This is the second appeal in this case. Our opinion on the first appeal, Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1987) (Sanchez I), detailed the course of the litigation in the trial court proceedings and need not be repeated, other than to note that Sanchez suffered severe injuries when his right hand was caught in the chain drive of a potato harvester owned by his employer, Bennett Creek Farms, and operated by its employee, Rusty Anderson. A unanimous jury awarded Sanchez a verdict totaling $1.35 million in damages.
After the entry of the judgment, Bennett Creek and Anderson moved for a remittitur reducing the amount of damages awarded, or in the alternative, for a new trial on various grounds, including excessiveness of the damages pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). The district court granted the defendants’ motion. Sanchez was given the option of accepting a $400,000 reduction in damages or a new trial. On Sanchez’s appeal this Court reversed the trial court order and remanded with instructions that the district court reconsider its earlier ruling on defendants’ motion in light of the principles announced in our opinion and in Quick v. *1065Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986) announced the same day as Sanchez I.
Following proceedings on remand, the district court once again ordered Sanchez to remit $400,000 and to accept $950,000 in damages or face a new trial. Although our opinion in Sanchez I explicitly required the entry of findings of fact as to whether the trial court was, in fact, shocked by the jury award, or found such award unconscionable so as to have the appearance that it was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the trial court did not make new findings as such, but utilized his prior written decision which was altered by interli-neating six additional words at two different places and adding a 39-word conjunctive clause. This will be more easily understood by printing the pertinent part of the earlier opinion of the trial court with the interlineated additions in bold face type:
In this particular case, several observations are initially noteworthy. This is the largest verdict I have seen returned by a jury in any personal injury action tried before me. On the other hand, I have never tried a case which was more thoroughly prepared for trial nor more skillfully presented, including the effective use of visual aids. The plaintiff is a handsome man, likeable and appealing, who obviously made a favorable impression on co-workers as well as doctors, psychologists, therapists, and other professionals who worked with him. His attending physician was exceptionally competent and knowledgeable in his field who had available for viewing detailed photos of most stages of his surgeries and medical treatment of the plaintiff. He had taken numerous photos to assist him in lectures on the surgical repair of hands. I cannot say that I have ever witnessed a better prepared or more thorough and skillful representation by defense counsel either, but the chips here just seemed to be stacked heavily in plaintiffs favor. Accordingly, the large verdict is understandable!.] and it did not shock me.
After thus “weighing” the evidence to determine what amount (as a “thirteenth juror”) I would have awarded in order to do substantial justice in this case, and fully and fairly compensate plaintiff for all his damages, I cannot in good conscience, come within $400,000 of the jury’s verdictf.] and I find such award unconscionable. That is a substantial difference, and the disparity between the jury’s award and what this Court would have awarded is so great as to suggest that the award is what might be expected of a jury acting under influence of passion or prejudice, and unless plaintiff is willing to accept a remittitur to $950,000, plus interest thereon at the highest legal rate from the date of judgment, I must therefore grant defendants a new trial.
I must acknowledge that it has been extremely difficult for me to discharge this “obligation” and in effect substitute my judgment on the damages for that of the jury. I have always felt a jury verdict is entitled to great deference particularly in the difficult area of damages, and particularly where, as here, it is unanimous. I have never had a case where so much of the damages were for items which are especially difficult of ascertainment with mathematical precision, such as pain and suffering. The fact that I could not have the benefit of any extensive discussion and consideration with 11 fellow jurors concerned me. The guidelines or suggestions as to how to discharge this obligation given in Din-neen are limited.
I will therefore attempt to explain how I have arrived at this result, after assuming that the case had been tried to the court, without a jury, and after I had decided the issue of liability in plaintiffs favor. I first considered the various elements of damage separately.
In weighing the evidence on damages it clearly indicated almost $100,000 in actual medicals, considering time and transportation for medical treatment. In addition, $30,000 would be reasonably probable for future medical and psychological care and treatment and vocational rehabilitation. About $21,000 had been lost in wages between the accident and *1066the trial. I would allow another year’s wages of $10,500 for him to obtain appropriate repatriation into the labor force.
