concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Though I concur with the majority with respect to the grant of the interlocutory injunction enjoining the DOT, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion regarding the disqualification issue because I believe that former Attorney General Michael Bowers’ representation of the Garden Club in this matter raises the appearance of impropriety and undermines public trust and confidence in our government officials who are lawyers. Disqualification should occur because representation of the Garden Club by the former Attorney General violates the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia, the doctrine articulated in Crawford W. Long Mem. Hosp. &c. v. Yerby, 258 Ga. 720 (3) (373 SE2d 749) (1988), and because failure to disqualify him diminishes the respect afforded the office of the Attorney General of Georgia.
The representation here of the Garden Club raises the appearance of professional impropriety, which a lawyer should avoid under Canon 9 of the Canon of Ethics of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia. Because the former Attorney General’s current representation of the Garden Club is significantly related to the previous litigation concerning the cutting of trees and vegetation on rights-of-way in which he had substantial responsibility, he should be disqualified. His conduct also violates Ethical Consideration (EC) 9-3 and Directory Rule (DR) 9-101 (B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.
EC 9-3 provides,
After a lawyer leaves judicial office or other public employment, he should not accept employment in connection with any matter in which he had substantial responsibility prior to his leaving, since to accept employment would give the appearance of impropriety even if none exists.
The majority contends disqualification is inappropriate in this case because the present litigation is not the same “matter” that was at issue at the time Bowers was Attorney General. The majority cites language from the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility in interpreting the word “matter” as it appears in EC 9-3 and DR 9-101 (B) in support of this argument.
I do not believe this definition of “matter” excludes Bowers’ work on the rights-of-way litigation during his tenure as Attorney General and his subsequent representation of the Garden Club on the same subject. The ABA describes a “matter” as, “The same issue of fact involving the same parties and the same situation or conduct. . . .” *153At issue in the litigation that ensued during Bowers’ tenure as Attorney General and in the present litigation is the trimming of vegetation and trees on Georgia’s highway rights-of-way in front of private signs. The same parties are involved in both lawsuits. There is not a lack of “discrete identifiable transactions or conduct involving a particular situation and specific parties.” ABA Formal Opinion 342 (1975).
The majority also contends disqualification is inappropriate because the former Attorney General did not have “substantial responsibility” in the Garden Club litigation. I do not agree with the majority’s characterization of his involvement in the Garden Club litigation, which it describes as “perfunctory.” This portrayal deemphasizes the role of the Office of the Attorney General by relegating his status to that of a mere nominal member of the office. The former Attorney General was ultimately accountable for the disposition of the litigation, despite the fact that one of his Assistant Attorneys General was necessarily more intimately involved with the details of the litigation. As stated by the ABA:
[I]t is not necessary that the public employee or official shall have personally or in a substantial manner investigated or passed upon the particular matter, for it is sufficient that he had such a heavy responsibility for the matter in question that it is unlikely he did not become personally and substantially involved in the investigative or deliberative processes regarding that matter. With a responsibility so strong and compelling that he probably became involved in the investigative or decisional processes, a lawyer upon leaving the government service should not represent another in regard to that matter. To do so would be akin to switching sides, might jeopardize confidential government information, and gives the appearance of professional impropriety in that accepting subsequent employment regarding that same matter creates a suspicion that the lawyer conducted his governmental work in a way to facilitate his own future employment in that matter.
Id.
Additionally, disqualification should occur under the doctrine articulated in Crawford W. Long Mem. Hosp. &c. v. Yerby, 258 Ga. 720 (3), which prohibits an attorney from “representing a client against a former client in an action that is of the same general subject matter, and grows out of an event that occurred during the time of such representation.” The majority notes that the present litigation does not arise out of the same general subject matter as the litigation in which the former Attorney General was involved because *154the new legislation was enacted after he left office. However, I believe the new legislation involves the same subject and is very similar to the legislation that was in force when the former Attorney General was in office, rendering the Yerby doctrine applicable to him.
Decided March 6, 2000. Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, David H. Flint, Mark W. Forsling, Groover & Childs, Denmark Groover, Jr., Duke R. Groover, for Outdoor Advertising et al. Meadows, Ichter & Trigg, Mark G. Trigg, Michael J. Bowers, for Garden Club of Georgia. Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Ray O. Lerer, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cathy Cox-Brakefield, Assistant Attorney General, for Shackelford and the Department of Transportation.Finally, I believe disqualification is particularly warranted in this case because of the lofty status and high visibility of the Attorney General, which increases the risk of public cynicism with respect to the integrity of government officials. EC 9-6 states, “Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to . . . strive to avoid not only professional impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety.” The possible negative inferences that can be drawn from the former Attorney General’s participation in this matter include the appearance of “switching sides” and the possibility that confidential governmental information may be used against the government. Id.
For the reasons stated above, I would conclude that the trial court’s denial of the motion to disqualify the former Attorney General constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, I dissent.