Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I find the Court of Appeal’s straightforward interpretation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.21 more consistent with the statutory language while at the same time fully effectuating the Legislature’s intent to provide additional remedies against abuse of elderly and dependent adults under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA) (§ 15600 et seq.).
In this case, we must determine the interplay of sections 15657 and 15657.2 of the act. Section 15657 authorizes the recovery of the decedent’s pain and suffering damages in a wrongful death action as well as the award *43of attorney fees. Section 15657.2 states, “Notwithstanding this article [i.e., sections 15657 through 15657.3], any cause of action for injury or damage against a health care provider, as defined in Section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, based on the health care provider’s alleged professional negligence, shall be governed by those laws which specifically apply to those professional negligence causes of action.”
The Court of Appeal concluded2 “that while it could have been said more simply, section 15657.2 ensures application of [the California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA)], but does not displace the enhanced remedies of EADACPA, when an action for elder abuse is ‘based on the health care provider’s alleged professional negligence.’ ” In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that the language of section 15657.2 “indicates a legislative focus on statutes of specific application to this category of claims, such as those that comprise MICRA. For example, Civil Code section 3333.1, [abrogating the collateral source rule and] enacted as part of MICRA (see Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 999 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 685, 884 P.2d 142] (Flowers)), applies to ‘an action for personal injury against a health care provider based upon professional negligence . . . .’ (Civ. Code, § 3333.1, subd. (a).) Similarly, Civil Code section 3333.2, [limiting recovery of noneconomic damages and] also enacted as part of MICRA (see Flowers, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 999), applies to ‘any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional negligence . . . .’ (Civ. Code, § 3333.2, subd. (a).) Statutes like these, which specifically limit their application to actions against a health care provider based on professional negligence, are those statutes that section 15657.2 states ‘shall . . . govem[].’
“The question, however, is whether section 15657.2 states that MICRA statutes shall solely govern or shall also govern. [Defendants] answer that the Legislature intended that MICRA alone should apply when the cause of action is based on the health care provider’s alleged professional negligence. [Defendants’] argument implicitly assumes that the application of MICRA or EADACPA is an either-or proposition, but that both cannot apply in the same case. [The Court of Appeal] disagree[d] with this assumption. Section 15657 solely displaces statutes of general applicability, such as Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34, which limits the damages recoverable for a decedent’s injuries or death, and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021, which limits the recovery of attorney fees. EADACPA’s enhanced-remedy provisions do not conflict with any specific provision of MICRA.”
*44The Court of Appeal also found no conflict between the provision for attorney fees in section 15657 and the provision in MICRA regulating the contingency fee that an attorney may contract for or collect in connection with an action “against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence . . . .” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6146.) “This provision of MICRA, however, pertains to contingency fees only; it solely places ‘limits on the percentage of a plaintiff’s recovery that an attorney may retain when he represents the plaintiff on a contingency basis.’ (Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 920, 927, fn. 5 [211 Cal.Rptr. 77, 695 P.2d 164].) The award permitted by section 15657 does not provide for a contingency fee; it is not calculated solely as a percentage of the recovery and more importantly it does not come out of or reduce the plaintiff’s award. An award of attorney fees under section 15657 is an additional liability imposed on the defendant. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B) [attorney fees authorized by statute are a form of recoverable costs].) [There is] no conflict between the provisions of MICRA and the enhanced remedy provisions of EADACPA. Thus, nothing precludes the joint application of [both].”
The majority “conclude^] that this interpretation is not viable” because “[t]he word ‘specifically’ is not necessarily intended to convey the opposite of ‘generally,’ but, when read in context, can be taken to mean simply that the law applying to professional negligence alone governs professional negligence causes of action, and that section 15657 is not intended to alter this law.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)
At best, this reasoning is definitionally strained. (See Webster’s New World Dict. (3d college ed. 1989) p. 1287 [as relevant here, “specific”—and by extension “specifically”—defined as “1 limiting or limited; specifying or specified; precise; definite; explicit [no specific plans] 2 of or constituting a species 3 peculiar to or characteristic of something [specific traits] 4 of a special, or particular, sort or kind”].) The majority’s convoluted explanation that MICRA “implicitly incorporate^] generally applicable statutes pertaining to civil actions” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 29) also provides no more analytical insight than the truism that the law is a “seamless web” (see People v. Perez (1979) 24 Cal.3d 133, 150 [155 Cal.Rptr. 176, 594 P.2d 1, 3 A.L.R.4th 339] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.)) or that “[i]t is assumed that the Legislature has in mind existing laws when it passes a statute.” (Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837 [122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874].)