After weighing the evidence in the case as to the earning capacity, age, life expectancy, habits, disposition, education, work history, aptitude, interest, intelligence and other pertinent factors in computing future lost wages, I would feel it reasonable to consider the defendant’s faculties and capacity for work is about 50% impaired due to the effective loss of his right hand. That such percent of impairment would likely decrease with training and after developing compensatory work skills and ability at at least the rate of earnings increases due to inflation. I would therefore multiply $5,250.00 (50% of his $10,500/yr. earnings) by 40 years — (assuming he would likely cease work around 60 years of age, or at least fully compensate for his disability by then) and thus arrived at $210,-000 as the present cash value of reasonably probable lost future wages.
With regard to plaintiff’s inability to perform usual activities, I feel it would be just to award him about $25,000 to permit him to purchase special compensatory devices and appliances as they now exist or may hereafter become available, and I feel that another $50,000 would be fair to attempt to compensate him for the substantial disfigurement of his right hand and loss of enjoyment of life, i.e. hobbies and recreation.
Finally, in view of the considerable physical and mental pain and suffering unquestionably experienced by the plaintiff in view of the nature, extent and duration of the injury here, (permanent and entire loss of dominant hand) the psychological impact on the plaintiff, the multiple surgeries he has gone through, and the disruption of his life, I would feel that $300,000 would be fair compensation; and for such pain and suffering reasonably certain to be experienced in the future, an additional sum of $200,-000.
In thus reluctantly discharging my “Dinneen obligation,” I have found it particularly difficult in this case. It is usually much easier in cases involving solely property damage or lost income or wages. I cannot honestly say that I would personally be willing to go through the loss, pain or suffering experienced by the plaintiff here for any amount of money. That has also been true in most other personal injury cases I have presided over, however. Nevertheless, the injury and suffering and loss having occurred, some measure of just compensation must be attempted.
Secondly, as sort of a check on the amount I arrived at through the foregoing analysis, I attempted to mentally compare other cases I have tried, adjusting them as best I can according to the respective ages, and vocations of the injured persons, the nature, extent and duration of their injuries, the recency of the case, and the various other appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances involved in the respective cases. After doing so, I feel that an award in the neighborhood of as much as $950,000 would not be significantly' out of line with such other awards.
Ill — INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) provides that a new trial may be granted if there is insufficient evidence to justify the verdict or it is against the law. There was clearly sufficient evidence to support both the verdict in plaintiff’s favor on the issue of liability and the amount of damages awarded to him.
In addition, by its post-remittitur memorandum opinion, the trial court ruled that its post-judgment order “which granted a new trial unless a remittitur was accepted, effectively vacated the [earlier judgment] entered upon the jury’s verdict.” The trial court stated only the conclusion that, “from that time no judgment was in effect upon which interest would run unless the Supreme Court had reinstated the judgment on appeal.” No authority for that proposition was cited.
Sanchez’s appeal requires us to address the following issues:
*1067I. Did the district court err in its decision concerning the accrual of post-judgment interest?
II. Did the district court err by again directing Sanchez to accept a remittitur or, alternatively, undergo a new trial on the issue of damages?
I. POST JUDGMENT INTEREST
Following remittitur and after hearing the parties, the district court entered its Decision and Order on May 27, 1987, ruling on the plaintiff’s entitlement to interest on the judgment:
... the Order dated January 25,1985 and entered herein on January 28,1985 which granted a new trial unless a remittitur was accepted, effectively vacated the Judgment and Amended Judgment previously entered on the jury’s verdict. From that time, no judgment was in effect upon which interest would run, unless the Supreme Court had reinstated the judgment on appeal.
Accordingly, I conclude that no interest will start to accrue until a final judgment is entered either after acceptance of the remittitur or conclusion of a new trial.
The court so ruled at the instigation of the defendants as urged in a written Memorandum submitted responsive to a plaintiff’s memorandum. Therein the contention was made that “no post-judgment interest would commence to run until entry of judgment following plaintiff’s election of the remittitur.” R., p. 26. This was further explained by the defendants:
... post-judgment interest would not commence to run until entry of judgment for the reduced amount, because until that point in time, there would have existed the possibility that the matter would be retried to a jury on the issue of damages.
R., p. 26. But, defendants also conceded to the trial court that this Court’s stay order on accepting the appeal precluded Sanchez from having to make an election. As a matter of fact, the defendants complained rather strongly to the trial court that the Supreme Court stay order had the effect of allowing Sanchez to delay making any decision required of him by the trial court’s order. Additionally, defendants conceded also the:
... existence of case law adopting the position that interest runs from entry of the judgment on the jury’s verdict in cases where the appellate court reverses a trial court’s order granting defendants’ post-trial motions.
