concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court’s order must be vacated and remanded. I agree the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order allowing Newton and McGonigal to intervene while an appeal was pending before this Court. I vote to vacate on these grounds. I dissent from the majority opinion’s dicta on procedures on remand. A superior court judge does not possess jurisdiction to enter an order overruling an earlier order by another superior court judge on the same issue without a finding of substantial change in circumstances.
I. Background
Plaintiffs originally filed this action alleging a contract with defendants and asserting entitlement to a commission for locating certain properties purchased by defendants. On 24 May 2002, defendants moved to dismiss Newton and McGonigal for lack of standing and to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied MCLLC’s motion to dismiss for subject matter jurisdiction, but granted its motion to dismiss Newton and McGonigal for lack of standing. Defendants appealed. On appeal, plaintiffs cross-assigned error to the trial court’s order dismissing Newton and McGonigal. In an unpublished opinion dated 18 November 2003, we dismissed defendants’ appeal as interlocutory and affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying their motion to certify the judgment. We did not reach plaintiffs’ cross-assignment of error.
While the appeal was pending in this Court, on 24 January 2003, Newton and McGonigal filed a purported intervenors’ complaint. On 8 April 2003, the trial court entered an order granting Newton and McGonigal’s motion to intervene. The trial court ruled, “there has been no substantial change of circumstances” and expressly recognized that its order “in effect overrules or circumvents Judge Cobb’s Superceding Order” dismissing Newton and McGonigal as plaintiffs. The trial court also granted defendants’ motion to stay further proceedings.
II. Issues
The issues presented are whether: (1) the trial court had jurisdiction to enter an order while an appeal was pending; and (2) the trial court erred in overruling a nondiscretionary order of another superior court judge without a change of circumstances by permitting Newton and McGonigal to intervene after they had been dismissed for lack of standing.
*798III. Trial Court Jurisdiction
A. Effect of Appeal
The majority opinion concludes, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294, defendants’ appeal in Bruggeman II divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider Newton and McGonigal’s intervention. I agree.
When an interlocutory order of the trial court is appealed, the trial court is not required to stay proceedings, but may disregard the appeal and proceed to try the action while the appeal on the interlocutory matter is in the appellate court. Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 364, 57 S.E.2d 375, 383, reh’g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950). Our Courts have upheld a trial on its merits while an interlocutory appeal is pending. See T&T Development Co. v. Southern Nat. Bank of S.C., 125 N.C. App. 600, 481 S.E.2d 347, disc. rev. denied, 346 N.C. 185, 486 S.E.2d 219 (1997). Under our statutes:
When an appeal is perfected as provided by this Article it stays all further proceedings in the court below upon the judgment appealed from, or upon the matter embraced therein-, but the court below may proceed upon any other matter included in the action and not affected by the judgment appealed from.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294 (2003) (emphasis supplied). A fair reading of this statute together with Veazey, T&T Development, and other precedents regarding the effect of an interlocutory appeal suggests the trial court may proceed on other matters outside the ruling issued by the interlocutory judgment. The trial court, however, is stayed from ruling upon or overruling “the judgment appealed from, or upon the matter embraced therein.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294.
Here, while the issue of Newton and McGonigal’s standing was on appeal to this Court in Bruggeman II, another superior court judge issued an order ruling on the same matter pending on appeal. Based on plaintiffs’ cross-assignment of error regarding Newton and McGonigal’s intervention in the case, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction and could not hear any matters relating to the issue of their participation as a party in the case. Plaintiffs were not precluded from raising the issue of standing on appeal pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 10(d) (2004). The trial court was divested of jurisdiction regarding this matter. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294.1 concur in the majority opinion’s ruling to vacate and remand for a new trial.
*799B. “Judge Shopping”
The majority opinion concludes, “Judge Crow’s inquiry into the case regarding the merits of Newton and McGonigal’s motion to intervene was therefore independent of Judge Cobb’s previous inquiry into, whether Newton and McGonigal had standing to sue defendants.” I disagree. I agree with defendants’ argument that the trial court erred in allowing Newton and McGonigal’s motion to intervene because it expressly overruled another superior court judge’s order dismissing them for lack of standing. No substantial change in circumstances had occurred since the earlier dismissal on standing had been entered.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized:
“The power of one judge of the superior court is equal to and coordinate with that of another.” Michigan Nat’l Bank v. Hanner, 268 N.C. 668, 670, 151 S.E.2d 579, 580 (1966). Accordingly, it is well established in our jurisprudence that no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another; that one Superior Court judge may not correct another’s errors of law; and that ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action.
State v. Woolridge, 357 N.C. 544, 549, 592 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2003) (quoting Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972)); see also Global Furniture, Inc. v. Proctor, 165 N.C. App. 229, 234-35, - S.E.2d -, - (July 6, 2004) (No. COA03-1043). One judge in a concurrent court may reconsider or alter another judge’s prior ruling “only in the limited situation where the party seeking to alter that prior ruling makes a sufficient showing of a substantial change in circumstances during the interim which presently warrants a different or new disposition of the matter.” Woolridge, 357 N.C. at 549, 592 S.E.2d at 194 (quoting State v. Duvall, 304 N.C. 557, 562, 284 S.E.2d 495, 499 (1981)). In Woolridge, Justice Brady noted, “Given this Court’s intolerance for the impropriety referred to as ‘judge shopping’ and its promotion of collegiality between judges of concurrent jurisdiction, this ‘unseemly conflict [of one superior court judge overruling another]’ . . . will not be tolerated.” 357 N.C. at 550, 592 S.E.2d at 194 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Judge Cobb dismissed Newton and McGonigal as parties for lack of standing on 12 September 2002. On 1 October 2002, Newton and *800McGonigal moved the trial court to allow them to intervene. On 8 April 2003, Judge Crow allowed their motion. Newton and McGonigal argue that Judge Crow’s order is distinguishable and does not overrule Judge Cobb’s earlier decision. Judge Crow’s order, however, expressly acknowledged, “this Order allowing intervention in effect overrules or circumvents Judge Cobb’s Superceding Order, entered 12 September 2002 . ...” In granting the motion, Judge Crow also concluded, “That between the time of the entry of Judge Cobb’s Superceding Order, filed 12 September 2002, and the date of this Order, there has been no substantial change of circumstances.” (emphasis supplied).
Under Woolridge and well-established jurisprudence, Judge Crow was without authority to reconsider, alter, or overrule Judge Cobb’s earlier order without receiving evidence and making a finding to support “a substantial change in circumstances . . . which presently warrants a different or new disposition of the matter.” 357 N.C. at 549-50, 592 S.E.2d at 194. The parties should have requested a hearing before Judge Cobb to obtain a ruling on the motion to intervene. Judge Crow noted in his order that he had spoken directly with Judge Cobb regarding the 12 September 2002 order, which tends to show that Judge Cobb was available to the parties.
One superior court judge does not have jurisdiction to enter an order altering or overruling another superior court judge’s prior order without a showing and a finding that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. Id. Judge Crow’s order allowing Newton and McGonigal to intervene expressly concluded otherwise and must be vacated.
IV. Conclusion
Our Supreme Court has expressly refused to condone “judge shopping.” Id. Whether or not Newton and McGonigal’s motion to intervene has merit, Judge Cobb is the only superior court judge with jurisdiction to make such a ruling, absent evidence to support a finding of “a substantial change in circumstances.” Id.
The trial court erred by: (1) ruling on a matter currently on appeal; and (2) in doing so, overruling another superior court judge on the same matter. Judge Crow’s order allowing Newton and McGonigal to intervene must be vacated for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294 and the requirements of Woolridge. I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.