dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court correctly set aside the jury’s verdict that found the defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide under a complicity theory. A case should not be submitted to the jury unless there is competent evidence supporting each element of the crime charged. See People v. Paris, 182 Colo. 148, 511 P.2d 893 (1973). In this case there is no evidence that Mitchell Anderson, the principal, committed criminally negligent homicide. As such, there was no basis for finding that the defendant was a complicitor to criminally negligent homicide, since the principal did not commit that crime. Moreover, I agree with the trial court’s statement that “[a] finding that a defendant ... had knowledge that another intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing is a logical impossibility.” Accordingly, I would find that the jury’s subsequent conviction of the defendant as a complicitor is not sustainable in this case.
The defendant’s conviction does not, in my view, square with our criminally negligent homicide or complicity statutes. See §§ 18-3-105 & 18-1-603, 8B C.R.S. (1986). Under the theory of complicity, a defendant is legally accountable as a principal for the behavior of another if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the unlawful act, the defendant aids, abets, or advises the other person in planning or committing the act. § 18-1-603; People v. Thompson, 655 P.2d 416 (Colo.1982); People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo.1981). In *106Thompson, we said that in order to hold a defendant criminally responsible under the complicity statute “the prosecution must establish that (1) the principal committed the crime, (2) knowledge by the complicitor that the principal intended to commit the crime, and (3) the complicitor having the requisite knowledge, did aid, abet or encourage the principal in the commission of the crime.” Thompson, 655 P.2d at 418; see also People v. Larson, 194 Colo. 338, 572 P.2d 815 (1977); People v. Martin, 192 Colo. 491, 561 P.2d 776 (1977); People v. Marques, 184 Colo. 262, 520 P.2d 113 (1974).
The issue raised is whether the evidence would support a conviction of Anderson for criminally negligent homicide because in my view, absent such evidence, Wheeler could not be guilty of being a complicitor to that crime. The act of the principal is the measure of whether a party is accountable as a complicitor. See § 18-1-603. The principal in this case, Mitchell Anderson, entered a plea of guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-four years in the department of corrections. Anderson took a large knife from his apartment, marched down to the decedent’s apartment, told the decedent that he was going to kill him, and then proceeded to stab the victim, killing him.
Even though Anderson was guilty of second-degree murder, his conduct in no way could be construed as criminally negligent homicide. Criminally negligent homicide occurs when one causes the death of another through conduct amounting to criminal negligence. § 18-3-105. There was nothing negligent about Anderson’s conduct. Rather, his behavior evidenced an intentional, methodical plan effectively conceived and executed.
Since Anderson’s conduct would not support a conviction of criminally negligent homicide and Wheeler’s acts do not alter her liability or that of Anderson, Wheeler could not be a complicitor to that crime. A complicitor’s liability flows from the culpable act of the principal. The accountability of a complicitor to criminally negligent homicide arises because the principal committed the unlawful homicide and the com-plicitor assisted or aided in the unlawful act’s commission. Since there is no evidence that Anderson committed criminally negligent homicide, Wheeler could not have assisted Anderson in the commission of that crime.
Moreover, a person cannot be a complicitor to criminally negligent homicide. “Any person who causes the death of another person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence commits criminally negligent homicide which is a class 5 felony.” § 18-3-105. “A person acts with criminal negligence when, through a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists.” § 18-1-501(3).
The statutory definition of criminal negligence coupled with that of criminally negligent homicide under section 18-3-105 creates criminal liability for an unintentional killing caused by the actor's failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a certain result will occur. See People v. Nhan Dao Van, 681 P.2d 932 (Colo.1984); People v. Jones, 193 Colo. 250, 565 P.2d 1333 (1977); People v. Hernandez, 44 Colo.App. 161, 614 P.2d 900 (1980).1 Thus, the act giving rise to criminal responsibility is by definition an unintentional one.
*107Criminally negligent homicide, when used as the basis for imposing responsibility for complicity, is a maverick. Nearly all homicide statutes have a specific or general intent requirement, while the criminally negligent homicide statute has none. Compare § 18-3-105 (criminally negligent homicide) with § 8-3-102(l)(a) (first degree murder); § 8-3-103(l)(a) (second-degree murder); and § 8-3-104(l)(a) (manslaughter). It is by definition an unintentional killing. This distinction between criminally negligent homicide and intentional homicides, or any other crime requiring intent, is significant for purposes of complicity responsibility.