R., p. 34.
On the other hand, the defendants had earlier on June 12, 1985, perfected their own cross-appeal from the final judgment entered on October 31, 1984, which cross-appeal included orders entered thereafter by the trial court on January 28, February 6, and February 19, 1985. The defendants’ cross-appeal requested the inclusion of some material in the appeal record which was in addition to that requested by Sanchez on his appeal. Notwithstanding that, the district court was thus led into the error of asserting that the order of January 28,1985, “effectively vacated the Judgment ... entered on the jury’s verdict.”
The final judgment, however, has not been vacated specifically [which is the ordinary and better practice] nor has it been vacated effectively. The trial court’s view would have been correct only if Sanchez had properly signified his refusal to consent to a reduction in the judgment on the verdict and the alternative of a new trial became effective. Then the earlier judgment would have been vacated, and no interest would have accrued until the entry of a new judgment. Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974). However, as matters stood upon the first appeal to this Court, and would continue to stand in the event of a timely second appeal, Sanchez still had the option of electing to consent to a lower judgment in the amount $950,000 — upon which interest would run from the date of the original judgment less the remittitur, Id. at 762, 519 P.2d at 431—or to undergo a new trial. Thus, to this date, the original judgment on *1068the jury’s verdict of $1.35 million remains in full force.
Moreover, a good portion of the court’s opinion in Sanchez I was devoted to passing on issues which the defendants presented in briefing and arguing their cross-appeal. As to the trial court’s induced belief that “no judgment was in effect upon which interest would run, unless the Supreme Court had reinstated the judgment,” —the answer is simply that this Court had no reason to concern itself with reinstating a judgment which had not been vacated and from which both parties had appealed. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in ruling that its post-judgment order effectively vacated the monetary judgment entered on the jury’s verdict.
Additionally, although not given mention in our Sanchez I opinion there is the matter of the order which was prepared for the trial court’s signature after that court issued its January 7, 1985 Memorandum Decision, the conclusion of which stated that “Counsel may prepare appropriate orders for my signature consistent with this opinion.” Presumably, counsel for each of the parties submitted proposed orders — in which regard the record is silent as to which counsel’s proposed order was utilized —but the one accepted, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk contains language therein which is somewhat out of the ordinary, reading thusly:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion for a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P.(59)(a)(5) is granted unless plaintiff will accept the sum of $950,000.00 in remittitur of the Judgment and Amended Judgment of this court entered on November 1 and 2, 1984, respectively, plus interest on any Second Amended Judgment entered pursuant to this Order in the amount of $950,000.00, plus costs, at the rate of 18 percent per annum from the date of entry of such Judgment.
R., p. 51 (emphasis supplied). It would be one thing to condition the grant of a new trial upon the plaintiff’s failure to timely file his consent to a reduction of the judgment by the sum of $400,000, and quite another to conditionally grant a new trial for the plaintiff’s failure to “accept the sum of $950,000,” plus interest, plus costs and interest on the costs. The first requires a filed consent; the second requires an acceptance which has been tendered.
Moreover, the defendants did not at any time test the Sanchez staying power by making a tender of $950,000, plus costs and accrued interest on both, in order to ascertain if it would be accepted as per the terms of the district court’s order. A partial transcript of a hearing attached to the Defendants’ Memorandum submitted to the trial court shows counsel for Sanchez saying to the court and counsel for defendants:
They can always stop the interest, Your Honor. We’ll accept their nine-fifty anytime they want to pay it, and the interest stops on that nine-fifty the minute we get our money. I’ll say in open court that we’re prepared to accept their nine hundred and fifty thousand but we want to appeal the judgment and the interest — or have the judgment reinstated as the verdict was returned. Then, of course, they only need worry about the interest on that portion of the judgment not paid.
R., p. 60-61.
It is also to be noted that in this case, as contrasted to Leliefeld v. Panorama Contractors, Inc., 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983), 111 Idaho 897, 728 P.2d 1306 (1986), there was, with respect to the jury’s damage award, no issue here as to apportionment. On the first Leliefeld appeal, the jury’s adjudication of monetary damages suffered by the plaintiffs was specifically affirmed, “... we consider the damages severable from the liability issue, ... we affirm that determination.” 104 Idaho at 375, 659 P.2d at 129.
