dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s analysis and disposition of both the procedural issue concerning the respondents’ collateral attack of the adoption decree and the substantive issue concerning the respondents’ attempt to revoke the consent to adoption. Inasmuch as the latter issue is of much greater significance, not only to these parties but also to parents and children in general, I address that issue first.
I
Although the majority characterizes the natural mother as being “extremely distraught, concerned and upset” when she executed the consent and delivered the child, it is important to bear in mind at the outset that her emotional condition is not an issue in this appeal. There is no question that both natural parents freely gave their written consent to the adoption with full knowledge of its meaning and effect.1 Thus, this case is not like Duncan v. Davis, 94 Idaho 205, 485 P.2d 603 (1971). In Duncan the trial court found that the natural mother “did not make a completely voluntary, free and knowing surrender of her child, and did not have any intention to forever surrender all right or claim to her baby.” 94 Idaho at 207, 485 P.2d at 605. Based on that finding, this Court upheld a revocation of the consent to adoption. Here, the trial judge in his memorandum decision expressly distinguished the circumstances presented in Duncan and found:
“The natural parents had full knowledge of the meaning of their acts in acknowledging consents to adoption and delivering the child for that purpose. The Respondents [appellants on appeal] are not responsible for any of the pressures that were upon the natural parents to place the baby for adoption. On the contrary [they] made efforts to assure that there *817was understanding of the meaning of the transaction and to communicate the importance to the natural parents that the transaction be considered final.”
Moreover, regardless of the majority’s inferential criticisms of private adoptions, ante at 963, n.l, in this case the natural mother herself decided against an agency adoption in favor of a private adoption so she could select the adoptive parents. The natural mother asked a relative to locate a suitable couple and, after the relative had found the appellants, asked a friend, a social worker, to “check them out.” The natural mother and the social worker consulted an attorney and secured the consent forms. The natural mother, after then temporarily deciding against the adoption, changed her mind once more and asked the appellants to again consider adopting the child. Upon learning that the appellants were still willing to adopt the child, the mother asked the appellants to meet her at an Idaho Falls restaurant. The natural parents, after the appellants had “pleaded with [them] not to deliver the child and the consents unless the acts were to be final,” surrendered the child and the executed written consents. There is no question that at the time the natural parents surrendered the child to the adoptive parents and signed the consent forms they fully intended to terminate their parental rights to the child and to place him in the custody of the appellants for adoption. There is absolutely no suggestion of any fraud, duress or undue influence on the part of the appellants. In short, the Court is presented with a case in which the natural mother, admittedly distraught and upset but not to the extent that she failed to understand the significance of her actions, knowingly and voluntarily consented to the adoption of her child and surrendered custody of him. Later she simply changed her mind.
The majority opinion places great emphasis on the district court’s statement that the natural mother “was extremely distraught, concerned and upset” at the time the consent was given. Ante at 963. However, such emotional stress is to be expected. Even when wisely and prudently made, a mother s decision to consent to the adoption of her child is unquestionably an emotionally painful and traumatic experience. Emotional stress is always likely to be present when such decisions are made. The mother’s decision is usually made in the face of adverse social and economic conditions, since these very conditions are frequently the basis for the decision. The Massachusetts Court summarized the situation as follows:
“Contemplation of the surrender of one’s own child is in many, if not all, cases a cause of emotional and mental stress. Many such surrenders are undoubtedly by mothers of children born out of wedlock and are contemplated because the trying circumstances tend to show that the welfare of the child calls for action at variance with that dictated by natural instincts of maternal love and affection. No statute has said that surrenders are valid only if executed free from emotion, tensions, and pressures caused by the situation. No principle of law requires the rule. A balance of the interests of the persons concerned and of society weighs strongly against it.” In re Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass. 230, 181 N.E.2d 836, 839 (1962).
See Regenold v. The Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill.2d 419, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 160, 369 N.E.2d 858, 867 (1977); Doe v. Roe, 87 N.M. 253, 531 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Ct.App.1975); In re Adoption of K_, 24 Utah 2d 59, 465 P.2d 541, 542 (1970). Nevertheless, there is absolutely no indication that the mother did not fully understand the significance of her actions. To rule, as the majority does, that a “distraught, concerned, and upset” mother is entitled to revoke her consent is, as a practical matter, to rule that virtually all consents may be revoked.
Before any adoption based on the voluntary consent of the natural parents can be fully and ultimately consummated, a point in time must come at which the natural parents’ right to simply change their minds and revoke that consent must finally and forever cease. This case, stripped to its essential issue, requires the Court to identify that point in time.
