dissenting.
I
Contrary to the stance taken by Justice Johnson, the issue presented here is not whether the wife, Barbara Draper, can maintain a negligence action against her husband. More simply, that issue has not been decided in the court below, and is not before us. Moreover, that issue in all likelihood will not come before us. That issue became stare decisis in this state fourteen years ago in Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975). In that action the plaintiff, Betty Rogers, accompanied her husband, Peter Rogers, on a motor trip from San Francisco to Yellowstone Park. The couple had an infant son with them. The trip was authorized by the Yellowstone Park Co., owner of the vehicle, and insured as such against claims of liability. Peter did all of the driving, and having apparently over-taxed his stamina, dozed or fell asleep while driving. The car left the road, and Betty was injured, and filed suit against Peter and his employer, the Yellowstone Park Co. The trial court concluded that under the then present state of the law of community property any recovery by Betty would belong to the community comprised of Peter and Betty, thus inuring to the benefit of the negligent Peter. A summary judgment in favor of Yellowstone was entered.
On appeal the issues raised in defense were various, but the fundamental issue was whether Betty could maintain a negligence action against Peter, whose negligence, if any, might be vicariously in turn attributable to his employer, Yellowstone Park Co. The Court issued its opinion on July 25, 1974. Responsive to a petition, rehearing was granted, and a second opin*979ion for the Court entered almost a year later, May 5, 1975. The case was indeed given thorough consideration.
A review of the opinions discloses that the Court carefully weighed all of the policy contentions, carefully reviewed the case law from other jurisdictions — as well as a substantial body of Idaho law — and made the determination to abolish the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, as one member of the court in dissent so worded it, and as it since has so been generally referenced. Justice McFadden, the author of the Court’s Rogers opinions, in writing after rehearing referred to the doctrine of inter-spousal immunity in speaking to “the purpose of abrogating [it].” 97 Idaho at 25, 539 P.2d 577.
Significantly, as one approaches Draper v. Draper, there was in Rogers no issue of insurance contract construction or interpretation. There was just that same exact issue of spousal immunity, although more broadly excluded from coverage as “household immunity.”
II
Four years after Rogers the Court was presented with Unigard Ins. Group v. Royal Globe Insurance Company, 100 Idaho 123, 594 P.2d 633 (1979). Significantly, in this case, as was not so in Rogers, there was no involvement of a tort victim suing the negligent tort feasor. That suit would follow later in another state. Unigard Ins. Co. filed the suit against Royal Globe Ins. Co. for the sole purpose of determining the susceptibility of three policies of insurance to which resort would be made in the event a potential tort action might be brought thereafter. The declaratory judgment action, in Idaho, was filed in January 1976. The tort action was filed in Oregon a year and a day later.
The parties stipulated prior to trial to the potential exposure of three policies and to the underlying facts which would produce the Oregon tort action. But, as was made abundantly clear by Justice McFadden in authoring this Court’s unanimous opinion, that:
[O]nly the rights and duties of the insurance companies vis a vis each other on these three policies are before us ... involved here is not an action in tort to establish liability, but rather a declaratory judgment involving interpretation of written contracts of insurance to determine priorities among different policies ... the rights and liabilities of the two insurance companies involved in this action arise out of written contracts of insurance, not out of tort doctrines of negligence or imputed negligence.
100 Idaho at 125-126, 128, 594 P.2d at 635-636, 638.
A holding in Unigard that Idaho law applied to the contracts of insurance was amply fortified and so far as is known has never been questioned. The contracts of insurance were sold in Idaho to Idaho residents. That holding was so patently required that the Court did not bother to consider what might be the law in Oregon — the place in which the two Idaho citizens were journeying when the fatality occurred to one which may have been the fault of the other.
Significantly, the issue there decided has no viable effect on the issue presented in Draper v. Draper. For one thing, one of the insurance companies argued on appeal that the stipulation of facts was in error and should be disregarded. That issue was turned away, the Court saying:
While appellant’s contentions are not without merit, they were not raised before the trial court. We have carefully reviewed the trial record and the trial briefs submitted by both sides, and we conclude that the issue was not brought before the trial court. Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court for the first time on appeal. Bair v. Barron, 97 Idaho 26, 539 P.2d 578 (1975); Dunn v. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236, 506 P.2d 463 (1973); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 437 P.2d 32 (1968). Appellant is therefore bound by its stipulation that both of its policies provide liability insurance coverage to Trabert.
