dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that this attorney disqualification was unwarranted, but I would not reach that issue because, in my opinion, a disqualification order is not immediately appealable.
As the majority notes, the right of appeal is controlled by statute. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-330 (1976 and Supp. 2003); N.C. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Twin States Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 480, 481, 347 S.E.2d 97, 97 (1986). Attorney disqualification does not fall within the ambit of section 14-3-330(2)(a). Representation by a particular attorney does not in effect determine or discontinue the action, or prevent a judgment from which an appeal might be taken. Compare Breland v. Love Chevrolet Olds, Inc., 339 S.C. 89, 93-95, 529 S.E.2d 11, 13-14 (2000) (holding that an order denying a motion to change venue is not immediately appealable under section 14-3-330(2)); Senter v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 341 S.C. 74, 77-79, 533 S.E.2d 575, 577-78 (2000) (same with respect to an order denying a motion to bifurcate liability and damages); Peterkin v. Brigman, 319 S.C. 367, 368, 461 S.E.2d 809, 810 (1995) (same with respect to an order denying a motion to approve a settlement agreement).
I understand that proving on appeal that an attorney disqualification has prejudiced a party is difficult. Because appealability is governed by statute, however, this difficulty is a concern of the legislature, not the judiciary. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.