*818In making this determination it is essential to understand the.legal context of the revocation issue. Legal adoptions did not exist at common law and exist today only by virtue of legislative acts. H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations § 18.1 (1968); see generally Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 P. 641 (1923). The issue presented here, therefore, is really one of statutory construction, In re Adoption of Jackson, 89 Wash.2d 945, 578 P.2d 33 (1978), which this Court must resolve in light of the legislature’s intent and the policies and purposes of the adoption statute. See Byrd v. Employment Security Agency, 86 Idaho 469, 388 P.2d 100 (1964). The purposes of adoption statutes have been summarized as follows: “Broadly those policies include promoting the best interests of children while at the same time protecting as far as possible the interests of both natural and adoptive parents.” H. Clark, supra, § 18.3 at 614. See 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 68.04 (4th ed. 1974). Indeed, examination of their historical background suggests that adoption statutes were chiefly a consequence of a growing concern for the welfare of children. See Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J.Fam.L. 443 (1972). It is with these policies in mind — the promotion of the child’s welfare and, subordinate thereto, the protection of the interests of the natural and adoptive parents — that this Court must resolve the revocation issue. See Department of Social Welfare v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 1, 81 Cal.Rptr. 345, 459 P.2d 897 (1969). Stjernholm v. Mazaheri, 180 Colo. 352, 506 P.2d 155 (1973).
Such a decision, therefore, must be based upon a careful consideration of the interests of the child and the interests of the natural and adoptive parents. The interests of the child, particularly infant children, are best served if the consent becomes irrevocable as early as possible in the adoption process, ideally at the time the consent is given and custody of the child surrendered. Attributing finality to the consent at that time protects the child from the trauma of being grasped, months or years later, from the only home, parents and family that it has ever known and from all the love and security they represent and the emotional shock of being forced into a strange environment with persons who are total strangers to the child. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Pincock, 99 Idaho 56, 577 P.2d 343 (1978). It is widely recognized that such changes in custody may result in serious and perhaps permanent emotional harm to the child. See In re Child, 1 Mass.App. 256, 295 N.E.2d 693 (1973); In re Adoption of Child by P, 114 N.J.Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (App.Div. 1971); H. Clark, supra, § 18.4 at 628; Comment, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Two Interpretations of a Child’s Best Interests, 11 J.Fam.L. 285, 305-09 (1972); Note, Alternatives to “Parental Right” in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 152, 158 (1963). The Washington Supreme Court, summarizing the reasons for making consents irrevocable at an early stage, recently stated:
“There are reasons to require an early termination of the ability of a parent to revoke consent to adoption. Infants are not held in hospitals for lengthy periods of time, prospective adoptive families are often found with rapidity and strong emotional ties are formed which should not be subject to being severed unless the prospective adoptive parents are unfit to so serve. The early confirmation of the consent and relinquishment removes a major uncertainty.” In re Adoption of Jackson, 89 Wash.2d 945, 578 P.2d 33, 36 (1978).
Furthermore, it is in the child’s best interest if the time at which the consent is considered final and irrevocable is also definite and easily ascertainable. Uncertainty, as this case verifies, breeds litigation which, regardless of how the issues are ultimately decided by the courts, often results in tragedy for the child. Given the understandable intensity with which parties pursue these cases, such litigation frequently involves both trials and appeals which, despite efforts by trial and appellate courts to expedite the matters, often consume years before the matters are finally resolved. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Pincock, supra. Nei*819ther God nor the legislature has empowered the courts to stay the emotional development of children under such circumstances. During the pendency of litigation the child will inevitably begin to form tender, emotional attachments with its adoptive parents which frequently will be shattered by the courts’ final disposition. In short, extended litigation in these cases generally represents a tragedy for the child. Much of this could be avoided by a clear, decisive and easily ascertainable standard for determining, short of prolonged litigation, when and if a consent is revocable. In this respect the majority opinion fails egregiously. The standard adopted by the majority, estoppel, does not provide the public with any clear guidelines. It is a standard which only the courts can apply. Under that standard, questions concerning revocation cannot be resolved with any certainty without litigation.
Although not entirely clear from the opinion, the majority seems to hold that the trial court may permit the natural parents to revoke their consent at any time, even after a formal decree of adoption, unless conditions of estoppel are present. Such a standard not only exposes the child to the possibility of being juggled between the parties for an uncertain period of time but, when there is a dispute, virtually assures that the child will be the unintended victim of lengthy litigation during which the parties and the courts struggle to apply that standard. The majority opinion represents a sad defeat for the welfare and interests of children, precisely those whom the statutory provisions in question were designed to protect.
