In this suit for declaratory relief the U. S. National Bank of Oregon, as trustee, seeks an interpretation of a trust instrument, and a declaration of the rights and liabilities of the trustee and the defendant beneficiaries, who are mother (Marjorie Bell Duling) and daughter (Carol Joyce Duling). The daughter filed a "counterclaim” against the bank and a "crossclaim” against the mother, asserting that each of them was liable to her for one-half of the trust income and principal paid to the mother by the trustee since February 6, 1962, amounting to approximately $88,000, plus interest. The trustee responded by asking for restitution from the mother of any amounts the daughter is determined to be entitled to recover from it. The daughter appeals from the trial court’s judgment and decree denying her claim. We review de novo.
Plaintiff is the trustee under a trust agreement executed in 1948 by Kenneth Duling, husband of Marjorie Bell Duling and father of Carol Joyce, bom February 6,1941. The trust was to be funded with the proceeds of insurance policies on his life.1 By its terms, trust income is payable to the mother for life. On the mother’s death or on the daughter’s 40th birthday, whichever should occur last, the trust terminates and is distributable to the daughter.
The third paragraph of Article X of the trust agreement provides the only exception to payment of all trust income to the mother during her lifetime:
"In the event of the remarriage of the trustor’s wife and after the trustor’s daughter shall have attained the age of twenty-one (21) years, the trustor directs the trustee to pay one-half (1/2) of the income thereafter to the trustor’s wife and the remaining one-half (1/2) to the trustor’s daughter, Carol Duling, *332for the remainder of the lifetime of the trustor’s wife. The trustee shall have the power to pay or apply part or parts of the capital of the trust estate not exceeding $2,400.00 in any one year in equal shares to the trustor’s wife and daughter during this period.”
The dispute in this case centers around the interpretation of this paragraph, and in particular the phrase relating to "remarriage.”
When the trust was executed the Dulings operated a large ranch in Terrebonne, Oregon, consisting of land acquired from his parents as well as by purchase from others. Following Kenneth Duling’s death in 1950, mother and daughter moved to Portland. On April 1, 1960, mother married Arthur Jaffe, at which time daughter was 19 years old, living at home as she had always done, and attending college. Mother notified the trustee of the marriage and asked how this would alter the payment of trust income. The trustee and Mr. Rankin, mother’s attorney, both wrote mother advising her that she would continue to receive all income until daughter reached age 21.
Shortly after receiving those letters, mother separated from Jaffe and began proceedings which culminated in a divorce decree on August 31, 1960. Mother notified the trustee in writing on January 24, 1961, of the divorce and advised the trustee that she had resumed the use of her former name. She testified that she was advised by her attorney that the effect of the divorce before daughter’s 21st birthday was that she would continue to receive all trust income even after daughter became 21. She also testified that Mr. Rankin advised her that he had conveyed his opinion to the trustee. There is no other evidence, documentary or testimonial, that either of those events, in fact, occurred. Mother discussed Mr. Rankin’s opinion with daughter, who accepted it without question. Mother acknowledged that she was aware of her daughter’s acceptance of, and reliance on, what she told her.
*333Daughter attained age 21 on February 6,1962, and mother continued to receive all of the trust income payments. The trustee’s records show that it took no action, other than to make the name changes mentioned above, and made no inquiries with respect to the trust provision in question. It is conceded that the trustee did not follow its normal operating procedures of calendaring a "tickler” memorandum as a reminder to check the file prior to the daughter’s 21st birthday, nor did it ever obtain a legal opinion or seek court guidance as to the effect of the mother’s marriage and divorce on the daughter’s right to income payments when she became 21.
It was not until March, 1976, that daughter was given a copy of the trust instrument by mother’s attorney when daughter agreed to dismiss proceedings to have herself appointed guardian of her mother.2 Shortly after receiving a copy of the agreement, daughter, on September 3,1976, through her attorney, made demand upon the trustee for one-half of the trust distributions, retroactive to February 6, 1962. The bank filed the present suit for declaratory judgment in November, 1976.
The trial court construed the third paragraph of Article X to mean that in order for the daughter to be entitled to receive one-half of the trust income, her mother had to be married at the time the daughter attained age 21. The trial judge concluded, therefore, that because mother divorced her second husband while daughter was still a minor, daughter was not entitled to one-half of the trust income. We agree.
If there were but one sensible interpretation of the provision, there would be nothing to construe (see Raymond v. Lillegard, 35 Or App 225, 580 P2d 1078 (1978)), but such is not the case. All the parties agree that two conditions at least had to occur before daughter would receive one-half of the income: Mother *334must have married and daughter must have attained the age of 21. Also, they agree that in the event the mother married before daughter became 21, mother was entitled to receive the entire income until daughter became 21. Further, if mother had married after daughter’s 21st birthday, daughter would be entitled immediately to begin to receive one-half the income. It is conceded that if mother had divorced her second husband the day after daughter became 21, that divorce would not have disentitled daughter to receive one-half of the trust income and revested mother’s income interest. That much is clear, but there is an ambiguity in the trust instrument as to whether the termination of the Jaffe marriage before the second happening which would divest part of mother’s income interest is relevant in determining whether the stated condition of "remarriage” was fulfilled.