100 Idaho at 127, 594 P.2d at 667. In addition, it is to be kept firmly in mind that *980not involved were any statutes in the Idaho Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, Title 49, ch. 12, Idaho Code. That is indeed important in assessing the nonap-plicability of Unigard to Draper v. Draper.
Ill
Another inter-familial immunity abrogation case which is deserving of attention is Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 109 Idaho 849, 712 P.2d 550 (1986). Moreover, it along with Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., plus proper consideration of the policy here at issue, as viewed with proper regard to Idaho statutory law examined in Rogers will lead to the only proper conclusion in this case. It is the same conclusion drawn by Judge Fuller in his carefully thought out memorandum opinion, to which considerable deference is due.
In the Reed case, Justice Huntley in authoring the Court’s opinion first noted that well over half of the fifty states now allow intrafamily negligence actions. Included in those states are our immediate neighbors of Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. Masterfully weaving his thread, he then went to the paramount crux of this transition in the law, namely state laws requiring liability insurance. In Idaho that statute was then I.C. § 49-238, and as did Justice Huntley, I will set it out and some of the ensuing language which so well portrayed the logic of its application:
The relevant statute in the case at bar reads:
49-233. Required Motor Vehicle Insurance — (a) Every owner of a motor vehicle ... shall continuously provide insurance against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death or damage to property suffered by any person caused by maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.
I.C. § 49-233 (1978) (emphasis added). Farmers Insurance Company issued a policy to the Reeds, and its language tracks almost exactly the ‘any person’ language in the statute. The company agreed:
To pay all damages the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of: (A) bodily injury to any person ... arising out of the ownership maintenance or use ... of the described automobile or non-owned automobile. (Emphasis added.)
However, unlike the statute, the insurance contract contains a clause which excludes coverage for household members. This is in spite of the clear legislative mandate ordering coverage extended for damage, injury or death suffered ‘by any person.’ This type of exclusion in a liability insurance policy leaves completely unprotected those family members injured when another family or household member is at the wheel in a negligently caused automobile accident. Unless the defendant can show that something shields it from the statutory obligation ‘imposed by law’ to pay damages caused by the policy holder to ‘any person,’ the household exclusion clause is flatly and unmistakably in violation of Idaho’s compulsory insurance law.
_ Traditionally, insurance companies have been relieved from their obligation ‘imposed by law’ to compensate by the intrafamily immunity doctrine. If there is intrafamily immunity in Idaho in the contest of automobile accidents, then the household exclusion clauses are valid. If there is no intrafamily immunity shield, the household exclusion clauses are invalid statutorily and as against public policy.
We will first explain why we decline to implement the immunity in this narrow area. Thereafter, we will examine whether the statute and public policy completely invalidate the exclusion clause.
Essentially, two factors support the in-trafamily immunity: (1) preservation of family harmony and (2) prevention of collusion or fraud. Pedigo [v. Rowley], 101 Idaho [201] at 203, 610 P.2d [560] at 562 [(1980)]. It was feared that family harmony in certain areas would be disrupted because of the acrimony engendered when family members are pitted as adversaries against each other, and be*981cause a judgment might erode the family financial base. But today, the presence of mandatory automobile liability insurance completely undercuts that rationale in this area. Thus, we feel that allowing an action, and subsequent recovery to the extent of the coverage under the automobile liability insurance, will enhance rather than disrupt family harmony. The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently adopted this approach in responding to the family disharmony argument:
Disruption of domestic tranquility is much less likely where the minor child can be compensated for his losses under the parent’s liability coverage, which additionally eases any financial strain on the family resulting from the accident.
Unah [v. Martin], 676 P.2d [1366] at 1369 [(Okl.1984)]. The court added:
While the existence of liability insurance — in this case compulsory coverage — does not create liability, its presence is significant, and cannot be ignored in the determination of whether our courts should continue to deprive unemancipated minors the right enjoyed by all other individuals.
The second major reason advanced by insurance companies in favor of applying the intrafamily immunity doctrine is prevention of fraud or collusion. This Court disposed of that argument in Thompson v. Hagen, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974)], and in Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company, 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975), when we declined to let insurance companies hide behind the interspousal immunity shield.
Implicit in respondent’s argument is that the judicial system is inadequate to safeguard against collusion in tort actions between spouses. We reject this contention, for courts in this state presently weed out fraud and collusion in other cases not involving actions between spouses.
We find nothing unusual or peculiar in interspousal suits to frustrate the capability of the judicial system to avoid or anticipate such abuses.
Id. at 17, 539 P.2d 569. See also, Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash.2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982).