Even more troubling, however, is the ten- or of the majority’s approach. The majority recognizes the natural parents’ right to revoke their consent unless the adoptive parents have sufficiently relied on the consent so as to estop a revocation. No consideration is given to or even mention made of the child’s interests. Rather, the majority reduces the question to a dispute between two sets of parents over possession of what might just as well be a chattel. It is the majority’s refusal to even consider the interests of the child from which I am compelled to most strongly dissent.
Not only does the majority opinion ignore the interests of the child, it ironically also fails to promote the interests of either the adoptive or natural parents. Like the child’s, the adoptive parents’ interests dictate that the consent be considered final at an early and definite moment. Adoptive parents are certainly entitled to proceed with the adoption, to begin to establish close family bonds with the child, and to integrate the child into their home without the threat of lengthy litigation resulting from a capricious change of mind by the natural parents. Indeed, the majority’s approach, which renders any consent tentative for an undetermined period of time, is likely to discourage parents from seeking adoptions and thereby hinder and frustrate the policies of the adoption act.
“It is apparent that if 'in particular cases the unstable whims and fancies of natural mothers were permitted, first, to put in motion all the flow of parental love and expenditure of time, energy and money which is involved in adoption, and then, as casually, put the whole process in reverse, the major purpose of the statute would be largely defeated.” In re Adoption of a Minor, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 191, 197, 144 F.2d 644, 650 (1944).
“Public policy demands that the adoption act should not be nullified by a decision that causes the public to fear the consequences of adopting a child with the full knowledge that their efforts are at the whim and caprice of a natural parent.” Welfare Division v. Maynard, 84 Nev. 525, 445 P.2d 153, 155 (1968), quoting Ex parte Schultz, 64 Nev. 264, 181 P.2d 585, 589 (1947).
The rule of law pronounced by the majority also leaves adoptive parents particularly vulnerable to extortion by unscrupulous natural parents, although there is no indication of such activity in this case. See In re Adoption of F_, 26 Utah 2d 255, 488 P.2d 130, 134 (1971); In re Adoption, Hecker, 448 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Mo.App.1969).
*820The majority ignores the interests of children and adoptive parents and emphasizes the plight of the natural mother and the presumption in favor of natural parents. However, the natural parents actually have the least interest in the specific point at which a consent becomes irrevocable, though they certainly have a strong interest in knowing when it is. Unlike the child and the adoptive parents, the natural parents have complete control over when the consent is given. There is no deadline for the natural parents. They can surrender the child and consent to the adoption at any time which best fits their needs and interests. That most natural parents choose to give the child for adoption at birth recognizes the sociological fact that the longer the decision for adoption is delayed the more difficult it is to sever the emotional bonds between the mother and the child. But the decision is solely the natural parents’ to make, and in the absence of fraud, coercion, or undue influence they should be bound by it, because after the consent is given and the child placed with the adoptive parents, the same emotional bonds are forged with the new parents. By changing her mind the natural mother is not merely exercising what the majority apparently finds to be the natural right of an “extremely distraught, concerned and upset” woman, but is destroying the emotional bonds which the child has forged with its new parents and, in most cases, the only parents and family it has ever known.
Even if the natural mother is presently unable to care for the child, the mother is still not required to make a final decision concerning adoption. The mother may have the child placed with foster parents until she is either in a position to properly care for the child herself or until she can make a final decision concerning adoption. What is important for the mother is that she know at the outset the point in time when her consent will be considered final and irrevocable. Given the importance of the decision and the strong emotional ties a mother naturally feels toward the child to which she gave birth, a mother who consents to adoption, once free of practical tasks of caring for the child, will typically experience some subsequent misgivings about the decision. Regenold v. The Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill.2d 419, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 160-61, 369 N.E.2d 858, 867-68 (Ill.1977); Katz, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Problems of Consent and the Role of Lawyers, 5 Fam.L.Q. 405, 411 (1971). For such a mother, it is important that she know whether' she can in fact reverse her decision and regain custody of the child or whether she must put such matters behind her and focus her concerns on working toward a brighter future. The equivocal ruling of the majority is a disservice to such mothers. It will encourage them to continually rehash their decisions, foster a false hope in their hearts that the courts will permit such revocations, and divert their attention from making permanent adjustments to a new life without the child.
In sum, the majority’s ruling serves the best interests of no one. The interests of all the parties, and particularly those of the child, dictate that in the absence of fraud, duress or undue influence, a consent to adoption knowingly and voluntarily made should be considered irrevocable at the time it is given and the custody of the child is surrendered.
