(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with the majority in denying Puget Power's claim to abandoned dividend funds, but dissent to their approval of Puget's retention of customers' abandoned performance deposits.
Between 1955 and 1979, Puget required new customers who were poor credit risks to make deposits to ensure their payment of Puget's electrical bill. These deposits remained the customers' property even though Puget retained possession of them. Upon termination of service, the customer was entitled to recover his full deposit and, after 1965, interest on the deposit as well. It is undisputed that these deposits were never intended as income for Puget.
Between these same years, Puget declared dividends and issued dividend checks to its shareholders. On occasion, some shareholders would fail to cash the dividend checks. Likewise, there were some customers who would fail to cash deposit refund checks. These funds accumulated in Puget's bank account.
Puget is seeking to keep the unclaimed deposits which amount to approximately $140,5004 and the unclaimed dividends amounting to approximately $50,700. Puget does not advance any reason why it should be entitled to keep the unclaimed money. Instead, it is acting in a defensive posture: it claims that the statute of limitations bars the State from recovering the money. The Department of Revenue claims that the State should receive these abandoned funds pursuant to the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, RCW 63.28 (now codified in RCW 63.29), and that the statute of limitations cannot be raised against the State.
*512Decision
The majority rationalizes its award of abandoned deposits to Puget based on the reasoning of Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Rev., 78 Wn.2d 961, 481 P.2d 556 (1971), which held that the statute of limitations may be a bar to the State's claim of right under the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, RCW 63.28. Bell, however, is a divergence from the law and has been recently overruled.
Bell held that a private corporation could assert the statute of limitations against the State. Recently we have reaffirmed the principle that the State, acting in its sovereign capacity, is immune from the application of limitation periods to actions brought for the benefit of the State. Bellevue Sch. Dist. 405 v. Brazier Constr. Co., 103 Wn.2d 111, 691 P.2d 178 (1984). Chapter 4.16 of the Revised Code of Washington sets forth the time limitations in which different causes of action may be brought. In RCW 4.16, the Legislature clearly provided that the State is not subject to any such time limitations:
The limitations prescribed in this chapter shall apply to actions brought in the name or for the benefit of any county or other municipality or quasimunicipality of the state, in the same manner as to actions brought by private parties: Provided, That there shall be no limitations to actions brought in the name or for the benefit of the state, and no claim of right predicated upon the lapse of time shall ever be asserted against the state . . .
RCW 4.16.160. (Italics mine.) This codification has existed without exception for over 100 years in this state. See Laws of 1955, ch. 43, § 2, p. 334; Laws of 1903, ch. 24, § 1, p. 26; Laws of 1873, p. 10, §§ 34, 35; Laws of 1869, p. 10, §§ 34, 35; Laws of 1854, p. 364, § 9; see also Rem. Rev. Stat. § 167. Consequently, it is clear that Bell was wrongly decided and, in any event, has been effectively overruled by Bellevue Sch. Dist. 405.
Bell not only ignored statutory law but also virtually *513nullified this state's unclaimed property act.5 Under Bell, there seldom would be a circumstance where the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (Act) could be applied. Under the Act, the following time periods governed when property was deemed abandoned: RCW 63.28.080, property held by banking and financial organizations, 12 years; RCW 63.28.090, property held by life insurance companies, 7 years; RCW 63.28.100, property held by utilities, 7 years; RCW 63.28.110, property held by business associations, 7 years; RCW 63.28.120, property held in course of dissolution of business association, 2 years after date of final distribution; RCW 63.28.130, property held by fiduciaries, 7 years; RCW 63.28.140, property held by a court or public officers, 7 years; and RCW 63.28.150, all property not specifically covered, 7 years. Thus, all but one type of property was not considered abandoned until 7 years after it was unclaimed. Yet, the statute of limitations in which to bring actions, except for actions to recover real estate or special assessment, or an action based upon a judgment by a court, are all less than 6 years. See RCW 4.16.020 et seq. Thus, the consequence of Bell was to effectively repeal the Act. The majority never discusses this aspect of its decision. Yet that is the inescapable result of the majority's decision since property would never be deemed abandoned until after the statute of limitations had run. Consequently, under the majority's analysis, banks, life insurance companies, utilities, business associations, fiduciaries, and court and public officers, from 1955 to 1979, could all deprive the State of abandoned property because it would not be deemed abandoned until after the statute of limitations had run.
Puget Power's Unjust Enrichment
In addition to the fact that the statute of limitations defense cannot be raised against the State, Puget is not entitled to keep the unclaimed deposits for the same reason *514the majority provides for holding that Puget is not entitled to the unclaimed dividends. The majority correctly characterizes the abandoned dividends as trust funds. Consequently, the statute of limitations has not yet run.6 The majority, however, does not explain what type of trust was created by the abandoned dividends. Yet the majority should have analyzed what kind of trust existed here because if it did it would have concluded that the unclaimed deposits should be accorded the same trust status as the unclaimed dividends.
