concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Georgia Power Company (Georgia Power) and Burkeen Construction Company, Inc. (Bur-keen), I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Utilities Protection Center, Inc. (UPC). In my view, issues of fact remain regarding UPC’s potential liability for failing to inform Georgia Power properly about the overhead high-voltage line that ultimately killed Mr. Whitmire.
Sherrie Whitmire sued Georgia Power, UPC, and Burkeen for the wrongful death of her spouse, Charles Whitmire. Ms. Whitmire contends that Georgia Power is liable for failing to take proper safety measures to protect her husband pursuant to Georgia’s High-voltage Safety Act (OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq.). She further contends that UPC is liable for negligently handling notice calls regarding work taking place near high-voltage lines and forwarding incorrect information to Georgia Power; and that Burkeen is liable for failing to notify Georgia Power of the overhead high-voltage line that killed Mr. Whitmire. The defendants moved for summary judgment below, which the trial court granted.
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review of the law and evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Holbrook v. Stansell, 254 Ga. App. 553-554 (562 SE2d 731) (2002).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Whitmire, the evidence reveals that on December 5,1999, Mr. Whitmire, an employee of C&B Mechanical Contractors (C&B), was killed while working to install water and sewer lines. As he assisted a backhoe installation of a sewer line, the backhoe came into contact with an overhead high-voltage line, and he was electrocuted.
*594On November 10, 1999, Kelly Massey, a C&B employee, called UPC to give notice of C&B’s intention to commence work on Westover Road near Whiddon Mill Road to install the water and sewer lines. The UPC operator asked Massey if any work would be performed “within ten (10) feet of [any] overhead power line,” and Massey replied, “No ma’am.” As a result of this response, UPC sent notice ticket number 08140749 with the heading “Underground Notification” to Georgia Power indicating only that underground work would be done in the area specified by Massey. The ticket made no mention of overhead lines at the site. In her affidavit, Massey explained that she would have told the operator “yes” if she had been specifically asked whether protection from overhead lines was desired.
On December 1, 1999, Massey called UPC and requested an update (referred to as a “restake”) of the notice ticket that had been issued in November to continue work at the same site. The restaked ticket number 08202731 contained the same information that had been included in the original November ticket. Specifically, the notice continued to bear the heading “Underground Notification,” and did not mention any overhead lines at the site. UPC informed Massey that the earliest date on which work could begin under the restaked ticket was December 6, 1999 (one day after Whitmire died).
Based on the notification from UPC that only underground work would be done and that no overhead high-voltage line protection had been requested, Burkeen, Georgia Power’s contractor, checked the proposed work area for underground power cables only. Burkeen had a contract with Georgia Power whereby it agreed to locate and mark underground power facilities when a notice to Georgia Power indicated that no protection from overhead high-voltage lines was needed. Burkeen had no contractual obligation to locate or mark overhead high-voltage lines. Burkeen checked the site for underground facilities, but assumed that it had no duty to mark the overhead high-voltage line that ultimately killed Mr. Whitmire.
1. The outcome of this case rests largely on the requirements of Georgia’s High-voltage Safety Act (HVSA), which provides:
The purpose of this part is to prevent injury to persons and property and interruptions of utility service resulting from accidental or inadvertent contact with high-voltage electric lines by providing that no work shall be done in the vicinity of such lines unless and until the owner or operator thereof has been notified of such work and has taken one of the safety measures prescribed in this part.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 46-3-31.
*595Before work can commence near high-voltage lines, the person or company responsible for the work (in this case C&B) must contact UPC to inform it about the work that is to be done. See OCGA §§ 46-3-32 (2)-(4); 46-3-34 (b). UPC then informs the utility that owns the power lines (in this case Georgia Power) of the work that will take place so that the utility can take proper safety measures before work commences. See OCGA §§ 46-3-32 (4)-(5); 46-3-33 (2).
Significantly, the HVSA defines the type of “work” of which the UPC must be notified in the following way:
“Work” means the physical act of performing or preparing to perform any activity under, over, by, or near high-voltage lines, including, but not limited to, the operation, erection, handling, storage, or transportation of any tools, machinery, ladders, antennas, equipment, supplies, materials, or apparatus or the moving of any house or other structure whenever such activity is done by a person or entity in pursuit of his trade or business.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 46-3-32 (6). The specifics of the required notice are set forth in OCGA § 46-3-34 (b):
Where work is to be done, the person responsible for such work shall give notice to the utilities protection center during its regular business hours at least 72 hours, excluding weekends and holidays, prior to commencing such work and such notice shall:
(1) Describe the tract or parcel of land upon which the work to be done is to take place with sufficient particularity to enable the owner or operator of the high-voltage lines to ascertain the precise tract or parcel of land involved;
(2) State the name, address, and telephone number of the person who will be in charge of the work;
(3) Describe the type of work to be engaged in by the person; and
(4) Designate the date upon which the work will commence and will be completed.
Here, C&B gave proper notice to UPC that work was going to take place “under, over, by, or near high-voltage lines” more than 72 hours before work was scheduled to commence, and, as UPC concedes, *596provided all other information required by OCGA § 46-3-34 (b) by responding to the UPC operator’s “litany of questions.” Thus, C&B fulfilled its statutory duty to give notice to UPC of work to be done near high-voltage lines such that Georgia Power should have been advised by UPC to implement proper safety measures.
The problems for Mr. Whitmire began in this case when UPC requested additional information from C&B that was not required under the notice provisions of the HVSA quoted above. Specifically, instead of simply acting on C&B’s notice that it would be working near high-voltage lines (which could include both overhead and underground lines), the UPC operator went on to ask whether any work would be performed “within ten (10) feet of [any] overhead power line.” When the C&B representative replied, “No,” UPC then informed Georgia Power that no request had been made for protection from overhead high-voltage lines. As explained below, a jury could reasonably find that UPC’s error was the proximate cause of Mr. Whitmire’s death.