In my view, not only do the interests of all the individuals affected require such a conclusion, but also a careful reading of the pertinent statutes. I.C. § 16-1506 provides that a written consent by the natural parents, properly acknowledged and filed with the court, “shall be deemed a sufficient appearance on the part of such person or persons.” The natural parents are not among those required by I.C. § 16-1506 to be present at the adoption hearing and the statute does not provide for notice to them of the adoption petition, hearing or order. It is indeed anomalous to conclude, as the majority does, that the legislature intended such consents to be tentative and revocable by the natural parents for an indefinite period of time when the legislature clearly envisioned that the consenting parents would generally not participate in or even receive notice of the adoption proceedings. *821Moreover, the legislature was not entirely unmindful of the revocation issue. In I.C. § 16-1504 the legislature provided: “[t]he consent of a parent who is a minor shall not be voidable because of that minority.” In interpreting a similar District of Columbia statute and ruling that a consent for adoption was irrevocable, the United States Court of Appeals concluded:
“It is inconceivable that Congress — . . . while forbidding, specifically, a method of avoidance [minority] favored in the law above all others — could possibly, at the same time, have contemplated unrestricted withdrawal of consent without cause or reason of any kind. Instead . . Congress has with deliberation and finality closed the door against changes of mind. It has restored to the court . . .its old power ... to diagnose the case of the unfortunate infant and prescribe a course of treatment for its future; unhampered by the changing winds of emotion which alternatively submerge and restore parental attributes.” In re Adoption of a Minor, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 191, 195, 144 F.2d 644, 648 (1944) (emphasis in original).
Accord, In re Adoption of Holman, 80 Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372 (1956). Likewise it is inconceivable that the Idaho legislature could on one hand deny natural parents the highly favored defense of minority and on the other hand intend that they be permitted to revoke such consents at will.
The majority, however, refuses to uphold the obvious intent of the legislature and criticizes the legislature for not requiring that consents be executed before the courts. Until 1969, I.C. § 16-1506 required that the consents of county residents be signed before the probate judge. In 1969 the legislature amended that section by providing that the consents of residents and non-residents need only be acknowledged by an “officer authorized ... to take acknowledgments of deeds.” Ch. 188, § 2, 1969 Idaho Sess. Laws 554. Requiring such consents to be given before a judge may be preferable to the present procedure and may reduce the number of attacks on such consents on the grounds that they were not knowingly and voluntarily given or were given as the result of fraud, duress or undue influence. Cf. Duncan v. Davis, 94 Idaho 205, 485 P.2d 603 (1971) (upholding conclusion that mother did not knowingly and voluntarily consent). However, those are not the problems presented here. There is no question that the respondents’ consent was legally sufficient and there is no question that it was freely and voluntarily given with a full understanding of its meaning and effect. There is no question that at the time the mother gave the consent she fully intended to permanently relinquish her rights to the child and to give the child to the appellants for adoption. There is no basis for supposing that her actions would have been any different had the consent been acknowledged by a judge rather than a notary public. The problem raised here is simply that subsequent to giving the consent the mother changed her mind, an occurrence unrelated to the manner in which the consent was executed. In criticizing the statutory manner for acknowledging consents, the majority is simply tilting with an issue not present in this case. In any event, that a majority of the members of this Court may prefer a manner for acknowledging consents to adoption different from that provided by the legislature is no basis for ignoring the Court’s duty to properly apply the laws, as enacted, in accordance with the intent of the legislature.
For the above stated reasons I would conclude that in the absence of fraud, duress or undue influence consents to adoption become final and irrevocable upon execution and delivery and surrender of the child. This rule is widely recognized in an increasing number of jurisdictions. See, e. g., In re Adoption of Holman, 80 Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372 (1956); Regenold v. The Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill.2d 419, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858 (1977); Golz v. Children’s Bureau of New Orleans, Inc., 326 So.2d 865 (La.1976); In re Child, 1 Mass.App. 256, 295 N.E.2d 693 (1973); Doe v. Roe, 87 N.M. 253, 531 P.2d 1226 (Ct.App.1975); Welfare Division v. Maynard, 84 Nev. 525, 445 P.2d 153 *822(1968); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Galveston, Inc. v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111 (1960); In re S., 572 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977). Nevertheless, I do believe the fact that the natural mother, subsequent to consenting to the adoption, has had a change of heart and now is desirous and willing to care for the child may be significant in the adoption proceedings. I.C. § 16-1507 requires that before entering a final order of adoption the judge must be “satisfied that the interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption.” Certainly the natural parents’ desire to regain custody of the child and their present willingness to assume the parental responsibility for the child are relevant to the judge’s determination whether the proposed adoption is in the child’s best interests. If convinced that the best interests of the child would be promoted by returning the child to the natural parents, the judge, in my view, would be entitled under I.C. § 16-1507 to deny the adoption petition and order the child returned to the natural parents. However, such decision must be based upon careful findings that such action would in fact serve the child’s best interests and not merely upon the fact that the natural parents have changed their minds. This interpretation of Idaho’s adoption act best ensures that its primary purpose, the promotion of the welfare of children, will be served. It also conforms to the principles embodied in the Uniform Adoption Act prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The model act allows the revocation of consents to adoption only if a decree has not yet been entered and then only if a court finds that the revocation would serve the best interests of the child. Uniform Adoption Act § 8 (amended 1971).
