dissenting.
Because the majority misapplies the longstanding precedent of this Court and unnecessarily relaxes the requirements for standing, I respectfully dissent.
After correctly quoting the rule on standing announced by this Court in Jackson v. Guilford County Board of Adjustment, the majority then disregards North Carolina’s stringent requirements for standing in favor of the less consistent rule of some other jurisdictions. In North Carolina, adjacent and nearby property owners have standing to appeal from quasi-judicial zoning decisions if the owners will sustain special damages, distinct from the rest of the community, amounting to a reduction in property values. Jackson, 275 N.C. 155, 161, 166 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1969) (citations omitted). While some states have held that evidence of increases in traffic, population, and noise may alone suffice to show special damages and grant standing, see, e.g., Lynch v. Gates, 433 Pa. 531, 534-35, 252 A.2d 633, 634-35 (1969) (increases in noise, population density, traffic, and loss of light and air), in North Carolina, a reduction in property value has been an essential element of standing for nearly forty years, see, e.g., Cty. of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg Cty., 334 N.C. 496, 503 n.4, 434 S.E.2d 604, 610 n.4 (1993) (citing Court of Appeals decisions which rely on Jackson for the rule that adjoining property owners must present evidence of a reduction in property values).
Under the well-established rule of Jackson, a petitioner must allege, and the trial court must find, that the adjacent or nearby property owner will suffer special damages amounting to a reduction in property value. See, e.g., Smith v. Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Adjust., 186 *647N.C. App. 651, 654, 652 S.E.2d 355, 358 (2007) (holding that petitioner lacked standing when she failed to allege that the zoning decisions at issue had decreased the value of her property or would do so in the future). Additionally, the record must contain evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the petitioner will in fact suffer a diminution in property value. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Town of Chapel Hill, 127 N.C. App. 347, 351, 489 S.E.2d 898, 901 (1997) (no standing when the record did not contain sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that the petitioner would suffer a diminution in property value); Heery v. Town of Highlands Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 61 N.C. App. 612, 614, 300 S.E.2d 869, 870 (1983).
North Carolina’s more stringent rule on standing is appropriate in light of the fundamental right of an owner to lawfully use and enjoy his property without undue restrictions. See Wise v. Harrington Grove Cmty. Ass’n, 357 N.C. 396, 401, 584 S.E.2d 731, 736 (2003) (“ ‘Every person owning property has the right to make any lawful use of it he sees fit, and restrictions sought to be imposed on that right must be carefully examined . . . .’ ” (quoting Vance S. Harrington & Co. v. Renner, 236 N.C. 321, 324, 72 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1952) (alteration in original))); cf. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 274 N.C. 362, 372, 163 S.E.2d 363, 370 (1968) (stating in an action for damages for the taking of private property for public use without paying just compensation that “the right of private property is a fundamental, material, inherent and inalienable right”). The rule is also consistent with N.C.G.S. § 160A-388(e2), which restricts standing in appeals from quasi-judicial decisions in zoning cases to “aggrieved part[ies].” N.C.G.S. § 160A-388(e2) (2007). Finally, the rule lends itself to objective, consistent, and fair application, gives property owners predictability, and discourages frivolous litigation.
Turning to the facts of this case, respondents seek a Special Use Permit to open an adult establishment in compliance with the Raleigh City Code. The proposed establishment would be located near the end of Mount Herman Road, a small, dead-end street in an industrial zoning district. The adjacent uses on Mount Herman Road include a heavy equipment rental company, a commercial steel company, a lumber company, an electrical transformer plant, and a fifteen acre vacant parcel. Petitioners are the owners of adjacent properties, plus an owner of property that is located at least one-half mile from the site of the proposed establishment and on a major highway that does not connect to Mount Herman Road.
*648In their petition for writ of certiorari filed in the superior court, petitioners alleged that they testified at the hearing before the Board of Adjustment regarding the adverse effects of the proposed adult establishment on their respective adjacent and nearby properties. However, petitioners did not allege that they would suffer special damages amounting to a reduction in property values. Thus, the petition for writ of certiorari failed to allege standing under North Carolina law. See Jackson, 275 N.C. at 161, 166 S.E.2d at 82.
In its order denying respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court erroneously concluded that petitioners have standing based on the applicable provisions of the Raleigh City Code. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the line of cases which require proof of special damages was inapposite and that petitioners did not need to show special damages amounting to a proven diminution in property values. The trial court added that, in the alternative, petitioners’ allegations regarding increased traffic, increased water runoff, parking, and safety concerns alone were sufficient to establish special damages for standing purposes. Notably, the trial court’s order lacks a finding that petitioners would experience a diminution in property values.
The majority refrains from addressing the errors in the trial court’s order by stating in a footnote that its holding is based on our prior case law and not the Raleigh City Code. However, the majority has failed to cite any cases which hold that allegations regarding increased traffic, increased water runoff, parking, and safety concerns alone are sufficient to establish special damages for standing. Our prior case law indicates that adjacent and nearby property owners have standing to appeal in quasi-judicial zoning cases only if they would suffer special damages amounting to a diminution in property values. .
The record of the hearing before the Board of Adjustment clearly shows that petitioners have failed to present evidence that they would suffer a diminution in property values. Mr. Bunn testified at the hearing that inadequate parking, increased traffic, water runoff, and safety issues would adversely affect the adjacent properties. However, Mr. Bunn gave no opinion regarding whether these concerns would diminish the values of the properties belonging to petitioners. Petitioners Mrs. Mangum, Mr. Overton, and Ms. Eure testified regarding their concerns, which were largely based on the assumptions that the provisions of the Raleigh City Code pertaining to parking were inadequate or that respondents would fail to comply with *649the conditions in the Special Use Permit. However, no witness testified that the proposed establishment would diminish the values of petitioners’ properties. The only valuation evidence presented by petitioners concerned a fifteen acre vacant parcel, owned by a non-party to this action.
The evidence presented before the Board of Adjustment demonstrates that, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, petitioners’ lack of standing in this case goes beyond a mere “imprecision with the pen.” Testimony regarding the effects of increased traffic, increased water runoff, parking, and safety concerns, without evidence that these factors would in fact diminish petitioners’ property values, is simply too general to support standing under North Carolina law. Thus, because petitioners have failed to satisfy the requirements for standing, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.