The critical factor in imputing criminal responsibility under the complicity doctrine is the defendant’s intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the unlawful act. § 18-1-603. I share the trial judge’s view that it is not logical to hold that an accused complicitor intended to promote or facilitate unintentional conduct such as criminally negligent homicide. It is incongruous to say that one person intended to facilitate an act when the actor himself did not intend to commit that act. To hold otherwise bestows upon the accused complicitor prescient qualities, inasmuch as it implies that a complicitor can know and intend to assist a principal in unlawful conduct when the principal himself does not know he will engage in that conduct.
I also believe that the majority misapprehends Thomas. Thomas states that the intent necessary to commit attempted reckless manslaughter is the “intent to engage in and complete the risk producing act or conduct.” People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972, 974 (Colo.1986). The majority reads this as analogous to the complicity statute’s requirement that a complicitor need only act with the “intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense” to incur criminal liability. While I agree that the language of the cases is similar, I believe that the inherent difference between attempted reckless manslaughter and complicity to criminally negligent homicide causes the rationale of Thomas to be inapplicable to this case.
The “risk-producing act or conduct” involved in Thomas was reckless manslaughter. Id. at 973. There, we stated that a person can attempt to commit reckless manslaughter, since one can intend to take a substantial step towards reckless manslaughter. Id. at 974-75. The same cannot be said when the “risk-producing act or conduct” is unintentional. In People v. Hernandez, 614 P.2d 900 (Colo.App.1980), the court of appeals pointed out that a person cannot attempt to commit criminally negligent homicide because it is logically impossible to “intend to perpetrate an unintentional killing.” Id. at 901. In my view it is also a logical impossibility for a person to be a complicitor to criminally negligent homicide because one cannot intend to assist or promote an unintentional killing.
I am disturbed by the majority’s statement that a defendant is responsible as a complicitor if the defendant knew “that the principal is engaging in, or about to engage in, criminal conduct.” Majority at 104. Under this dangerously broad statement a person who assisted a principal in what was originally agreed to be minor criminal conduct is fully liable for the principal’s more serious criminal conduct even if the complicitor did not contemplate, assist or aid the more serious conduct. This result is not, in my view, reconcilable with the theory of complicity liability, which is to hold the complicitor liable only for those acts which he intended to assist. See generally 1 Torcía, Wharton’s Criminal Law 180-81 (1978); Kadish, From Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 Calif.L.Rev. 323, 347-53 (1985). The criminal culpability of a complicitor, like that of an accessory, must be proportionate to his culpable intent and his participation in the commission of the principal’s crime. The majority’s statement that the defendant is guilty if she knew the principal was going to engage in any criminal conduct whatsoever creates a legally meaningless standard which circumvents the fact that the prosecution could not prove the defendant knew Anderson was going to commit second-degree murder or manslaughter. See § 18-1-603. The complicitor must have some basis for know*108ing she could suffer criminal responsibility. The majority’s statement that the complicitor must be aware that the principal is engaging in conduct that grossly deviates from the standard of reasonable care and poses a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to another is not consistent with the clear wording of the complicity and criminally negligent homicide statutes. §§ 18-1-603 & 18-3-105. As part of the test for complicity, I would require more than mere knowledge that a principal was about to deviate from a reasonable standard of care and engage in criminal conduct.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order setting aside the jury’s verdict and the entry of a judgment of acquittal on the charge.
. Both Jones and Hernandez were decided under section 18-3-105(l)(a), 8 C.R.S. (1973), the precursor to section 18-3-105, 8B C.R.S. (1986), under which the defendant was charged. Section 18-3-105(l)(a), 8 C.R.S. (1973), is substantially similar to section 18 — 3—105, 8B C.R.S. (1986), and provides:
18-3-105. Criminally negligent homicide. (1) A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death of another person;
(a) By conduct amounting to criminal negligence.
Nhan Dao Van was decided under section 18-3-105, 8 C.R.S. (1978 & 1983 Supp.), which is substantially similar to section 18 — 3—105, 8B C.R.S. (1986), and provides:
18-3-105. Criminally negligent homicide. Any person who causes the death of another person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence commits criminally negligent homicide which is a class 1 misdemeanor.