After proceedings on remand for a rede-termination of liability on the second appeal to this Court the sole issue presented was the interest allowable on the jury’s determination of plaintiffs’ damages. This court held that the claimed damages having been reduced to a liquidated amount in Leliefeld I, the trial court did not err in ruling that *1069interest properly accrued thereon. Specifically we first observed:
The main thrust of the defendants’ argument to us is that until proportionate culpability would be determined at the second trial it would be impossible for them, with any degree of certainty, to make any tender of payment on damages — either to the plaintiffs or into the court registry, in order to stop the accrual of interest. However, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court has pointed out, ‘The damages were liquidated at the first trial, and it was theoretically possible for a tender to have been made.... This is especially true when, as here, no question of damages was involved upon the second trial.’ Id. [Nelson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 102 Wis.2d 159, 306 N.W.2d 71] at 73 [1981] (quoting from Zeidler v. Goelzer, 191 Wis. 378, 211 N.W. 140 (1926).
Leliefeld v. Panorama Contractors, Inc., 111 Idaho 897, 906, 728 P.2d 1306, 1315 (1986) (emphasis added). We then stated that Leliefeld II “presents a set of circumstances more suggestive of the advisability of [making] a tender than any of the Wisconsin cases,” and we explained why — all of which is readily available at 111 Idaho at pp. 906-907; 728 P.2d at pp. 1315-1316.
Today, we have a set of circumstances even more suggestive of the advisability of making a tender than was present in Lelie-feld II. A judgment on the jury’s verdict had been entered in favor of Sanchez in the amount of $1,350,000, and was accruing interest.
At the instigation of the defendants the district court had made its own computation of damages, and had arrived at its damage assessment of $950,000. That would be the amount of the judgment on the verdict if Sanchez consented to such reduction. No lesser amount was involved. No apportionment was involved; the judgment on the verdict was jointly and severally against Frank Galey and his employee, Rusty Anderson. Likewise, if Sanchez consented, the amended judgment which would have been entered against the defendants would have been the same joint and several judgment in the lesser amount of $950,000. It would have carried the same date as the initial judgment on the jury verdict.
On the advisability of making any tender in order to avoid accruing interest on the still extant judgment, the defendants had to be well aware that a jury, described by the district court as fine a jury as he had ever experienced, had set damages at $1,350,000. Defendants were, by reason of their successful motion, also advised by the results obtained that the district court’s assessment of damages was $950,000.
The defendants, or their insurance carrier, if any, whichever is the case being of no moment, clearly decided to make no tender whatever, and have retained the use of the money represented by the district court’s lower figure of $950,000 since the judgment was entered on the verdict on October 31, 1984. In January of 1985 the defendants were made aware that the court-set damages were that sum of $950,000. And, at the same time they were made aware that the trial court had closely examined their claim for a new trial on the issue of liability based on alleged errors, and knew that the court found none. The defendants then on their cross-appeal in Sanchez I sought to persuade this court of reversible error at the trial, but again failed, and were so advised October 17, 1986. And again no tender of any kind was made to stop the accruing interest.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Dursteler v. Dursteler, 112 Idaho 594, 733 P.2d 815 (Ct.App.1987), which is almost side-by-side with Sanchez I, also served to advise the defendants that “When a judgment is modified downward, the new sum draws interest from the date of the original judgment ... post-judgment interest may run on the final judgment from the date of the original judgment despite a subsequent modification on appeal.” 112 Idaho at 596, 733 P.2d at 817. We perceive no difference between a modification made at the trial court level, or by an appellate court.
Since the views of Justice Johnson on the second issue, discussed below, command a majority, the trial court’s order requiring the plaintiffs to accept a $400,000 reduction *1070in the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict, or otherwise face a new trial, will stand and is affirmed.
If Sanchez timely files his consent to the order of remittitur, the district court will thereupon enter a modified judgment in the sum of $950,000, plus interest accruing thereon at the legal rate (18 percent) since the date of October 31,1984, until satisfied.
HUNTLEY and JOHNSON, JJ. and McFADDEN, J. pro tem, concur.