The question in this appeal is whether an illegitimate child has a legally cognizable claim as a benefi*717ciary in a wrongful death action brought for the death of her father under the provisions of RCW 4.20.010. Resolution of the question is dependent upon the meaning to be attributed to the words “child or children” as they appear in RCW 4.20.020.
Tomas Telles died on October 20, 1965, as a result of a collision near Wapato, Washington, between his automobile and a tractor driven by respondent Garrett J. Wesselius. On December 7, 1965, Nellie Armijo, administratrix of the Telles’ estate, commenced a wrongful death action against Wesselius. The original complaint named as beneficiaries Telles’ eight children by a former marriage, all of whom are emancipated. A ninth child, Toni Marie Telles, approximately 1 year old, was not named as a beneficiary. In terms of this appeal it is undisputed that Toni Marie is the natural but illegitimate issue of decedent.
Appellant Toni Pacheco, mother of Toni Marie, petitioned for and was granted appointment as guardian ad litem of the child. She thereafter sought and obtained from the probate department of the Yakima County Superior Court an order directing the Telles’ estate administratrix to join Toni Marie as an additional beneficiary in the wrongful death action. The administratrix’s complaint was accordingly amended.1
On November 18, 1966, respondents-Wesselius moved for a summary judgment dismissing Toni Marie as a beneficiary of the wrongful death action because of her illegitimacy. The motion was granted, and this appeal followed.
There is no significant dispute as to any material issue of fact. For purposes of this appeal the parties have agreed that (1) decedent and Toni Pacheco, the child’s mother, lived together as husband and wife both before and after the birth of Toni Marie; (2) decedent paid all of the hospital and medical bills incurred as a result of the birth of the child; (3) until his death, decedent cared for, loved, and *718fully supported Toni Marie and her mother; (4) following the birth of the child, decedent had, on numerous occasions, orally acknowledged his paternity of the child;2 and (5) decedent and appellant, father and mother of Toni Marie, had planned to marry on the Friday following the date on which decedent met his death.
In enumerating the beneficiaries of wrongful death actions, RCW 4.20.020 provides in part as follows:
Every such [wrongful death] action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, child or children of the person whose death shall have been so caused. (Italics ours.)
In essence, we must decide whether the words “child or children” in the preceding statute are qualified sub silentio by the word “legitimate.”
The Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Viet., c. 93, generally referred to as Lord Campbell’s Act, is the germi-nant of all wrongful death statutes. W. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1043 (1965). The first wrongful death statute in Washington Territory appeared in 1854. Civil Practice Act, Terr. Laws of 1854 § 496, at 220. This statute created a cause of action for the “widow, or widow and children, or child or children, if no widow, of a man killed in a duel . . . .” (Italics ours.) The statute has been amended and expanded a number of times since then, but the words “child or children” have never been specifically qualified legislatively as to legitimacy. Furthermore, this court has not previously considered and construed the words “child or children” as used in the wrongful death statute. The issue now before us is thus one of first impression, and may be resolved by adopting what we individually and collectively consider to be the *719most amenable, appealing, and convincing judicial disposition.
In our judgment, the words “child or children” in RCW 4.20.020 should be construed to include illegitimate as well as legitimate children of deceased parents. No overtones of Victorian or other notions of provincial morality have been noted or implied by legislative enactment and revision of the wrongful death act, and it is but commonsense humanity to conclude that a statute which provides the “child or children” of a decedent with a remedy for lost support encompasses all natural or adopted children of the decedent who were dependent upon him regardless of their legitimacy.
Respondents contend, however, that we have in fact previously determined that the words “child or children,” when used in statutes, will be considered to mean “legitimate child or children.” In support of this thesis, a 52-year-old case is cited, Peerless Pac. Co. v. Burckhard, 90 Wash. 221, 155 Pac. 1037 (1916). The Peerless case, however, despite its language, in our view can no longer be said to support such a broad proposition, if in fact it ever could. Peerless has never been relied upon or even cited by this court for its pronouncements concerning interpretations of the words “child or children” in statutory enactments. Furthermore, research discloses no other Washington case, and none has been referred to this court, which states that the words “child or children” in a statute do not include illegitimate children. On the contrary, we have recently held that the words “child” and “children” in our nonsupport statute, RCW 26.20.030, apply to legitimates and illegitimates alike, despite the fact that no such requirement is explicitly spelled out by the legislature. State v. Russell, 68 Wn.2d 748, 415 P.2d 503 (1966). The Peerless case, supra, is insufficient authority upon which to base a rule regarding interpretation of the words “child” or “children” in the wrongful death statute of this state. The decision is simply one of those proverbial derelicts floating on the sea of the.law, and should be treated accordingly.
