(concurring in the result) — A question implicit in this appeal is whether, under the declaratory judgment act (RCW 7.24), the courts of this state have the power or jurisdiction to entertain and decide this case. This question is not argued by the parties. It concerns their status and whether the parties have a justiciable interest in the matter they are attempting to litigate. Secondly, there is a question (argued strongly by the parties) whether § 8 of chapter 156, Laws of 1951, as amended by § 1, chapter 206, Laws of 1953 (RCW (Sup. 1953) 3.14.010), is constitutional.
The opinion assumes without discussion that the answer to the first question must be in the affirmative. On the basis *897of our decision in Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wn. (2d) 767, 246 P. (2d) 489,1 agree with the legal conclusion implicit in the assumption made by the opinion. Perhaps it should be pointed out here that in the Huntamer case the secretary of state had announced that all candidates for office at the 1952 general election would be required to execute the oath or affidavit specified in chapter 254, Laws of 1951. In the Huntamer case, we said:
“Plaintiffs, seeking an adjudication of alleged rights under our declaratory judgment act, instituted this suit in the superior court for Thurston county against the secretary of state, Earl Coe, in his capacity as chief election officer of the state of Washington. Specifically, plaintiffs sought to have § 16, p. 801, and subsection (e) of § 1, p. 794, of chapter 254, Laws of 1951, adjudged unconstitutional, null, and void.
“The trial court took jurisdiction of the case on the basis that the declaratory judgment act was applicable, and adjudged the above provisions of chapter 254, supra (hereinafter referred to as chapter 254), to be unconstitutional, null, and void. The secretary of state has appealed.
“The facts in this case may be briefly stated as follows: As found by the trial court, L. C. Huntamer, Thomas C. Rabbitt, Florence M. Morrissey, and James A. McDaniel, residents and electors of this state, desire and intend to become candidates, respectively, for governor, United States Congress, and the state legislature. . . .
“Plaintiffs state they will be prevented from becoming candidates for the respective offices because they cannot or will not execute the oath or affidavit as proposed by the secretary of state as they interpret and understand it and its effect.
“Because of the particular circumstances in this case, involving, as they do, some questions of considerable public interest and importance, we think the trial court acted properly in assuming jurisdiction to adjudicate certain questions in the case under our declaratory judgment statute. In saying this, we are fully aware of the decisions regarding our declaratory judgment act in the following cases: Washington Beauty College v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 80 P. (2d) 403; Johnson v. State, 187 Wash. 605, 60 P. (2d) 681, 106 A. L. R. 237; Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P. (2d) 341, 114 A. L. R. 1345; and State ex rel. Yakima Amusement Co. v. Yakima County, 192 Wash. 179, 73 P. (2d) 759.
*898“In Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments 1413 (1951), the following statement is found:
“ A petition for a declaratory judgment is particularly appropriate to determine the constitutionality of a statute when the parties desire, and the public need requires, a speedy determination of the public interest involved therein.’
“In Allison v. Sharp, 209 N. C. 477, 481, 184 S. E. 27, where the facts admittedly were somewhat different from those in the case at bar, the supreme court of North Carolina said:
“ ‘The plaintiffs and all the people of the State are vitally affected by the statute in controversy. While there was another remedy at law available to them, they have challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which they contend that the registrar refused them registration. Under such circumstances and conditions, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act affords a ready means of testing its validity.’ ”
On the question of the constitutionality of the statutory provisions under consideration, the opinion states:
• “A discussion of the standards under which delegation of legislative authority is permissible, is not called for in this case. The specific mandate of the twenty-eighth amendment to the constitution of the state of Washington is too clear for interpretation. It unequivocally places the duty of fixing the number of justices of the peace upon the legislature exclusively, and leaves no room for the applicability of the doctrine of permissive delegation of legislative authority.”
It appears to me that the above-quoted language means that the legislature cannot delegate, (a) to county commissioners, (b) to a justice court district committee, or (c) to any other agency of government (existing or created especially for the purpose), the authority to provide for justice of the peace courts in the various counties, even if definitive standards (population, area, or otherwise) are prescribed by the legislature for the guidance and control of the action of the recipients of the delegated power. I think the position, thus stated, is too extreme, and I cannot agree with it. It is my belief that, if adequate legislative standards had been written into the enactment, we would have a different question before us. Under such circumstances, I would not agree *899that the legislative objective should be invalidated by this court on constitutional grounds. In other words, the constitutional defect I see in the statutory provision under consideration lies in the fact that it prescribes no workable, definitive standards; i.e., no judicially acceptable limitations within which the delegated legislative power is to be exercised by the recipients thereof, the justice court district committees, and the boards of county commissioners.
On the basis of the reasons indicated, I concur in the result reached in the opinion.
Hamley and Weaver, JJ., concur with Finley, J.