It is clear that the unclaimed dividends do not constitute an express trust. An express trust is intentionally created between the parties of the trust agreement. Diel v. Beek-man, 7 Wn. App. 139, 499 P.2d 37 (1972). There is no evidence in the record that Puget intended to create an express trust with regard to the unclaimed dividends. Indeed, Puget strenuously argues that no trust existed with regard to such funds. Its act of appropriating the unclaimed dividends after 2 years is further proof that it never intended to create an express trust.
It is equally clear that the unclaimed dividends did not create a resulting trust.
There are three situations in which the trust which arises is properly called a resulting trust: (1) where an express trust fails in whole or in part; (2) where an express trust is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate; (3) where property is purchased and the purchase price is paid by one person and at his direction the vendor conveys the property to another person.
5 A. Scott, Trusts § 404.1 (3d ed. 1967). The present set of facts cannot be characterized as any one of the three situations listed above.
The final type of trust that the unclaimed dividends could be characterized as is a constructive trust. Unlike an express or a resulting trust, a constructive trust can arise even though the parties never intended to create a trust. *515Proctor v. Forsythe, 4 Wn. App. 238, 480 P.2d 511 (1971); 5 A. Scott, Trusts § 462.1 (3d ed. 1967). Instead of finding intent to create a trust, the important objective in deciding whether to impose a constructive trust is preventing unjust enrichment. As Judge Cardozo stated:
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee . . .
Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378 (1919). Under Washington law, the holder of the property need not have acquired it through any wrongful act. Scymanski v. Dufault, 80 Wn.2d 77, 491 P.2d 1050 (1971). The only thing of importance is that the continued possession of property would amount to unjust enrichment. Scymanski v. Dufault, supra; Proctor v. Forsythe, supra.
Thus, regarding the unclaimed dividends, it would be an unjust enrichment of Puget Power were it allowed to keep the dividends since once it declared the dividends, the property rights to the dividends passed on to the shareholders or their assigns. In the same manner, allowing Puget Power to keep the unclaimed deposits would amount to unjust enrichment since this money never belonged to it. Instead, it always belonged to the users who were forced to make such deposits in order to receive electricity.
The only difference between unclaimed dividends and unclaimed deposits is that the dividends were kept in a separate account. Yet this difference is not enough to impose a constructive trust in the former but not in the latter situation. Segregation of funds is important when the existence of an express trust is in question. Kronisch v. Howard Sav. Inst., 154 N.J. Super. 576, 382 A.2d 64 (1977). However, in deciding whether to impose a constructive trust different rules apply. A constructive trust is not a true trust; instead, it is imposed by a court to prevent unjust enrichment. Thus, it would be illogical not to impose a constructive trust just because the holder mixes the funds *516with other property. See Pollution Control-Walther, Inc. v. Belzer, 406 So. 2d 372 (Ala. 1981); State v. United States Steel Co., 12 N.J. 51, 95 A.2d 740 (1953). Consequently, the unclaimed deposits, as well as the unclaimed dividends, should be characterized as being held in a constructive trust by Puget Power. As such, as explained by the majority, the statute of limitations has not yet run.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, the majority disregards RCW 4.16 and our decision in Bellevue Sch. Dist. 405 v. Brazier Constr. Co., supra, and holds that the statute of limitations defense can be asserted against the State. In addition, it finds that between 1955 and 1979, RCW 63.28 was a meaningless act. Furthermore, it finds that dividends are trust funds but the unclaimed deposits are not.
The majority's decision today hands to Puget Power an undeserved enrichment. These utility deposits were never intended to constitute income to Puget Power. Moreover, Puget does not advance any legal basis that would entitle it to keep the money. In addition, there are no public policy grounds for allowing Puget to keep this money. On the other hand, the Legislature intended that unclaimed property go to the State where a trust fund7 would be maintained so that owners could always recover their money. And from a public policy standpoint, these funds should go to the State where it can be used for the benefit of all the people rather than allowing a private profitmaking corpo*517ration to keep these funds for its own use.
I would reverse the trial court's ruling on the unclaimed deposits and vest them in the State of Washington and affirm as to unclaimed dividends.
Williams, C.J., concurs with Dore, J.
Between 1967 and 1979, the unclaimed deposits amounted to approximately $87,500; it is estimated that between 1955 and 1966 these unclaimed deposits amounted to approximately $53,000.
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the Legislature does not pass meaningless acts. Guinness v. State, 40 Wn.2d 677, 246 P.2d 433 (1952).
See majority opinion, part III.
RCW 63.29.230 states, in part, as follows: ''[T]he department shall promptly deposit in the general fund of this state all funds received under this chapter, including the proceeds from the sale of abandoned property under RCW 63.29-.220. The department shall retain in a separate trust fund an amount not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars from which prompt payment of claims duly allowed must be made by the department. Before making the deposit, the department shall record the name and last known address of each person appearing from the holders' reports to be entitled to the property and the name and last known address of each insured person or annuitant and beneficiary and with respect to each policy or contract listed in the report of an insurance company its number, and the name of the company. The record must be available for public inspection at all reasonable business hours."