(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although I agree that the conviction for pointing a firearm should be vacated for the reasons stated in the majority *117opinion, I am compelled to dissent as to the conviction for resisting arrest.
The indictment as originally drawn charged Bryson with assault on a police officer while resisting arrest. The jury acquitted him of that charge, but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of resisting arrest. See State v. Ritter, 296 S.C. 61, 370 S.E.2d 610 (1988) (16-9-320(B) includes all of the elements of section 16-9-320(B)—knowingly and willfully resisting a lawful arrest—subsection (A) is then necessarily a lesser-included offense of subsection (B)).
That is of no moment, however, because if the court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction on the indictment because of the amendment prior to trial, it could not have convicted Bryson of the lesser-included offense. However, both subsections (A) and (B) are specific in that the prohibited conduct is limited to and must involve a particular class of individual, i.e., a law enforcement officer. The original indictment identifies the victim as a law enforcement officer of this state in addition to naming him. In my view, under the statute in question, it is not necessary to include the name of the law enforcement officer as long as the victim is clearly identified as such. Naming him would be mere surplusage. State v. White, 338 S.C. 56, 525 S.E.2d 261 (Ct.App.1999).
The majority opinion reasons that the amendment changing the identity of the officer deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction because if more than one officer is assaulted, each assault is a separate offense and therefore the identity of the victim is necessary. If this indictment, as originally drafted, charged Bryson with assaulting several officers, I might be inclined to agree. However, I do not believe we have to address that issue because that is not the case before us. Bryson was charged with assaulting “a” police officer, and he was sufficiently apprised of what he had to defend against.
I do not believe that amending the indictment merely to change the name of the victim deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction because it did not change the nature of the offense charged. I would therefore affirm the conviction for resisting arrest.