For the reasons expressed above, we decline to preclude intrafamily automobile negligence actions by judicially broadening the family immunity doctrine in Idaho. Therefore, the liability of the insurance companies to pay on their automobile liability insurance policies remains at ‘liability imposed by law.’ I.C. § 49-233 (1978).
Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 109 Idaho at 851-852, 712 P.2d at 552-553.
The Reed opinion also brought back to mind Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974), another notable case in the same vein as Rogers and Reed. Here the Court struck down the Idaho Guest Statute, I.C. § 49-1401. That statute had been a blight on the Idaho horizon since its enactment in 1931. The title of the House Bill which became I.C. § 49-1401 is intriguing: AN ACT RELEASING OWNERS OF MOTOR VEHICLE FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO PASSENGERS THEREIN.1
In concluding the Court’s proper disposition of the Guest Statute immunity there is not only the well-stated, precedent-documented opinion of Justice McQuade, concurred in by Justices Donaldson and Bakes, but also the separate majority opinion of Justice McFadden wherein he concluded that the guest statute was inconsistent with Idaho’s then newly adopted comparative negligence. Justices Donaldson and Bakes concurred in Justice McFadden’s opinion as well as with Justice McQuade. Justice McQuade correctly pointed out that in the event of such an inconsistency, the latter-enacted statute prevails over the earlier. 96 Idaho at 26, 523 P.2d at 1372.
*982IV
In my view it is not difficult to analyze and determine Draper v. Draper. Unigard has no application whatever. Rogers does. Reed does. Thompson does as a matter of legal philosophy and judicial policy. (Hardly ever does an appellate court produce two majority opinions reaching the same result.) Moreover, Draper v. Draper is to an extent sui generis. The complaint filed in an Idaho district court, as amended, was basically predicated upon two claims. The first was the negligence claim which Barbara Draper filed against her husband —which remains in abeyance while we consider the related, and, to a large extent integrated, claim that State Farm Mutual is responsible for any damages which may be recovered — an obligation of which presumably it has given notice it will not respect. The tort claim is not before us on this review.
State Farm’s answer has joined issue in its answer to Barbara Draper’s complaint on the insurance issue. It has attached a copy of its policy. On page 6 thereof, almost side-by-side are two interesting provisions. Under the heading THERE IS NO COVERAGE follows 1. (not involved here), and then 2., which is, and continues the theme of declaring no coverage as follows:
2. FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO
a. ...
b. ...
c. Any insured or any member of an insured’s family residing in the insured’s household.
But, then there is on the right side of the page, a heading in letters half the size of the headings on the left. This diminutive heading is captioned: MOTOR VEHICLE COMPULSORY INSURANCE LAW OR FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW. Part number 1 thereof is subcaptioned Out-of-State-Coverage. In ever yet diminishing sized print it provides:
a. the policy will be interpreted to give the coverage required by law; and
b. the coverage so given replaces any coverage in this policy to the extent required by the law for the insured’s operation, maintenance or use of car insured under this policy.
The district court, Judge Fuller, obviously made a close and painstaking examination of the sixteen page policy which State Farm Mutual attached to its Answer to Second Amended Complaint. Although State Farm Mutual’s pleadings specifically raised the “household exclusion,” Judge Fuller found in the policy itself a provision which he concluded brought the policy terms into compliance with the requirements of Idaho Statutory law. In his memorandum decision and order he ruled: “In the alternative, this court finds that the policy contains a provision accepting the coverage required by out-of-state compulsory insurance laws.” R., p. 71. Judge Fuller was on sound ground, as has been shown above by noting the specific language of the policy. That language tells the insured in no uncertain terms that if he travels into Idaho, and any of the other forty-nine states, he is in compliance with the compulsory insurance laws of those fifty states. Should he drive to Alaska and necessarily travel through Canada, he is in compliance with Canadian laws.
It is logical to believe that Oregon-issued State Farm Mutual liability policy provisions were incorporated to accommodate the requirement of I.C. § 49-1211(l)(b) which states that the insurance carrier of a non-resident of Idaho who has not registered his vehicle in Idaho must "agree in writing that the policies shall be deemed to conform with the laws of Idaho relating to the terms of motor vehicle liability policies issued in Idaho.” The policy is a writing, and it clearly is binding on State Farm Mutual, not just as to Idaho law, but as to any state the Oregon resident policy holder may enter.
