(dissenting):
I would readily join in the issuance of an injunctive decree removing and prohibiting every vestige of racially discriminatory or other unconstitutional application of Alabama’s poll tax laws, but I cannot join in the opinions of the majority. In my view it is unusual, to say the least, for a district court to declare constitutional and statutory provisions of a state invalid when the last pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the subject holds to the contrary. The impropriety of the action of the majority is brought into sharper focus by the fact that substantially identical issues were submitted to the Supreme Court in the case of Harper v. Virginia State Board *109of Elections1 approximately three weeks before this case was submitted to this district court. I am aware of the statute requiring speedy consideration of poll tax cases.2 It is assumed that the Supreme Court feels the same urgency and attaches the same importance to the litigation as does this district court.
The Harper case now pending before the Supreme Court involves an annual poll tax in the amount of $1.50 in non-federal elections imposed by the laws of Virginia. Arguments presented to the Supreme Court were similar to those presented to this Court. See 34 U.S. L.Week 3261 (February 1, 1966). The principle of judicial restraint dictates that we await the action of the Supreme Court.
The poll tax has never been declared invalid by the Supreme Court. It has uniformly been considered that the case of Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 58 S.Ct. 205, 82 L.Ed. 252 (1937) is the final word to-date on the question of the validity of state imposed poll taxes in non-federal elections. 3 ****As succinctly stated by the three judge district court of Virginia when the Harper case was before it:
“Notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ impoverishment and eligibility to vote, their denunciation of the State constitutional and statutory poll tax requirements has been squarely refuted by the Supreme Court in Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283, 58 S.Ct. 205, 82 L.Ed. 252 (1937). We are not at liberty to deviate from that precept. There the Court considered arguments akin to those of the plaintiffs here, including the economic factor, and rejected them.”
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 240 F.Supp. 270, 271 (1964).
When Harper was argued before the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Clark posed the following question:
Mr. Justice Clark: “What do you do with the Breedlove case?”
Counsel for the appellant Harper replied:
“Breedlove has lost all meaning and significance in light of recent decisions of this Court. Breedlove should be overruled.” (Emphasis added)
Mr. Justice White asked substantially the same question of the Solicitor General of the United States:
Mr. Justice White: “What about Breedlove?”
The Solicitor General is reported to have responded to the effect that the Breed-love case was contra to the position of the Government. 34 U.S.L.Week 3262. It is obvious that the decision in Breed-love is binding on this Court and is dis-positive of the issues before us. We should follow the decisions of the Supreme Court and not seek to anticipate what future rulings may be, especially in cases involving the validity of a state constitutional provision. Such has always been the law of the Fifth Circuit. Judge Rives, speaking for the Court en banc, succinctly stated the rule in How*110ard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 (1956):
“This Circuit follows the law as stated by the Supreme Court and leaves any need for modification thereof to that Court * *
The Breedlove case reached the Supreme Court by Appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia,4 holding valid the provisions of the Constitution of Georgia and statutes enacted in pursuance thereof requiring the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to the right to register-and vote for candidates seeking the office of President and Members of Congress. The Georgia decision carefully delineates the issues presented. The poll tax was attacked on every possible constitutional ground. Breedlove, the petitioner, alleged that the Georgia poll tax was contrary to and in derogation of the following provisions of the Constitution: (a) The Preamble; (b) Article IV, Section 4, guaranteeing to every state a republican form of government; (c) Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 relating to uniform tax; (d) Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 which prohibits the laying of a capitation or other direct tax unless it is in proportion to the census; (e) Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states; (f) Article VI, Clause 2 declaring the Federal Constitution to be the supreme law of the land; (g) the following provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) the privileges and immunities provision; (2) the due process clause, “and the clause in said amendment which defines the word ‘liberty’ ”; (h) the Fifteenth Amendment establishing and guaranteeing certain rights of citizens without regard to race, color or previous condition of servitude, including the right to vote; (i) the Nineteenth Amendment prohibiting laws denying or abridging the right of citizens to vote on account of sex; (j) the First amendment relating to rights of conscience and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. In addition to all of the foregoing, it was claimed that the poll tax violated the Constitution of the State of Georgia. Both the Georgia Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States rejected all of Breedlove’s contentions and held the tax valid. It is difficult to see how that decision can be termed inapposite, or can be classified as dictum with respect to the issues now before us. There are other cases sustaining the poll tax, but I believe Breed-love to be the nearest in point and that a discussion of other decisions is not necessary. Accordingly, I do not reach the merits of this case for the reasons stated, but it is necessary to refer to the majority opinions which do discuss the merits.
It is not good and proper to delve into the tragic shadows of history following Reconstruction and the reactions it created and use the emotional statements of politicians uttered in public debate over a half century ago in a convention hall to decide the constitutionality of Alabama’s present basic poll tax law adopted in the year 1953 and subsequently amended in the year 1962. There is much in the history of all of the states, and indeed the nation itself, with which we do not agree. It is easy to find statements from the past which do not fit the present. As an example, for those who may be interested, there are statements by Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator, which do not square with present day constitutional concepts. Some statements by Lincoln make some of the statements referred to by delegates to Alabama’s Constitutional Convention appear temperate and mild by comparison. I refrain from quoting such statements because I think they would be misunderstood in the context of this opinion. However, their source is cited for those who may be interested enough to read them. See “The *111Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln” (Basler ed.) Rutger’s University Press (1953), Vol. Ill, page 16 (August 21, 1858), pages 146-7 (September 18, 1858). See also Douglas, “An Almanac of Liberty” (Doubleday 1954), page 29.
Indeed, our own Federal Constitution as originally adopted was infected with the idea of discrimination as evidenced by Article I, Section 2, Clause 3:
“Clause 3. Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.” (Emphasis added)
It was necessary to enact the Fourteenth Amendment to change the mode of apportionment of representatives among the several states, and the Sixteenth Amendment as to taxes on incomes without apportionment.
Unquestionably, some of the delegates to the Alabama Constitutional Convention possessed a motive of discrimination against Negroes, but Alabama too has completely changed its Constitution. It did so by a basic change in 1953. Again, I reiterate what I said in the beginning. Racially discriminatory or other unconstitutional application of Alabama’s poll tax should be enjoined wherever it appears; and this principle applies to the Chief Executive and all the officers and agents of the State with equal force. Nothing herein said is intended to constitute a condonation or approval of any racially discriminatory acts, certainly not the brochure recently distributed by the Chief Executive of this State.
I respectfully dissent.
. The decision of the District Court in Harper is reported in 240 F.Supp. 270 (1964).
. Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973h(c).
‘‘Jurisdiction of three-judge district courts; appeal to Supreme Court
(c) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of sucli actions which shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. It shall be the duty of the judges designated to hear the case to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.”
. The 24th Amendment to the Constitution abolished state imposed poll taxes in federal elections. See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965).
. Breedlove v. Suttles, 183 Ga. 189, 188 S.E. 140 (1936).