concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Sabillon has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s improper advice, but write separately to emphasize the complete lack of evidence put forth by Sabillon in his attempt to make that showing. This Court has consistently held that an affirmative misrepresentation by an attorney regarding the effect of a guilty plea can serve as the basis for a finding of ineffective representation, so long as the defendant shows a reasonable probability that he would have chosen to go to trial but for the misrepresentation.5
In this case, however, Sabillon offered nothing more than an unsupported, conclusory, affidavit from his attorney, stating that Sabillon relied on the attorney’s advice “to his detriment.” Sabillon did not testify, nor did he offer any evidence showing why he would have chosen to go to trial and risk a long prison sentence, and near-certain deportation, instead of accepting the generous first offender probationary sentence and the mere possibility of deportation, by pleading guilty. If the unsupported conclusions in the attorney’s affidavit were enough in this case, the prejudice analysis in cases such as this would be effectively rendered meaningless. Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Sabillon has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that but for his attorney’s bad advice, he would have eschewed the State’s first offender offer and proceeded to trial.
*5Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Elisabeth G. MacNamara, Leonora Grant, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant. Campano & Sperling, Jean C. Sperling-Cavaliero, for appellee.See, e.g., Rollins v. State, 277 Ga. 488 (591 SE2d 796) (2004); Gerisch v. Meadows, 278 Ga. 641 (604 SE2d 462) (2004).