dissenting.
Thomas was at trial on an indictment charging he “knowingly and intentionally possessed] a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony.” Thomas was not being tried for a narcotics offense. Yet, the trial judge permitted evidence to prove Thomas had the propensity to engage in an uncharged offense of drug distribution.
At trial, Thomas properly preserved the issue for appeal that the prior bad act evidence was inadmissible to show he had the propensity to commit the crime for possession of a firearm. He also properly preserved the issue of whether such evidence should not have been admitted because it was overly prejudicial, and lacked probative value. Objecting to *760the testimony about the small plastic baggies and the introduction of them in evidence, Thomas’s trial attorney said “I don’t think this is relevant.” During the discussion about the objection, the prosecutor indicated that he intended to argue that “when you find drugs its a reasonable inference that somebody can be armed and dangerous.” Thomas’s attorney argued “the probative value does not outweigh the prejudice because [it is] immensely prejudicial for the jury to hear ... there were all these bags ... in the car.” The trial judge admitted the evidence, “find[ing] that the probative value does outweigh the prejudice.” Thomas argues on appeal as he did at trial: that the evidence was “irrelevant” and lacked “probative value” and that “the prejudice ... greatly outweighed any tenuous probative value.” I would hold that the objection was well stated and that the trial judge erred by admitting the evidence.
This evidence plainly was inadmissible.
It is well established in our jurisprudence that evidence of other offenses is generally not admissible to prove guilt of the crime for which a defendant is presently on trial. See Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 142, 314 S.E.2d 371, 383 (1984); Moore v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 72, 76, 278 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1981); Eccles v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 20, 22, 197 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1973). This is so because “[s]uch evidence implicating an accused in other crimes unrelated to the charged offense ... may confuse the issues being tried and cause undue prejudice to the defendant.” Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998).
Commonwealth v. Minor, 267 Va. 166, 171-72, 591 S.E.2d 61, 65 (2004). Accord Fleenor v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 270, 274-75, 105 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1958) (holding that “such evidence confuses the issue before the jury, unfairly surprises the accused with a charge he is not prepared to meet, and tends to prejudice him in the minds of the jury by showing his depravity or criminal propensity”).
*761The rationale behind the rule is that evidence is inadmissible which tends to prove only that the accused “has a propensity to commit bad acts ... and, therefore, he probably committed the bad act with which he stands charged.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 213, 220, 429 S.E.2d 229, 233 aff'd on rehearing en banc, 17 Va.App. 248, 436 S.E.2d 193 (1993). Even if it is alleged that the evidence is admissible as an exception to the rule, “the legitimate probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.” Id.; see Guill, 255 Va. at 139, 495 S.E.2d at 491-92. Thus, even if we assume the inference the prosecutor desired is a rational one, the evidence must be excluded when the jury might give the evidence prejudicial weight.
This is such a case. The only evidentiary value of the empty baggies was to suggest an inference that Thomas had the propensity to distribute narcotics. On this inference, the prosecutor pyramided further inferences that Thomas must have known the gun was in the car because the jury could assume that drug distributors possess guns. The trial judge’s admission of evidence that empty baggies were found in the car was error because this evidence allowed a speculative inference Thomas had committed or intended to commit another crime, which had no connection to the offense for which he was being tried. “The accused comes to trial to meet the specific charge against him, not to vindicate or to explain every collateral charge that may be made in the course of the introduction of the evidence.” Limbaugh v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 383, 391, 140 S.E. 133, 135 (1927).
Simply put, the prosecutor sought to lead the jury to draw “the inference that because of a criminal propensity [Thomas] probably committed the crime for which he was being tried.” Fleenor, 200 Va. at 275, 105 S.E.2d at 163. This type of speculative inference drawing has long been condemned.
It is well settled in this State, and elsewhere, that evidence which tends to show that an accused has committed another crime independent of, and unconnected with, that for which he is on trial is inadmissible. This is upon the principle that such evidence confuses the issue before the *762jury, unfairly surprises the accused with a charge he is not prepared to meet, and tends to prejudice him in the minds of the jury by showing his depravity or criminal propensity.
Id. at 274-75, 105 S.E.2d at 163.
Prior bad acts evidence is admissible for limited purposes, for example to show identity, intent, or motive. Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 Va.App. 241, 245-46, 337 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1985) (citing permissible uses). Even if such evidence is admissible as an exception to the rule (and in this case, it was not-calling it “motive” instead of “propensity” is a rose by any other name), “the legitimate probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.” Wilson, 16 Va.App. at 220, 429 S.E.2d at 233; see Guill, 255 Va. at 139, 495 S.E.2d at 491. Indeed, we have ruled that “in a prosecution for possessing drugs with the intent to distribute, the fact that an accused has sold drugs on a prior occasion, where the prior sale is not shown to have been related to the charged offense, has great potential for prejudice.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 329, 332, 443 S.E.2d 820, 821 (1994). This is so because “[ejvidence of unrelated drug sales suggests to the jury that the accused has a propensity to commit a crime of this nature.” Id. “[B]oth this Court and the Virginia Supreme Court have repeatedly rejected the admission of evidence of separate and unrelated prior drug transactions to show a defendant’s sale of drugs or possession of drugs with the intent to distribute.” Cooper v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 643, 648, 525 S.E.2d 72, 74 (2000). See Donahue v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 145, 154-56, 300 S.E.2d 768, 773-74 (1983); Eccles v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 20, 21-22, 197 S.E.2d 332, 332-33 (1973); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 52, 52-53, 189 S.E.2d 359, 359-60 (1972); Hill v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 480, 485-87, 438 S.E.2d 296, 299-300 (1993); Wilson, 16 Va.App. at 219-23, 429 S.E.2d at 233-35. If a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute narcotics would be inadmissible to prove knowledge of or intent to possess the gun or the baggies, then certainly the evidence of the empty baggies and the inferences the prosecutor sought to draw *763from them were inadmissible here, where the speculation required to make any conclusion is far greater.
Beyond prejudice, this evidence should have been excluded because of its dubious probative value in establishing the charge of possession of a firearm. As the Supreme Court noted in Guill,
“if the circumstances [of the other event] have no intimate conne[ct]ion with the main fact; if they constitute no link in the chain of evidence ... they ought to be excluded, because they are irrelevant; [and] if they denote other guilt, they are not only irrelevant, but they do injury, because they have a tendency to [cause] prejudice.”
255 Va. at 139, 495 S.E.2d at 491 (quoting Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574, 577 (1829)).
There was no such “intimate connection” here. The evidence that empty baggies were found in the car merely allowed the jury to draw a speculative inference that Thomas had committed or intended to commit another crime, which had no connection to the offense for which he was being tried. Moreover, no evidence at trial proved that any of the baggies contained marijuana or any other controlled substance. Here, the prosecutor offered the empty baggies as evidence and then sought to use the discovery of the baggies in the car to support a chain of impermissible inferences involving Thomas’s previous conviction of drug distribution. It offered the evidence as a basis to argue to the jury the following: First, it could infer these baggies were items connected with a trade in narcotics. Second, it could infer from Thomas’s previous conviction for possession of narcotics that he possessed the baggies as an incident of his trade as a drug dealer. Third, it could speculate that drug dealers carry guns as an incident of the drug trade. Lastly, it could infer from Thomas’s possession of items of the drug trade that Thomas was engaged in the distribution of drugs and, therefore, knowingly possessed the gun. Allowing such a long chain of speculation, far removed from the facts, is not probative evidence.
*764For these reasons, I would hold that the judge erred in admitting in evidence the empty baggies. Therefore, I dissent.