UPC apparently asked the specific question about working within ten feet of an overhead high-voltage line based on the language of OCGA § 46-3-33 (1), which states that
[n]o person, firm, or corporation shall commence any work as defined in paragraph (6) of Code Section 46-3-32 if at any time any person or any item specified in paragraph (6) of Code Section 46-3-32 may be brought within ten feet of any high-voltage line unless and until... [t]heperson responsible for the work has given the notice required by Code Section 46-3-34____
(Emphasis supplied.) It is worth noting that similar language about working within ten feet of a high-voltage line can be found in the limitation-of-liability provision found in OCGA§ 46-3-39, which states that “[t]he owner or operator of high-voltage lines shall not be liable for damage or loss to person or property resulting from work within ten feet of high-voltage lines unless notice has been given as required by Code Section 46-3-34. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the interpretation that UPC and the majority seek to impose upon the HVSA, this statutory language makes clear that both the provisions about commencing work within ten feet of a high-voltage line and the limitation-of-liability provision serve purposes entirely different from those served by the notice requirements of OCGA § 46-3-34. As the statute states, work cannot commence within ten feet of a high-voltage line, nor can a utility be liable for injuries suffered by those working within ten feet of a high-voltage line, “unless and until. . . [tjhe person responsible for the work has *597given the notice required by Code Section 46-3-34. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 46-3-33 (1); see also OCGA § 46-3-39. Even the definition of “work” under OCGA § 46-3-32 (6) contains nothing suggesting that the only work for which a person may receive protection after giving notice to UPC is work that takes place within ten feet of a high-voltage line. The “work” need only consist of any activity that takes place “under, over, by, or near high-voltage lines.” OCGA § 46-3-32 (6). UPC and the majority cannot rely on the provisions of OCGA § 46-3-33 to add a ten-foot-working-radius limitation to the notice provisions of OCGA § 46-3-34 when no such limitation exists in the statute.
By adding this irrelevant and inappropriate limitation to the notice, UPC confused the C&B representative (who had already given proper notice without the irrelevant question being asked) and Georgia Power as well (who was misinformed about the scope of protection needed despite C&B having fulfilled its duty to give proper notice). Thus, this case presents a jury question regarding whether UPC was negligent in carrying out its duties to properly receive notice of work to be done near high-voltage lines and to forward accurate information to Georgia Power about the scope of protection needed for the work.
The fact that Mr. Whitmire started work and died one day before the work was scheduled to commence does not change the result here, because we cannot rule out the possibility that UPC’s potential negligence was the proximate cause of Mr. Whitmire’s death. UPC informed Georgia Power that there was no need for protection from overhead high-voltage lines in the area where Whitmire was going to be working. As a result, Georgia Power did not provide any such protection at any time before Whitmire’s death. Regardless of when Whitmire began the work, the only protection provided at the work site would have been protection from underground lines, and Whit-mire still would not have been given protection from the overhead line that ultimately killed him. Under these circumstances, a jury must resolve the question whether UPC’s alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Whitmire’s death. See, e.g., Atlanta Affordable Housing Fund v. Brown, 253 Ga. App. 286, 288 (2) (558 SE2d 827) (2002) (“The question of proximate cause is one for the jury except in palpable, clear, and indisputable cases.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Bossard v. Atlanta Neighborhood Dev. Partnership, 254 Ga. App. 799, 800 (2) (564 SE2d 31) (2002) (“Except in extraordinary cases where the facts are plain and indisputable, the jury should decide all questions of negligence, contributory negligence, cause and proximate cause ”) (punctuation and footnotes omitted).
*598Decided November 23, 2004 Gregory, Christy, Maniklal & Dennis, Hardy Gregory, Jr., Preyesh K. Maniklal, Morris, Webster & Corless, Francis L. Morris, Jr., Cook & Connelly, Bobby Lee Cook, for appellant. McNatt & Greene, Hugh B. McNatt, Reinhardt, Whitley, Wilmot & Summerlin, John R. Reinhardt, Moore, Clarke, Duvall & Rodgers, Charles J. Willcox, Watson, Spence, Lowe & Chambless, Louis E. Hatcher, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Frank M. Lowrey TV, Robert L. Pennington, for appellees.I would therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment to UPC.
2. As for Georgia Power and Burkeen, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to both. As explained above, the problems in this case arose from the inappropriate question posed to C&B by UPC, and UPC’s forwarding of inaccurate protection information to Georgia Power. C&B gave proper notice to UPC, but here, no liability rests with Georgia Power because it had no choice but to act on the basis of the information that it had received from UPC. There is no evidence that Georgia Power had any reason to believe that the information forwarded by UPC would be unreliable. To the extent that the received notice was improper, this was so because UPC failed in its duties, not Georgia Power. Likewise, Burkeen was contracted to check only for underground lines and had no duty to provide protection for Mr. Whitmire from overhead high-voltage lines. See OCGA § 46-3-33 (2) (owner or operator of high-voltage line implements safety measures); see siso Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga. App. 27, 29-30 (2) (443 SE2d 670) (1994) (plaintiff could not recover for personal injuries as third party beneficiary of contract because defendant had no duty to plaintiff where contracting parties did not expressly intend to protect plaintiff from specific harm suffered). Thus, to the extent that liability could exist for any defendant under the facts of this case, it would exist only for UPC.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ellington and Judge Phipps join in this opinion.