(dissenting).
I dissent, because: 1) The 66 A.L.R.2d 1057 and 1065 references made by the main opinion, in' my opinion, do not reflect the consensus of opinion of most of the cited cases; and 2) that the main opinion says *227that because a peace officer of 24 years experience in checking and investigating accidents was not experienced enough to state his opinion as to where the impact occurred so as to make his opinion inadmissible, because no proper foundation was laid to determine his expertise, seems somewhat naive when nobody questioned his qualification, no one having requested to voir dire him or question such qualifications; and 3) that if there were error in admitting such testimony, I doubt its prejudiciality under the circumstances of this case.
The A.L.R. citation generally approves the doctrine that in similar cases, the matter of admissibility is one for the sound discretion of the trial court. The colloquy between court and counsel about “opinion” or “judgment” seems unimportant, although I can see a distinction of sorts, in light of the basic reason given by the main opinion that no foundation had been laid for the officer’s testimony as an expert. I have difficulty in saying that the officer’s opinion would have been admissible under the facts of this particular case if he had been grilled for hours as to his qualifications, hut finally was shown to be qualified, hut inadmissible if a discerning advocate, sensing the very decision of this case, did not voir dire the witness, — thus inviting error, which the main opinion now says occurred prejudicially, and which the main opinion also now opines that an expert witness must remain a deaf-mute if the opposition advisedly does not question his qualifications, thus assuring a reversal in the event of defeat. It is submitted this 24-year experience alone established his qualifications as an expert unless successfully discounted by voir dire examination or cross-examination.