The development of New York law in this area is also instructive. In Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service (Baby Lenore), 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787, appeal dismissed sub nom. De-Martino v. Scarpetta, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S.Ct. 54, 30 L.Ed.2d 38 (1971), a case which the majority relies upon and which provoked nothing but criticism from commentators, see, e. g., Note, In the Child’s Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Child Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 446, 454 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals, emphasizing the common law presumption in favor of natural parents, upheld a revocation made five days after the child had been placed in an adoptive home. In response to that decision, the New York legislature amended the state’s adoption statute to provide that in a private placement adoption a consent executed before a court was irrevocable. The New York legislature also provided that a consent not executed before a court was revocable for thirty days, but only if the court found that the revocation was in the child’s best interests. The New York legislature also specifically eliminated any presumption in favor of the natural parents in such disputes. N.Y.Dom.Rel.Law § 115-b (McKinney 1977). I predict that the majority’s decision in this case will influence the Idaho legislature in the same way that Scarpetta influenced the New York legislature.
In rejecting the interpretation of the Idaho Adoption Act in harmony with its language and policies, the majority resorts to a mischaracterization of the best interests of the child standard, ante at 966, and relies entirely upon “the inherent rights of natural parents . . . Ante at 966. The “best interests” test is much more than a mere comparison of the social status and economic means of the competing sets of parents, as is suggested by the majority’s selective quotation from an Oregon intermediate appellate court decision, ante at 966. Rather, the best interests standard involves a careful weighing of the myriad factors, such as the character and maturity of. the parents, their commitment to the care of the child, the child’s present bonds of affection, the family setting and stability, and so forth, which together form the foundation for a stable and happy home for the child. See generally Riener v. Riener, 93 Idaho 900, 477 P.2d 841 (1970); Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 477 P.2d 834 (1970); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 93 Idaho 42, 454 P.2d 756 (1969); Anderson v. Smith, 79 Ida*823ho 68, 310 P.2d 783 (1957); Paul v. Paul, 78 Idaho 370, 304 P.2d 641 (1956); Comment, Paternal Custody of Minor Children in Idaho, 8 Idaho L.Rev. 345, 347 (1972). Status and wealth are no guarantee of a happy home for the child, although the financial inability to provide for the essential needs of the child often leads to an unsuitable environment for the child. The biological affinity between a natural mother and her child is an important factor to be considered in applying the best interests test. But, on the other hand, repeated changes of the mind by the natural mother concerning whether she wants to give her child for adoption may also indicate a superficial and wavering commitment to the care of the child. What is important is that the judge before whom the adoption is pending take all of these considerations into account in determining what is in the child’s best interests. In deciding whether to deny the adoption petition and return the child to the natural parents because of their change of heart, the judge must set aside the personal and often selfish and egocentric wishes of both the natural and adoptive parents and be guided principally by the best interests of the child. Cf. Mast v. Mast, 95 Idaho 537, 539, 511 P.2d 819, 821 (1973) (child custody proceeding).
While this Court has long recognized the right of natural parents to the care and custody of their own children,2 it has also recognized that this right is not absolute. Yearsley v. Yearsley, 94 Idaho 667, 496 P.2d 666 (1972); Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 477 P.2d 834 (1970); see Stjernholm v. Mazaheri, 180 Colo. 352, 506 P.2d 155 (1973). By their own actions — typically neglect or abandonment of the child — or by a finding that they are not fit, the natural parents may lose the benefit of the rule assuring them the right to the care and custody of their children and trigger judicial inquiry into whether the best interests of the children require a severance of those rights. See Moss v. Vest, 74 Idaho 328, 262 P.2d 116 (1953). In my view, a voluntary and knowing consent to adoption by which the natural parents evidence the intent to permanently relinquish their rights to the child and to have the child adopted and forever cared for by someone else constitutes a waiver of the benefits of the general rule favoring natural parents. Other courts have described this relationship between the right of natural parents to custody of their children and their right to revoke a consent to adoption as follows:
“Ordinarily the law presumes that the best interest of the child will be sub-served by allowing it to remain in the custody of the parents, no matter how poor and humble they may be, though wealth and worldly advancement may be offered in the home of another. Where, however, a parent, by writing or otherwise, has voluntarily transferred and delivered his minor child into the custody and under the control of another, as in the case at bar, and then seeks to recover possession of the child by writ of habeas corpus, such parent is invoking the exercise of the equitable discretion of the court to disrupt private domestic relations which he has voluntarily brought about, and the court will not grant the relief, unless upon a hearing of all the facts it is of the opinion that the best interests of the child would be promoted thereby.” Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, *824129 P. 423, 426 (1912) quoted in Welfare Division v. Maynard, 84 Nev. 525, 445 P.2d 153, 155 (1968).