More importantly, as the Court of Appeal explained, “accepting [such an] interpretation of section 15657.2 would require [] ignoring] the Legislature’s focus on MICRA. If the Legislature’s intent was simply to displace *45application of section 15657, reference to MICRA was unnecessary, particularly since the two statutes are not inconsistent.” The court also noted “that the ‘notwithstanding’ language may additionally suggest that sections 15657 through 15657.3, which constitute ‘this article,’ will be subservient to ‘those laws which specifically apply to those professional negligence causes of action.’ In other words, to the extent ‘those statutes specifically applicable to those professional negligence causes of action’ conflict with the provisions of sections 15657 through 15657.3, the terms of the former statutes will control rather than the terms of the latter. []”
The Court of Appeal’s interpretation also obviates the need to parse the distinction between “neglect” and “professional negligence.” The majority aptly concedes this poses some “difficulty” at least in the case of certain health care institutions such as nursing homes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 34), since section 15610.57 refers to the “negligent failure” to render adequate care to an elderly or dependent adult and virtually every category of “neglect” set forth in the statute involves some form of professional negligence if committed by a health care provider. (E.g., § 15610.57, subd. (b)(1) [“[fjailure to assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food, clothing, or shelter”], (2) [“[fjailure to provide medical care”], (3) [“[fjailure to protect from health and safety hazards”], & (4) [“[fjailure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration”].) Imposing a “recklessness” requirement does not transform the essential character of the underlying conduct from negligence.
The majority suggests the Court of Appeal’s construction of section 15657.2 conflicts with the legislative history of EADACPA. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 29-30.) The Court of Appeal acknowledged “that the Legislative Counsel’s Digest described ‘this bill’ [amending the statutory scheme to include the sections at issue here] as ‘specifying] that actions against health care professionals for professional negligence shall be governed by laws specifically applicable to professional negligence actions, rather than by these provisions' (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 679 (Mar. 5, 1991) p. 2, italics added.) Albeit imprecise, this statement is not inconsistent with [the Court of Appeal’s] interpretation []. The statement refers to ‘professional negligence actions.’ It cannot be disputed that pure negligence causes of action are not subject to section 15657. (See § 15657.) The enhanced remedies of that section arise only where the defendant has acted with recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice in the commission of the neglect. (§ 15657.)
“Moreover, this confusing description of the 1991 amendments in the Legislative Counsel’s Digest is scant evidence of a legislative intent that section 15657.2 have the affect that [defendants] attribute to it. (Cf. Isbister *46v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72, 87 [219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212] [finding confusing comment by Legislative Counsel was scant evidence of legislative intent].) ‘ “Although a legislative counsel’s digest may be helpful in interpreting an ambiguous statute, it is not the law.” . . .’ (In re Barry W. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 358, 367 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 161], citation omitted.) We will not disregard the problems that we find in interpreting the statute in the fashion advocated by [defendants] simply as a result of this (or similar) inconclusive and ambiguous comments in the legislative history. [Fn. omitted.] (See J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1578 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 206] [‘wisest course is to rely on legislative history only when that history itself is unambiguous’].)”
Although the court was responding to defendants’ arguments regarding the significance of this legislative statement, its observations are equally apposite to the majority’s criticism.
The Court of Appeal’s interpretation has the further virtue of avoiding another foray into the Central Pathology thicket. (Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208, 832 P.2d 924].) The result in that case was undoubtedly correct with respect to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13. As we are now seeing, however, the analysis is far from a suitable template for construing different statutory language enacted to address different concerns. Despite its extended discussion, the majority essentially determines nothing more than that “based on professional negligence” means whatever this court says at any particular moment. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 40, 41-42.) Under the Court of Appeal’s analysis, it is unnecessary to address the meaning of this phrase here “because [] [defendants’] appeal fails even if the phrase [] includes [] a case alleging reckless neglect.”
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment but on the analytical basis set forth by the Court of Appeal.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Brackets together, in this manner [], without enclosing material, are used herein to indicate deletions when quoting from the opinion of the Court of Appeal; brackets enclosing material (other than publisher’s added parallel citations) are, unless otherwise indicated, used to denote insertions or additions by this author.