On September 2, 2003, Cecil Fortner was injured when Alan Arnsdorff drove his pickup truck through a stop sign and slammed into Fortner’s truck. Arnsdorff was insured by Grange Mutual Casualty Company under a policy with a bodily injury liability limit of $50,000, and his plumbing business had an additional $1 million in liability coverage with Auto Owners Insurance Company. In early November 2003, Fortner’s attorney sent letters to the attorneys for Grange and Auto Owners, offering to settle all claims by accepting $50,000 from Grange and $750,000 from Auto Owners. The letters provided that if the offer was not accepted in writing within 15 days, then it would be irrevocably withdrawn. Auto Owners did not respond within the time period, but Grange responded that it would pay the $50,000 contingent upon Fortner signing a full release with indemnification language and dismissing his claim against Arnsdorff with prejudice. Fortner’s attorney deemed this a rejection of his settlement offer and ceased further negotiations with Grange.
Fortner subsequently won a $7 million verdict against Arnsdorff, which was affirmed on appeal.1 Arnsdorff then assigned to Fortner the right to pursue any cause of action that Arnsdorff might have against Grange based on its purported bad faith or negligent failure to settle the case. Fortner brought such an action against Grange, and the case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Grange. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and denied Fortner’s motion for a new trial. Fortner appeals.
Fortner contends that the trial court’s jury charge concerning an insurance company’s response to a settlement demand conditioned upon another insurance company’s response was erroneous. The court charged the jury:
In responding to a settlement demand, which demand is conditional upon the response of another insurance com*672pany, an insurance company can offer its policy limits in response to the demand and then let the plaintiff negotiate with the remaining insurers. In that situation, the insurance company would have given equal consideration to its insured’s financial interest and fulfilled its duty to him. And you would return your verdict in favor of the defendant.
Fortner argues that the charge was not adjusted to the facts of the case and that it was an incorrect statement of law because the law requires that an insurer act reasonably in responding to a settlement offer. Fortner’s arguments are without merit.
In Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman,2 the Supreme Court of Georgia noted that industry experts had agreed that in cases involving multiple defendants and insurance companies, one company can offer its policy limits in response to a demand and then let the plaintiff negotiate with the remaining insurers.3 The Supreme Court went on to hold:
[A]n insurance company faced with a demand involving multiple insurers can create a safe harbor from liability for an insured’s bad faith claim ... by meeting the portion of the demand over which it has control, thus doing what it can to effectuate the settlement of the claims against its insured. This rule is intended to protect the financial interests of policyholders in cases where continued litigation would expose them to a judgment exceeding their policy limits while protecting insurers from bad faith claims when there are conditions involved in the settlement demand over which they have no control.4
Contrary to Fortner’s claims, the jury charge at issue in the instant case — in responding to a settlement demand which is conditional upon the response of another insurance company, an insurance company can offer its policy limits in response to the demand and then let the plaintiff negotiate with the remaining insurers — comports with the ruling in Brightman and is thus a correct statement of the law. Moreover, it was properly adjusted to the facts of the instant case since Fortner made a settlement demand that was conditional upon the responses of both Grange and Auto Owners.
*673And contrary to Fortner’s arguments, the trial court did, in other parts of the charge, clearly instruct the jury that Grange had a duty to settle within policy limits, that it could be liable for an excess judgment entered against the insured based on a bad faith or negligent refusal to settle, and that the jury must determine if Grange acted reasonably in responding to the settlement offer. Furthermore, on a re-charge, the court reiterated that the jury must determine whether or not Grange acted reasonably in responding to the settlement offer and “if you find that Grange did not meet that portion of the plaintiffs demand over which it had control, then you would return your verdict in favor of the plaintiff.”
In order for a trial court’s jury instruction to constitute reversible error, the party challenging the instruction must establish that the instruction was both legally erroneous and harmful. In determining whether this burden has been met, this Court looks at the jury charge as a whole to decide whether the law given in the disputed charge was adequately explained by other portions of the trial court’s instruction.5
Taken as a whole, the jury charge at issue in this case was correct and not misleading and fully apprised the jury of the applicable law. Fortner has failed to carry his burden of establishing error and harm, and therefore the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed.
Judgment affirmed.
Blackburn, P. J., Smith, P. J., Ellington and Phipps, JJ., concur. Barnes, C. J., and Miller, J., dissent.Arnsdorff v. Fortner, 276 Ga. App. 1 (622 SE2d 395) (2005).
276 Ga. 683 (580 SE2d 519) (2003).
Id. at 686 (1).
Id. at 687 (2).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. New Freedom Mtg. Corp., 285 Ga. App. 22, 24 (1) (645 SE2d 536) (2007).