The fears which seem to be the basis for the majority’s rejection of the best interests of the child standard and their reliance upon “the inherent rights of natural parents” are misplaced in this case. From the New York Court of Appeals ill-fated decision in Scarpetta, the majority quotes the following language: “[The] contest between a parent and nonparent [may not] resolve itself into a simple factual issue as to which affords the better surroundings, or as to which party is better equipped to raise the child.” Ante at 966. From an Oregon intermediate appellate court decision the majority quotes: “ ‘[C]ourts should not interfere with the natural relationship of parent and child upon the sole ground that the proposed adoptive parents are able to give the child superior advantages over those within the means or social status of the natural parents . . . Ante at 966, 967.
Though not precisely stated, these quotations and the majority’s comments concerning the best interests of the child standard and the rights of natural parents reflect a concern that wealthy and prominent couples desiring to adopt a child not be able to' take advantage of the confusion and emotional turmoil of a new mother who, though comparatively poor and disadvantaged, is nonetheless a competent and loving parent. The majority seems to fear that such couples may be able to gain permanent custody of the child by dazzling judges with their superior economic means and social status. In our present society, with numerous couples waiting years in order to adopt one of the limited number of available children, such concerns cannot be lightly dismissed, and the courts must be vigilant in guarding against this danger. But such concerns, which are relevant to whether the consent was freely and knowingly given, are misplaced here. The record indicates that the appellants are of very moderate means, though of sufficient means to adequately raise the child. It must be remembered that here the natural mother sought out the appellants. There is simply no indication of any undue influence or improper conduct on the part of the appellants. Rather, the entire episode was initiated and orchestrated by the natural parents. In affirming the setting aside of this adoption because of fears that clever, wealthy couples may improperly obtain the children of unwitting mothers, the majority is courageously though needlessly jousting with imaginary problems while trampling under the interests of a very real child.
II
I turn now to the procedural argument advanced by the appellants that the habeas corpus proceeding was an improper collateral attack on the adoption decree. Here again, it is important to bear in mind what is and what is not an issue in this appeal. There is no question that the respondents have the right to raise and litigate the revocation question. The procedural question raised here is whether they selected the proper forum and procedure to do so. The issue is whether the respondents were entitled to collaterally attack in the habeas corpus proceeding the adoption decree or whether their remedy was limited to a direct attack by appeal or by a motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b).
The general rule is that a judgment is not subject to collateral attack where the court entering the judgment had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties. IB Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.405[4.-1] (2d ed. 1965); 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 621 (1969). In Hartenbower v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 67 Idaho 254, 175 P.2d 698 (1946), this Court held that any jurisdictional defect permitting a collateral attack “must appear on the face of the judgment-roll.” 67 Idaho at 260, 175 P.2d at 701. See Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141 P.2d 976 (1943); School Dist. No. 1 v. Snowflake Union High School Dist., 100 Ariz. 389, 414 P.2d 985 (1966).
Accordingly, even an erroneous judgment may not be collaterally attacked unless the judgment reveals on its face a jurisdictional *825defect. This rule is necessary to protect the integrity of judgments and our judicial system. One commentator has summarized the purpose of the rule as follows:
“If, whenever a judgment were called in question, the court in this proceeding could review the matter previously adjudged to determine whether there had been error, a judgment would have no finality; immortal litigation would overcome mortal man; and the sound principle of fundamental repose, which underlies res judicata, would be subverted.” IB Moore’s Federal Practice, supra at 635-36.
These principles against collateral attack are applicable to adoption proceedings and decrees. See, e. g., Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947); Finn v. Rees, supra; Jones v. Jones, 215 Kan. 102, 523 P.2d 743 cert. denied 419 U.S. 1032, 95 S.Ct. 515, 42 L.Ed.2d 307 (1974); cf. Mitchell v. Pincock, 99 Idaho 56, 577 P.2d 343 (1978) (full faith and credit to California guardianship judgment). A habeas corpus proceeding which challenges an adoption decree is generally considered a collateral attack. See Finn v. Rees, supra. In sum, the crucial issue is whether the adoption decree is jurisdictionally defective on its face.