*720Respondents cite Whittlesey v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 645, 163 Pac. 193 (1917), for the rule that remedial statutes which are in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed as to their classes of beneficiaries. It is contended that this rule forecloses Toni Marie’s chances of becoming a beneficiary under RCW 4.20.020, presumably on the theory that a strict construction of the words “child or children” would not include illegitimates. Respondents’ contention, however, is not persuasive. Whether done liberally or strictly, judicial interpretation is necessary even under respondents’ rule; illegitimate children are not necessarily excluded under the terms of RCW 4.20.020. This being so, we must still engage in a process of weighing and balancing competing values, and it appears to us that social policy considerations favoring inclusion of illegitimate children as beneficiaries should be given effect. As stated in 3 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 7205 (3d ed. 1943):
[M]any of the decisions in the past [construing wrongful death statutes], and a few of the later ones as well, have crippled the operation of this legislation by employing a narrow construction on the basis that these statutes are in derogation of the common law. However, it may now safely be asserted that the better and modern authorities are in agreement that the objectives and spirit of this legislation should not be thwarted by a technical application.
Finally, respondents urge that the resolution sought by appellant would place decedents’ estates at the mercy of unscrupulous charlatans who will pose as illegitimate children for the purpose of reaping undeserved benefits. Suffice it to say that such a problem does not exist in the instant case, as it is undisputed that Toni Marie is decedent’s daughter and that she was under his care and support until his death. In addition, as to any individuals contending they are illegitimate children of a decedent, the burden of proof is theirs and is a heavy one — certainly no less onerous than in other litigated cases. We are convinced that the burden of proof, as in other lawsuits, will provide estates ample protection and should remove any reasonable fear of fraudulent claims.
*721Although our decision allowing appellant’s daughter to be a beneficiary of the wrongful death action being brought for the death of her father is contrary to a majority of the cases in other jurisdictions, see Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 1235 (1960), it is clearly in accord with a decisive current trend in legislative and decisional law which ignores legitimacy when creating or applying statutes designed to benefit children. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 368 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1966) (illegitimate child is a “child” within the meaning of Federal Employee’s Group Life Insurance Act); In re Woodward’s Estate, 230 Cal. App. 2d 113, 40 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1964) (term “minor children” in family support statute includes illegitimates); State v. Russell, 68 Wn.2d 748, 415 P.2d 503 (1966) (illegitimacy of child no defense to prosecution for nonsupport); Wade v. State, 39 Wn.2d 744, 238 P.2d 914 (1951) (under certain circumstances and when welfare of child so dictates, father may have custody of illegitimate child).
The reason for this trend is clear. Society is becoming progressively more aware that children deserve proper care, comfort, and protection even if they are illegitimate. The burden of illegitimacy in purely social relationships should be enough, without society adding unnecessarily to the burden with legal implications having to do with the care, health, and welfare of children. As stated in In re Woodward’s Estate, supra, at 118, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 784:
Modern society shrinks from application of the Old Testament (Exodus 20) commandment “visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children. ...” Rather we accept the more humanitarian view stated by Judge Leon Yankwich, that “there are no illegitimate children, only illegitimate parents.”
Significantly, a very persuasive argument can be made that a decision contrary to ours would deny appellant’s daughter her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws, since there is no valid social reason, for purposes of welfare legislation, for distinguishing between members of the class “illegitimate children” and other members of the broader class “children” to which the mem*722bers of the more narrow class belong. See H. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1967). It is unnecessary for us to reach this constitutional question, however, for it is apparent that construction of a statute to thrust the burden of illegitimacy upon an innocent child would be an unfortunate and ill-advised exercise of our judicial function, and one we choose to avoid.
The order granting respondents’ motion for a summary judgment dismissing appellant’s daughter as a beneficiary of the wrongful death action being brought for the death of her father is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Rosellini, Hunter, Hamilton, and Hale, JJ., concur.
Another action arising out of the same accident was joined with the wrongful death action for trial after the original complaint had been filed. Neither the fact of joinder nor the action so joined, however, has any bearing on this appeal and therefore will not be discussed.
It is conceded that no written acknowledgment of paternity was ever made. However, even if there were written acknowledgment it would not affect the outcome of the instant case. The wrongful death statutes, unlike the descent and distribution statutes, do not provide for legitimation by written acknowledgment, and the written acknowledgment provision in the descent and distribution statutes applies only “for purposes of intestate succession.” RCW 11.04.081.