concurring.
AS 12.30.040 provides:
Release after conviction, (a) A person who has been convicted of an offense and is awaiting sentence, or who has filed an appeal shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of AS 12.30.020 unless the court has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or prevent the person from posing a danger to other persons and the community. If that determination is made, the person may be remanded to custody. This section does not affect the right of a person appealing from a judgment of conviction from a district court to the superior court to be released on bail pending appeal under Rule 603(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of (a) of this section, if a person has been convicted of an offense which is an unclassified felony or a class A felony, the person may not be released on bail either before sentencing or pending appeal.
The state argues that this provision of Title 12 [Code of Criminal Procedure], Chapter 30 [Bail] applies only to merit appeals, not sentence appeals. The court of appeals apparently accepted this argument (“... a sentence appeal does not fall within AS 12.30.040”), although it failed to articulate any basis for that conclusion. This court, without remarking on the existence of AS 12.30.040, tersely states that the “... only statute relevant to the question presented here is AS 12.55.120(c)_” 1 Since Chapter 30 is a comprehensive treatment of the subject of bail, I do not understand why it is ignored.
I agree with the statement that AS 12.-55.120(c) “... neither grants nor denies the right to bail pending appeal.”2 Since it does neither, I think it only appropriate to turn to the bail statute to see if bail is either granted or denied by it. That statute, above quoted, makes no distinction whatsoever between merit and sentence appeals. Although subsection (a) was enacted before the advent of sentence appeals, it was amended in 1974, 1980, 1982 and 1984. Indeed, subsection (b), a recent enactment, is a specific denial of release on bail under certain circumstances. If the legislature intended to treat sentence appeals in a manner different than merit appeals, there has been ample opportunity to explicitly do so.
An anomaly results from the decision of the court of appeals, now affirmed by this court. A defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction on the merits, with or without a sentence appeal, thereby maintaining his innocence, finds that his opportunity for release after conviction is fettered by the constraints of AS 12.30.040. If, however, he chooses to accept the judgment that he is guilty as charged, and seeks only to have his sentence reviewed, his opportunity for release after conviction is not limited by any statutory constraints, but rather lies within the “inherent authority of the court” and thus, I assume, is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. I find it odd that a defendant who maintains his innocence by challenging his conviction *160is apparently worse off with respect to release after conviction than a person who accepts his guilt and challenges only his sentence.
I am unpersuaded that AS 12.30.040 is inapplicable to a sentence appeal. Since it does not differentiate between a merit appeal and a sentence appeal, I conclude that it is controlling and that there is no need to seek justification for release pending a sentence appeal in the “inherent authority of the court.”
. Dobrova asserted the applicability of AS 12.-30.040(a) before the court of appeals, an assertion which that court expressly rejected. Before this court the state has expressly denied the applicability of AS 12.30.040(a). Dobrova cites the statute as one of the rules and statutes regarding bail pending appeal, while apparently conceding that no statutory right to bail exists. This court is not bound to accept any concession as to what the law is in a given case, and in view of this court’s remarkably liberal approach to whether an issue has been raised, I view the issue as one which may and should be addressed.
. In a footnote, the court has expressed the view that "If sentence appeals were intended to be governed by .040 the final sentence of .120(c) would serve no purpose.” 694 P.2d at 158, n. 4. I view that final sentence, in context, as ambiguous. If it does have a purpose, then the only purpose can be to treat sentence appeals differently from merit appeals, i.e., no bail is permitted in sentence appeals.