That the State Farm Mutual policy so provides is not remarkable. The policy was sold to Van Draper, 713 Locust Ave., Nys-sa, Oregon. While it may have been within the contemplation of the parties in selling and buying the policy that by reason of Nyssa’s close proximity to Idaho, there would be frequent trips into Idaho, the particular provision is part of a printed *983policy. Thus it is more likely that State Farm Mutual was aware that people in the West are prone to travel, and much of that travel is interstate, and practically all of it is by motor vehicle. Be that as it may, the provision in the policy clearly states that there is out-of-Oregon coverage, and the nature of that coverage is “to give the coverage required by law” of the state which its insureds (here, the Drapers) may decide to enter. It is a commendable policy provision.
Idaho has had since 1947, a statute which requires motor vehicle liability policies to contain such a provision. I.C. § 49-1521, which was in effect at times here pertinent, states:
(b) Such owner’s policy of liability insurance.
1. ...
2. Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada ...
Idaho statutory law is thus seen requiring that a policy show that it affords coverage nationwide, i.e., under the laws of 50 states (and Canada), where the Oregon policy is made applicable in Oregon, and also in of the other forty-nine states and Canada, the proviso being that it will “give the coverage required by law.”
Idaho statutory law, as judicially amended, gives coverage to a wife who is injured by the vehicular negligence of her husband, Rogers, 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 and, although not applicable, to parents whose minor child has been killed by the vehicular negligence of one of their other children, Reed, 109 Idaho 849, 712 P.2d 550.
Judge Fuller’s decision should be affirmed. Moreover, when he discusses the Idaho public policy, he is also on sound ground. The point here is, however, that such policy was performed for him by this Court’s opinions, in Rogers, Reed, and Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365. Judge Fuller in discussing public policy is only “guilty” of correctly applying it to this particular set of circumstances, which is to say that “if guilty” of any error it is in deciding the issue differently than Justice Johnson and those who have readily joined his opinion, decide it. Probably there is here, as in many cases, room for diverging views. There were those, including some members of this Court, who voiced their discontent with the Rogers and Reed decisions. Yet those decisions still stand, and are there to be followed or to be overruled.
I see no reason to get overly excited concerning Justice Johnson’s use of Uni-gard. It simply does not fit into this scenario. The contract here involved is a contract entered into in Oregon, but it was specifically made subject to the compulsory motor vehicle responsibility law of Idaho, and forty-nine other states and one foreign country as well.
Mrs. Draper’s potential claim for relief arose when she was injured, July 29, 1984. She had two years in which to file it, or face the bar of the statute of limitations. When she did file her claim for relief it became an action, “in its legal sense a suit brought in court.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 26 (5th ed. 1979). At that time it became a pending action. Prior to that time it was nothing but a potential claim upon which she might or might not bring an action. Once filed, however, it was an action that arose out of the factual background alleged in her complaint.
Notwithstanding the advent of Idaho’s adoption of the “federal rules” of civil procedure, the authors of the opinions in Thompson, Reed, and Rogers indulged in loose terminology as to actions pending, which was correct, but also as to “actions arising in the future, actions arising after this decision becomes final, and as to actions subsequent to December 31, 1984.” Actions simply do not arise. If a complaint is filed, an action will become pending.
A cause of action does not arise, it accrues when in tort law, there has been a *984negligent act of commission or omission. It is a right which a party has to institute a judicial proceeding. Black’s Law Dictionary, 201 (5th ed. 1979).
Barbara Draper had a cause of action on which she subsequently filed suit on June 17,1986. This was subsequent to the Reed decision’s declared date of applicability, whether it be the date that decision was issued, or the earlier date of December 31, 1984, when an opinion was issued which was withdrawn. In either event, her suit was filed in point of time after the Reed decision, and in no way can it be seriously urged that she was seeking to obtain a retroactive application of Reed.
Moreover, her suit was not predicated upon Reed’s holding, but upon the premise that she was injured in Idaho and State Farm Mutual policies of insurance provided that it accepted controlling Idaho law whenever the insureds under the policy might happen to be injured in Idaho. It was, as Judge Fuller observed, a case of first impression making new law in Idaho.
A final question: Is an out-of-state motorist traveling in Idaho subject to the laws of Idaho? The answer is, of course, in the affirmative. The traveler is bound by the Idaho rules of the road. He can be held guilty of criminal conduct for some violations.
As with any Idaho resident, he is required to have liability insurance, and if he does not, he is there, too, subject to criminal prosecution. It satisfies Idaho that his proof of having such liability insurance may consist of evidence of an Oregon certificate of insurance. This is all as it should be. Making it even better, his Oregon-issued policy gives recognition to its acceptance that when the Oregon driver is in Idaho, or any other of the fifty states, the Oregon-issued policy will give the coverage required by the out-of-Oregon state.