thing it attacks, Ordinance 6B, is long since repealed, extinct, and is no more.
There was reason in the abandonment of protest proof after the motion to dismiss had pointed out the repealing ordinance of August, 1949. Those representing the city could find no further interest in the referendum petition. They knew that if an election should be held on the petition, whether the petition was legally sufficient or not, if the people should vote to repeal or veto Ordinance 6B, it would be no better repealed or invalidated than it was in August, 1949. They also knew if the people should vote against repealing 6B, that ordinance would not thereby be re-enacted. It could not be possible to convert this referendum proceeding into a proceeding for the initiation of a law. Too many requirements for the initiating of a measure to be adopted by the people are wholly absent from a proceeding in referendum.
However, the majority have decided the motion to dismiss should be denied, the opinion should be promulgated and published, the Sand Springs City election perhaps must be held, etc. But no good can be done by it. Nothing can be accomplished. Could the voters reenact this repealed ordinance by voting at this election not to repeal or to veto it? Surely the majority do not so hold. They have not said so. Could the voters at this election repeal Ordinance 6B already repealed since August, 1949? If they did, what would be accomplished thereby? The answer is nothing, and so we dissent.
We will say, however, the proceeding should be dismissed. The result then would be that the objectionable ordinance would remain repealed, much needless expense would be saved, the people would be spared the confusion at voting in such a useless election, after all they set out to accomplish by the election has already effectively come to pass. No explainable reason whatever can be given for voting in such election, no reason why a citizen should vote one way or the other, no reason why he should vote at all.
We observe the authorities holding that, pending referendum, those in authority may not repeal the ordinance and re-enact the law, thereby circumventing and defeating the referendum right. But no case is cited holding they cannot repeal outright. That does not defeat referendum. That grants everything sought by the referendum, and that too without the delay or expense of a referendum election.
For that matter, we do not yet know whether the referendum petition here is legally sufficient or not, and we never will know. Upon trial the city' clerk found it was not. Here, for lack of contrary proof, the referee assumed it was sufficient and so held. Apparently the *307majority opinion finds likewise, though still without proof. However, that really makes no difference here, for whether we have an election on a deficient petition, or an election on no petition at all, or no election at all, the result will be identical as to old Ordinance 6B now expressly repealed for nearly a year. Once it was an odious law, at least to those who attacked it by referendum petition, and it never was vigorously defended by anyone. Now for a year it has been wholly extinct. Why belabor it further with a so-called referendum election.
We dissent.