Stapleton v. District Court of Twentieth Jud. Dist.

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the Opinion of the majority. According to the American Bar Association Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, Approved Draft, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as Standards on Fair Trial and Free Press) § 3.1, which section the majority adopts, the decision on the motion for a closed hearing is not discretionary with the trial judge. “In the case of pretrial proceedings, closure, though not automatic, must be ordered unless there is no substantial likelihood that information to be disclosed may be inadmissible at the trial and that dissemination of such information may prejudice the defendant.” Standards on Fair Trial and Free Press, § 3.1, Commentary, pp. 117-118. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, when the trial judge concluded that prejudicial evidence could be anticipated to emerge at the hearings on defendant’s motions to suppress, it was incumbent upon him to grant defendant’s motion to hold the hearings in private, in camera, sessions.

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that failure to protect prospective jurors from prejudicial pretrial publicity may result in reversal of convic*197tions. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). In cases where the likelihood of harm is apparent, relief will be granted “despite the absence of any showing of prejudice.” Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965). In light of these guidelines, we must exert every caution to prevent prejudice if convictions are to be invulnerable to attack.

Section 3.1 of the Standards on Fair Trial and Free Press provides a workable means of protecting an accused against inflammatory publicity. The publicity that has been described by Justice Groves in his dissent, in my opinion, compels intervention by the Court to insure that further inflammatory publicity does not contaminate the trial and prevent the selection of a fair and impartial jury for the trial of this case.

MR. JUSTICE GROVES has authorized me to say that he joins me in this dissent.