(dissenting): I find myself unable to concur with the majority opinion in this case and I dissent therefrom for the following reasons:
At the outset I feel that the case before us is distinguishable from Bedenbender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 531, 280 P. 2d 630, for the reason that the facts, contracts of payment, and the status of the proceedings are different. In the Bedenbender case, supra, the trip had just begun, there was no definite amount of payment nor one alleged or proved that was ascertainable. Thus, in that case, the contract for payment could not have been enforced while here the trip for all practical purposes had been completed and the contract could *201have been enforced by the driver because a definite amount for transportation was alleged in the petition.
This brings us to the status of the proceedings. In the Bedenbender case the appeal was from a ruling of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to the evidence. The case here under consideration was appealed because of a ruling of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to a petition. The pleadings and proof in the Bedenbender case show that the one and only cause for the trip was a common social venture purely for pleasure. In the present case the parties were delegates of a fraternal organization to a convention held in Topeka. I cannot agree that under such facts the sole and only purpose, cause, or motivating influence for the trip or transportation was social or pleasure. The status of a person riding in a car depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Decisions of other jurisdictions, while not conclusive, are somewhat helpful since other states have statutes similar to ours. This is especially true of the state of California from which jurisdiction appellant cited several cases. See Druzanich v. Criley, 19 C. 2d 439, 122 P. 2d 53, 115 P. 2d 810 and 107 P. 2d 445; Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 C. 2d 428, 122 P. 2d 47, 115 P. 2d 814; Whitmore v. French, 37 C. 2d 744, 235 P. 2d 3; Harris v. Harfmann, 113 C. A. 2d 615, 248 P. 2d 501. Whether a person is a “guest” when riding with another sometimes resolves itself into a question of fact for the jury or the trial court to determine,. (5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, § 239, p. 634.) I hesitate to enlarge the “guest statute” to the extent that whenever the driver is a friend of the party riding with him there is a community of interest which may be in part social or pleasure and the rider is a “guest” irrespective of compensation to or benefit derived by the driver as a result of the transportation. (60 C. J. S., Motor Vehicles, §399 [5].) Without laboring the matter further, I think the opinion in the Bedenbender case is sound under the facts and circumstances therein contained, but those same facts and circumstances are not here involved. I believe the judgment and order of the trial court sustaining the demurrer to the petition should be reversed.