The order of adoption was entered by an attorney magistrate who had jurisdiction over the subject matter. I.C. §§ 16-1506 and 1-2210; I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(B); Idaho State Bar, Desk Book, Local Dist. Ct. Rules, 7th Jud.Dist. 4 (1977). The adoption order states that the natural parents’ consents to adoption, properly acknowledged, were filed with the magistrate. Under our adoption statute these consents provided the magistrate with personal jurisdiction over the natural parents and made them parties to the adoption proceedings. I.C. § 16- 1506 provides that a consent to adoption, properly acknowledged and filed with the court, “shall be deemed a sufficient appearance on the part of such person or persons.” I.R. C.P. 4(i) provides that “[t]he voluntary appearance of a party ... is equivalent to personal service of the summons and a copy of the complaint upon him.” By providing that a consent is a procedural equivalent of a voluntary appearance, the legislature enabled the court to enter an order of adoption which would be binding on the natural parents without their being served with process. Cf. I.C. § 16-2007 (waiver of notice and hearing on petition to terminate parental rights); D. H. Overmyer Co. of Ohio v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 92 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (waiver of due process rights of notice and hearing). This procedure facilitates the consummation of an adoption under the statute while at the same time maintaining anonymity between the natural and adoptive parents. I also note parenthetically that the consent forms used in this case were prepared by an attorney for the natural mother after she and a social worker consulted with the attorney concerning the procedure for placing her child up for adoption.
The majority acknowledges the effect under our adoption statute of the consent filed with the magistrate, ante at 959, but then misapprehends its significance with respect to the collateral attack issue. The majority finds that the respondents’ revocation of their consent to adoption was also effective as a revocation of their waiver of the right to notice and to appear. The majority therefore concludes that the adoption decree is not entitled to res judicata effect and may be collaterally attacked. In making the leap from its premise to its conclusion, the majority confuses the merits of the revocation issue with the procedural question. In determining whether the adoption decree is subject to collateral attack the focus of a court’s inquiry is not on what actually occurred — the court is not to relitigate the issues — but the proper focus is on what the magistrate ruled, as indicated on the face of the judgment. If the decree is in error, the procedure for correcting the mistake is a direct attack, not a collateral attack.
The adoption decree involved in this case does not reveal on its face any jurisdictional defects. On its face it is indistinguishable from an adoption decree in a case where the *826natural parents never attempted to revoke their consent. In their habeas corpus proceeding the respondents sought to contradict the decree by arguing that in fact there had not been a proper consent to the adoption. As such, the habeas corpus proceeding was an impermissible collateral attack on the order of adoption and should have been dismissed for that reason.
The Court’s recent decision in Mitchell v. Pincock, supra, is also applicable to this case. In Mitchell, the petitioner, a natural mother, sought through a habeas corpus proceeding the return of her child from the respondent, a stranger who had failed to return the child as required by a California judgment. Because of constitutional principles of full faith and credit and the rules of res judicata, this Court refused to permit the respondent in that case to relitigate in the habeas corpus proceeding matters resolved by the California judgment. The Court held that in order for “[t]he seemingly endless litigation [to] be stopped,” 577 P.2d at 345, the respondent could not attack the California judgment in the habeas corpus proceeding and that her remedy was limited to direct attacks and appeals, which in that case had previously failed. In the instant case the majority is allowing the respondents in this appeal to do what the Court held the appellant in Mitchell could not do, i. e., attack in a collateral habeas corpus proceeding matters covered by a valid judgment from a different proceeding.
The proper procedure for the natural parents to raise the revocation issue is a direct attack on the magistrate’s decree of adoption, either by appeal or by a motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b). In the circumstances of this case I believe the preferable procedure is a 60(b) motion, since an appeal would present the reviewing court with an issue not presented to the trial court and to which a proper record had not been made. The record here does not indicate that an appeal was taken from the magistrate’s decree. However, after the district court ruled on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, the respondents filed a 60(b) motion to set aside the order of adoption. The record does not indicate whether any action has been taken on that motion.3
The district court in its memorandum decision acknowledged the procedural problems raised by the habeas corpus proceeding:
“There are procedural difficulties with a determination of the merits of the case upon the hearing had on Habeas Corpus. This because the response to the Habeas Corpus writ discloses that the Respondents are the adoptive parents, as aforesaid, and the Order of Adoption gives them lawful custody, to say the least. They are now the parents of the child and the Petitioners stand as foreigners under the adoption decree. In that sense, the Habeas Corpus proceedings is a collateral attack on the decree. If this action were instituted other than in the District Court in and for Bingham County, the very Court that entered the adoption decree, it is thought the procedural difficulties might be even more complex.”
