concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part.
I concur only in the majority’s conclusion that this matter must be reversed and remanded. I dissent from those portions of the majority opinion which purport to vacate, on subject matter grounds, the portions of the trial court’s order related to N.C.G.S. § 130A-192 (2003).
I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion in three important respects. First, I disagree with the majority’s holding that, if the plaintiff lacks standing to seek redress against this defendant for the violation of G.S. § 130A-192, then the trial court is without authority to consider that statute even if its meaning and application are relevant to an issue in the case. Secondly, this matter should be reconsidered by the trial court on the central issue actually raised in the pleadings and tried before it originally, not on an entirely different one identified by this Court. Thirdly, the trial court, in its evaluation of the merits of plaintiff’s claim, materially relied upon a misinterpretation of a relevant statute, such that the trial court’s con-*308elusion that defendant’s actions did not constitute “cruelty” cannot be sustained.
Preliminarily, I observe that the majority opinion unnecessarily addresses the issue of plaintiffs standing to bring suit under G.S. § 130A-192. The discussion of standing arises from the majority’s erroneous premise that plaintiff herein brought a lawsuit against defendant, a private nonprofit corporation, for violation of G.S. § 130A-192, a statute applicable only to county or other governmental entities. In fact, as the majority acknowledges, plaintiff “filed a complaint pursuant to [N.C.G.S.] § 19A-1 et seq.” alleging cruelty. Although plaintiff’s complaint makes some reference to G.S. § 130A-192, the gist of its claim is that defendant inflicts unjustifiable pain, suffering, and death to certain cats and dogs, by euthanizing them almost immediately after they are received. Plaintiff sought to demonstrate or illustrate the alleged cruelty by reference to defendant’s failure to hold these stray cats and dogs for even the bare minimum of 72 hours that G.S. § 130A-192 requires of county animal shelters.1 However, plaintiff did not bring suit under G.S. § 130A-192, so the majority’s extensive discussion of plaintiff’s standing to bring such a suit is wholly unnecessary.
A serious problem arises from the majority opinion’s confusion of a party’s standing to bring suit under a statute against a certain party with the court’s authority to consider or interpret the statute when it may be relevant to an issue before the court. The majority opinion concludes that, because plaintiff lacked standing to sue defendant SPCA under G.S. § 130A-192, “neither the trial court nor this Court has jurisdiction . . . regarding the interpretation” of the statute, and that the interpretation of G.S. § 130A-192 “was not properly before the trial court.” The majority cites no authority for its holding that a court may not utilize its interpretation of a statute unless it provides a cause of action for the plaintiff. A plaintiff’s lack of standing to challenge a statute does uot deprive the court of authority to interpret the statute. And, of course “[i]t is permissible in the interpretation of statutes to consider other statutes related to the particular subject, or to the statutes under construction.” Davidson County v. City of High Point, 85 N.C. App. 26, 34, 354 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1987) (citing Abernethy v. Board of Comm’rs, 169 N.C. 631, 86 S.E. 577 (1915)). In holding that neither the trial court nor this Court had the *309authority to interpret the scope of G.S. § 130A-192, the majority is in error. Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that purports to vacate, on lack of subject matter jurisdiction grounds, the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court “regarding plaintiff’s claim for violations by defendant under N.G. Gen. Stat. § 130A-192.”
Further, in my opinion, it is essential to address the meaning of G.S. § 130A-192 inasmuch as the trial court rested its decision, in large part, on its interpretation of the statute. The interpretation of the statute is relevant to plaintiff’s claim because the fact (if proven) that defendant fails to adhere to the minimum standards applicable to county agencies is some evidence of whether “unjustifiable . . . death is caused or permitted[]” by defendant. See N.C.G.S. § 19A-1(2) (defining “cruelty”).
Turning to the meaning of G.S. § 130A-192, the trial court erred in its interpretation of this statute. The trial court judge concluded that the requirement of G.S. § 130A-192, that dogs and cats without rabies tags be held at least 72 hours before being killed, was applicable only to “tame” cats and not to “wild” or “feral” cats. The court based its ruling on the definitions in N.C.G.S. § 130A-184 (2003), of animals subject to rabies control measures. The statute states that “ ‘cat’ means a domestic feline,” and that “ ‘dog’ means a domestic canine.” The correct interpretation of this is that “domestic cat” and “domestic dog” are delineating which species of animals are within the ambit of the statute. That this is the correct interpretation is immediately apparent when one considers the following: The 72 hour hold is one small item in a comprehensive rabies control statute, which applies the same definitions to all statutes in the rabies control section. Consequently, if stray dogs and cats are excluded from the provisions of G.S. § 130A-192, then they are also excluded from the rest of the rabies section. In that event, the animal control officer would have no authority to take crucial measures to reduce the spread of rabies — a truly absurd interpretation and application of the statutes. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 130A-195 (“Destroying stray dogs and cats in quarantine districts”); N.C.G.S. § 130A-197 (“Infected dogs and cats to be destroyed”); N.C.G.S. § 130A-199 (“Rabid animals to be destroyed”); N.C.G.S. § 130A-200 (“Confinement or leashing of vicious animals).
Finally, the majority opinion instructs the trial court to enter findings and.conclusions on remand regarding whether a “poke test” that defendant purportedly employed to decide whether a cat is a house *310pet or a stray “feral” animal constitutes “cruel treatment.” The “poke test” was neither the basis of plaintiffs claim, nor the basis of the trial court’s ruling. I emphasize that plaintiff’s claim is premised on a claim that defendant inflicts unjustifiable pain, suffering, and death to certain cats and dogs by euthanizing them almost immediately after they are received. During oral argument before this Court, both parties agreed that this case does not implicate the question of whether the “poke test” constitutes “cruelty”. This inquiry, now required by operation of the majority opinion, is simply not relevant to a determination of plaintiff’s claim — except as it may collaterally help establish that defendant, indeed, failed to hold all cats for a certain period.
In short, the trial court’s incorrect interpretation of G.S. § 130A-192 materially impacted its determination on the ultimate issue before it, and requires remand for the court to utilize the correct interpretation in its consideration of plaintiff’s claim that the defendant caused unjustifiable pain, suffering, and death to certain animals by its failure to hold all cats for some minimum period. In making its ultimate determination on the merits, the judge may consider as some evidence not only the fact that our legislature generally requires county entities to hold all cats for 72 hours, G.S. § 130A-192, but also a host of other statutory provisions that may be relevant. See, e.g., G.S. § 130A-197 and G.S. § 130A-199. .
For all the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand for the entry of a new order by the trial court, leaving in its discretion whether to receive additional evidence.
. The definition of “cruelty” includes “every act, omission, or neglect whereby unjustifiable . . . death is caused or permitted.” G.S. § 19A-1(2). Thus, even in the absence of the 72-hour provision in G.S. § 130A, the trial court would be obligated to determine whether failure to hold all cats for 72 hours constituted cruelty.