concurring specially. This special concurrence does not follow the opinion written by Judge Stolz, nor am I in complete agreement with same.
1. The first enumeration of error complains because the trial court refused to allow Mrs. White, plaintiff, to testify that she went home and went to bed upon advice of her physician. She contends this testimony was admissible to explain her conduct under Code § 38-302. Earlier she was asked why she left the scene of the wreck and she testified she was in pain and went to see her doctor, who examined her and advised her to go home and go to bed and rest. This was admissible evidence and the court erred in repelling it. Nor was it vitiated by the full and complete testimony of her doctor. I have carefully read all of the testimony of her doctor and not once was he asked, nor did he testify, concerning this question. Mrs. White had the right to explain her conduct and to show that a medical expert had instructed her to do exactly what she did — go home and go to bed. Such testimony to explain conduct is not hearsay but original evidence. Joiner v. Joiner, 225 Ga. 699 (3) (171 SE2d 297). And, "it is always permissible for a witness to explain his conduct.” Grant v. State, 75 Ga. App. 784 (3) (44 SE2d 513), and its rejection is error. Bryant v. State, 191 Ga. 686 (14) (13 SE2d 820).
2. It is contended that the verdict against Mrs. White, plaintiff, was authorized because the jury was authorized to find she received no injuries. With this I cannot agree. It is urged that the state patrolman during his investigation while at the scene tried to ascertain whether anyone was hurt, and he testified, "Out at the scene no one seemed to be injured or anything, in that manner and for this reason I carried no injuries on my accident report.” This is negative testimony in the extreme. Who was the patrolman to set himself up as an expert on who was and who was not injured? Many times injuries do not manifest themselves until many hours, and in some cases, many days, after the wreck. Mrs. White’s testimony is attacked because she had suffered prior injuries and had litigated concerning them on more than one prior occasion. What does that prove? Absolutely nothing! Mrs. White testified that she was injured in this collision; her doctor testified that she was injured, and that in his opinion the injuries arose from this collision. Her doctor testified that he found bruises on her chest, neck, abdomen and back, which was within 40 minutes after the *415wreck, according to Mrs. White’s testimony. Mrs. White further testified that she suffered pain because of the collision, and her injuries were still in existence at the time of the trial. Her doctor testified that she responded with pain in his examinations following the wreck, and had a great deal of tightness and tenseness of the muscles of the cervical spine and lower back; and also had rigidity of the abdominal muscles because of the hematoma and bruises. These were objective findings on his part.
What witness denied that she was injured in this collision? What witness denied that she suffered pain as a result of injuries received in this collision? None! Positive and direct testimony of an unimpeached witness cannot be arbitrarily disbelieved by a jury. Lankford v. Holton, 187 Ga. 94, 102 (200 SE 243); Myers v. Phillips, 197 Ga. 536 (4) (29 SE2d 700). A party may testify as to his own injuries and he may be believed in preference to the evidence of a whole college of physicians that he was not injured. Southern R. Co. v. Tankersley, 3 Ga. App. 548 (1) (60 SE 297); Chapman v. Radcliffe, 44 Ga. App. 649 (3) (162 SE 651); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Dupee, 71 Ga. App. 148, 153 (30 SE2d 365). The law infers bodily pain and suffering from personal injury. Dodson v. Cobb, 92 Ga. App. 654, 655 (89 SE2d 552).
3. But I do not agree with the majority opinion in Division 2, and unhesitatingly state that there was no illegality in the verdicts because of inconsistency. Here, the cases of husband and wife were consolidated for the purpose of trial. The jury had the right to find in favor of one plaintiff and against the other. They remained two separate cases, and the legal effect was as if they had been tried by two separate juries. This was quite plainly held in the case of Nickle v. Armstrong Furniture Co., 107 Ga. App. 362 (130 SE2d 249) which has been followed in Purdy v. Norrell, 111 Ga. App. 546 (2) (142 SE2d 311). The majority would disapprove of the Nickle case and seeks to distinguish the Purdy case which follows and supports Nickle because two later cases, to wit: Smith v. Tri-State Culvert Mfg. Co., 126 Ga. App. 508 (191 SE2d 92) and Waggoner v. Bevick, 127 Ga. App. 877 (195 SE2d 246) seem to have the opposite view. But these two cases are not applicable, and are not in point.
In Smith, supra, there were two separate suits and two separate trials, and the "defendant acknowledges liability.” It was held that plaintiff was entitled to recover something. The question of inconsistent or repugnant verdicts was not discussed. In Waggoner, supra, only one suit was involved, but the plaintiff sued in two capacities, to wit: individually for wrongful death, and as legal *416representative of the estate. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in one capacity and against her in the other. Of course, this was an inconsistent verdict. But again, two suits were not involved. But if there is any inconsistency in the holding of the Nickle case, and the Purdy case on the one part, and the Smith and Waggoner cases, on the other part, the earlier cases must be followed under the rule of stare decisis. See Cauble v. Weimer, 101 Ga. App. 313, 316 (113 SE2d 641); Drury v. State, 211 Ga. 888, 889 (89 SE2d 513). The Nickle and Purdy cases cannot be disregarded until overruled, and of course, five judges of this court are required to overrule. I am in favor of upholding the Nickle and Purdy cases, and only four judges are in full agreement with the majority opinion here seeking to expressly disapprove of Nickle.
4. I do concur with the majority opinion as to the findings of error in the various charges of the court as to accident, following too closely, comparative negligence and the failure of the plaintiff, Mrs. White, to exercise ordinary care for her own protection. In my opinion only by remaining home could the plaintiff have avoided the collision.
5. I concur specially in the recommendation of reversal, but for a different reason as to Mr. White’s case. This verdict was inadequate under the evidence. It was uncontroverted that he incurred medical expenses in stated amounts and suffered property damage in the sum of $3,700. These items themselves far exceed the award of $2,800, without consideration of loss of her services and consortium to some extent. Therefore, from the uncontradicted evidence, it is clear that the verdict in his favor was grossly inadequate, prejudicial and was due to gross mistake in considering the same and arriving at a verdict.
For all the foregoing reasons, it is my opinion the trial judge erroneously denied the joint motion for new trial as to both defendants, and a new trial should be granted.