After noting that the magistrate division is a division of the district court and discussing the procedure for attacking the adoption decree under I.R.C.P. 60(b), the district court nevertheless concluded that it could properly reach the merits of the revocation issue in the habeas corpus proceedings:
“As the issues appear after the hearing, the remedy of habeas corpus in the opinion of the Court is a proper remedy to reach the issues. The substance of the procedure is similar as though the matter had proceeded through Rule 60(b), and it matters little how the procedure be named or designated where the Court alignment is as noted above. It is thought the issue could not be more squarely presented than has been done.”
Although the district court judge perceived the procedural problems in the case, the district judge was mistaken in concluding that the habeas corpus proceeding was *827proper since the issues were clearly joined and since the order of adoption was entered by a magistrate sitting in the same judicial district and county as the district judge. I recognize that for administrative convenience petitions for adoption are filed, as are all actions, in the district court, I.C. §§ 1-104 and 16-1506, and that the magistrate division is a division of the district court, not a separate court. Adoption petitions are heard by magistrates because the district court judges, pursuant to I.C. § 1-2210 and I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(B), have granted such jurisdiction to the magistrates. Where the district judges, pursuant to those provisions, grant jurisdiction over adoption proceedings to attorney magistrates, the magistrate division acquires general jurisdiction over adoptions. Cf. Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141 P.2d 976 (1943) (former probate court). A valid judgment of a magistrate therefore has binding res judicata effect in all the nation’s tribunals, both federal and state. See Chais-Shulman v. Bank of America Trust No. 54212, 456 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1972); City of Brady v. Finklea, 400 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1968); IB Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 0.405[4.-l] (2d ed. 1965). In my view, this includes district judges in the same judicial district and county as the magistrate entering the order.- In a collateral proceeding, district court judges are bound by the valid judgments of magistrates within their judicial districts, just as the judges in any other state or federal court are bound by such judgments. District court judges may set aside the valid judgments of magistrates within their judicial districts only when reviewing those cases by way of appeal. See I.C. §§ 1-2213 and 16-1512; I.R.C.P. 83; see also Koester v. Koester, 99 Idaho 654, 586 P.2d 1370 (1978).
Furthermore, a motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b) would be properly directed to the magistrate who entered the order of adoption. The court in the best position to hear and decide a challenge to an adoption order, such as the challenge raised by the respondents in this case, is the tribunal which originally heard the adoption petition. The federal courts, in applying F.R. C.P. 60(b), have generally ruled that such motions must be made in the court which rendered the judgment because that court is far more familiar with the case and with the circumstances forming the basis of the motion. 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2865 (1973). Such observations are equally applicable to 60(b) motions attacking a judgment entered by the magistrate division.
For these reasons I would reverse the district court judgment in the habeas corpus proceeding. Since no action appears to have been taken in the magistrate court on the respondents’ motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b) to set aside the order of adoption, that matter is not now before this Court.
SHEPARD, C. J., concurs.. The natural mother was not married to the father of the child at the time she surrendered the child to the appellants, and therefore the father’s consent was not necessary under I.C. § 16-1504. Nevertheless, both the natural mother and her present husband, respondent Robert P. Andersen, who claims to be the father of the child, executed the consents, and together they delivered the child to the appellants.
. The statement in the majority opinion that “Idaho decisions, however, have stressed again and again, in a variety of contexts, the inherent rights of natural parents to the custody of their own children,” ante at 966, is somewhat of an overstatement of the authority cited in support of that conclusion. Clayton v. Jones, 91 Idaho 87, 416 P.2d 34 (1966); Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485, 401 P.2d 541 (1965); Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947); and Jain v. Priest, 30 Idaho 273, 164 P. 364 (1917), all concerned attempted adoptions under a statute authorizing adoptions without consent of the natural parent in cases of abandonment, cruelty or neglect by the non-consenting natural parent. A careful reading of those cases discloses that the decisive issue was not any particular presumption in favor of natural parents but the fact that the statutorily required showing of abandonment, cruelty or neglect had not been made. In Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 P. 641 (1923), the Court upheld a contract for adoption, declaring that such contracts were no longer against public policy. The majority’s reason for citing that case entirely escapes me.
. Respondents, in their brief, admit that they failed to comply with the requirements of I.R. C.P. 7(b)(3) when they prepared and filed their motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b).