The word "remarriage” carries two connotations. It may mean the act of marrying after having previously been married; it may mean the status of being married after having previously been married. See, e.g., Peters v. Briggs & Sons, 10 Or App 310, 499 P2d 1361 (1972); Minder v. Minder, 83 NJ Super 159, 199 A2d 69 (1964); Lehmann v. Lehmann, 225 Ill App 513 (1922); Peters v. Peters, 214 NW2d 151 (Iowa 1974). In the present situation there is nothing to compel either reading of the word in the provision standing by itself. So, as did the trial judge, we first look to "the four corners” of the trust agreement to determine whether we can glean the settlor’s intent. Morse v. Macrum, 22 Or 229, 233, 29 P 615, 30 P 73 (1892); Fields v. Fields, 139 Or 41, 45, 3 P2d 771, 7 P2d 975 (1932); Unander v. US. National Bank, 224 Or 144, 153, 355 P2d 729 (1960).
We draw the following from the trust instrument:
1. When the trust was executed Mr. Duling lived near the rural community of Terrebonne, but in Crook County; he was married and had one child, a daughter.
*3352. The initial trust corpus consisted of several life insurance policies, totalling a substantial amount in face value in 1948 dollars.
3. The instrument was designed to enable the settlor to have as much of his testamentary estate pass to it as he might desire.
4. He was concerned to provide a secured income to wife in the first instance, and all of the income was to be hers at least until daughter reached 21, even if she entered into a new marriage and even if through a division of income to daughter on the occurrence of marriage could have resulted in advantages (e.g., income taxes) without endangering daughter’s support.3
5. He demonstrated a substantial degree of confidence in wife by expressing his desire that as to any business interests and farm land that should come into the trust the trustee be "guided relative to the management and operation *** by the judgment of the trustor’s wife ***.”
6. He was concerned with the welfare of daughter as a minor and with wife’s "station in life,” and he therefore provided for a limited power to invade principal.
7. He intended to provide at least one-half the income to his wife for her lifetime in all events.
8. He intended, in the event the divesting events never occurred, that wife have all the income for life *336even after daughter was no longer being supported by her.4
9. The happening of a marriage and a divorce during daughter’s minority was not provided for either expressly or by necessary implication.
From the trust instrument itself we cannot reasonably draw an inference that the settlor had any specific intention as to how his trustee should apply the income in the present situation. It seems that the possibility of wife’s marriage and divorce simply never occurred to him. If we turn to the "extrinsic evidence” that was offered, we get no help at all. It would serve no purpose to review that evidence in detail here, for the sum and substance was that neither the trustor nor the scrivener ever considered the possibility of the situation arising.5
3. Nonetheless, we must assign some meaning to the provision, for it is an integral part of the dispositive scheme. Not being able to divine a certain intention when none in fact existed, we must adopt a construction which is most consistent with the overall intention discerned from the other provisions of the trust instrument. Pioneer Trust Co. v. Thielsen, 199 Or 206, 258 P2d 788 (1953). That process leads us to conclude that Mr. Duling’s overriding intention was to provide security for his wife, depending upon her to take care of their child during her minority. If when that minority ended, and if wife was married and would not therefore be solely dependent on the trust and her own property for her livelihood, then the daughter was to begin to receive an assured share without the possible *337intervention of wife’s husband. Absent the existence of that situation, wife was to be the sole direct beneficiary for her life or until she married after the daughter’s attaining her majority. In short, we reach the same conclusion that the trial judge reached.6
Affirmed.
Under his contemporary will the residue, consisting of everything but the family home and furnishings which went to mother, poured over to the trust.
The proceedings were subsequently dismissed.
The trust instrument was executed in June, 1948. Congress created the estate tax marital deduction (now IRC §2056) in the Revenue Act of 1948 (P.L. 471, 80th Cong., Second Session) on April 2, 1948, applicable to estates of persons dying after December 31, 1947. See 1948-1 C.B. 304-306. Nothing in the record bears on the impact of the new deduction on the drafting of either the trust or the will.
No special provision was made for the event of wife’s death during daughter’s minority. The second paragraph of Article X simply specifies the income payments to daughter if mother died before daughter reached 40. Similarly, his contemporary will contains no reference to a guardian for the daughter.
Error is assigned to the admission of testimony by the scrivener, the trustor’s attorney, about what the trustor intended by the provision. We need not decide the issue. The trial judge did not consider the testimony in arriving at his judgment, and we find it of no' assistance except to the extent that it merely confirms our conclusion that neither the settlor nor his attorney ever thought about the problem.
The dissent waxes wroth over a purported excision by the majority of the word "and” from the contested provision. The emotion is passing strange, for it was precisely the presence of that word that caused the author of this opinion to recognize the ambiguity and to appreciate the trial court’s analysis as being correct.