(dissenting) — No great mystery underlies *679this case. The City of Seattle is anxious to annex certain property which includes the main plant of the Boeing Company. An affidavit on behalf of the defendants indicates the City will reap $2 to $3 million more annually in revenue over services provided to the area proposed to be annexed. Having failed in attempting to persuade the Legislature of the unfairness of the statutory requirements for annexation, the City has changed its venue and now calls upon the courts to hold the legislation unconstitutional.
In its recital of facts, the majority neglects to mention that owners of property exceeding 98 percent of the assessed valuation in the area filed a petition opposing annexation and that approximately 83 percent of the registered voters in the area submitted petitions asking that the annexation be terminated. No property owner or voter within the area proposed to be annexed has joined the City in this suit.
On the question of standing, I concur with the trial court and with the majority that plaintiff has standing to question the issue of special legislative aspects of RCW 35.13-.165 and RCW 36.93.180(10) which limit the application of those statutes to cities of over 400,000 in population. I also concur with the trial court but disagree with the majority on whether plaintiff has standing to raise the issue that RCW 35.13.165 denies equal protection of the laws to those voters who live within the area sought to be annexed.
The test for standing in this jurisdiction is twofold. A plaintiff must demonstrate both (1) that it has an interest that is '"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guaranty] in question'" and (2) an "injury in fact". Save a Valuable Env't v. Bothell, 89 Wn.2d 862, 866, 576 P.2d 401 (1978); Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 493, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184, 90 S. Ct. 827 (1970). The City meets neither of these tests.
Plaintiff's entire argument that it meets the zone of interest test is as follows:
*680[T]he City has an interest ... in lawful procedures to enlarge its boundaries ... [in the expenditure of] large amounts of money and effort ... in responding to the voters' petition for annexation which will have been wasted if the unlawful termination petitions are allowed to prevail. In addition, the City's interest in logical service areas will be violated by a law which violates citizens' rights to vote. A city has a legitimate concern for planning its boundaries, and has standing to protect that concern from unconstitutional procedures.
(Citation omitted.) Brief of Appellant, at 40-41. While these are interests of the City, they are not the sort of interests protected by the equal protection clause. As defendant Boeing Company points out, the test is not whether the party merely has an interest in the litigation but whether the party has an interest which is protected by the particular constitutional provision allegedly violated.
Plaintiff may not attack the constitutionality of a statute unless harmed by the particular feature of the statute which is challenged. State v. McCarter, 91 Wn.2d 249, 253, 588 P.2d 745 (1978). Plaintiff is asserting what it claims are the constitutional rights of the residents of the proposed area of annexation. It is seeking to assert a right which it does not have against the residents who do have it in order to deprive the residents of their statutory authority to terminate the annexation proceeding. The City is attempting to assert the right of others who are not even within the jurisdiction of the City. If, in fact, the "right to vote" exists for the voters in the proposed annexation area, they are perfectly capable of exercising that right themselves. They have not chosen to do so. To allow the City standing to meddle in the affairs of the voters of the proposed annexed area, persons in no way within the jurisdiction of the City, would vitiate the requirements for standing established by this court.
Nowhere does the City show how the equal protection clauses of either the state or federal constitutions protect its interests in the expenditure of "large amounts of money", "lawful procedures", a "logical service boundary", *681or "planning its boundaries". The majority cites Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, supra, to support its position on standing. That case, however, dealt with Const. art. 9, § 1, which provides it is the paramount duty of the State to provide an ample education. To comply with this provision, a school district must receive sufficient funding. We held the school district could demonstrate a zone of interest. In this case, however, there is no constitutional or statutory provision which gives rise to a zone of interest sufficient to confer standing in the City. The City has no duty to annex territory and no right of annexation except as permitted by the State. The power of the State over annexation is absolute. Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, 52 Wn.2d 181, 324 P.2d 438 (1958). Under RCW 35.13.174 the resident voters decide whether an area is to be annexed. Only those residents in the area proposed to be annexed can demonstrate a "zone of interest" necessary to confer standing to challenge the constitutionality of the annexation statutes.
The City also fails to meet the injury-in-fact test. In order to meet the test plaintiffs must allege " (a) a particularized injury (b) concretely and demonstrably resulting from defendants' action (c) which injury will be redressed by the remedy sought." Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321, 1324 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 901 (1982) (quoting Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1976)). The City claims an injury in fact because it has spent money in its efforts to gain the annexation and has been unable to get it. The City, however, has not shown the alleged injuries resulted from action of the State or that the injuries would be corrected by the judicial remedies sought. The remedy sought would not require the area be annexed but only that an election be held among the residents of the area to be annexed. If these residents vote "no", the City would continue to suffer the exact injury of which it now complains.
Finally, the City is a political subdivision of the State. As was observed in Mountlake Terrace v. Wilson, 15 Wn. App. 392, 394, 549 P.2d 497 (1976):
*682The due process clause protects people from government; it does not protect the state from itself. Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created for exercising such governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them, and they may not assert the protection of the due process clause against action of the state government.
No more than did the plaintiff in Hoppe v. King Cy., 95 Wn.2d 332, 337, 622 P.2d 845 (1980) have a "roving commission to bring [the] lawsuit" does plaintiff here have standing to bring this action unless it meets the standing requirements established by the court. It has not done so.
In addition to failing to establish standing, the City has failed to meet its burden of proof that RCW 35.13.165 and RCW 36.93.180(10) are special laws under Const. art. 11, § 10 (amend. 40). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. International Tracers of Am. v. Estate of Hard, 89 Wn.2d 140, 148, 570 P.2d 131 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 1004 (1978). The unconstitutionality must be proved "beyond all reasonable doubt". Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disab. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 83 Wn.2d 523, 528, 520 P.2d 162 (1974). The burden of proof rests with plaintiff, not the defendants. Where (1) the classification applies alike to all members within the class, (2) there is some basis for reasonably distinguishing between those within and without the designated class, and (3) the classification has a rational relationship to the purpose of the challenged statute, the statute will be upheld. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State, 93 Wn.2d 465, 478, 611 P.2d 396 (1980).
The reason for this rule has been expressed by this court in State v. Laitinen, 77 Wn.2d 130, 132-33, 459 P.2d 789 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1055 (1970):
Highlighting the issue here is the marked difference between the decision making processes of the judiciary and those of the legislative branch of the government under our constitutions. Whereas the judges must determine the facts from the evidence, avoiding personal predilections and opinions, come to a conclusion of ulti*683mate fact from the proof presented, and apply the law thereto regardless of personal animus, bias or feelings, the legislative branch of government under our constitution is free of such strictures. Legislators may well have been selected by the people not in spite of but because of openly declared opinions, prejudices and predilections. Unlike the judges, legislators need not base their decisions upon the weight of evidence, but may vote against the preponderance of it or vote upon a proposition without hearing any evidence whatever. In prescribing the police power, all that is constitutionally required of the legislature is that a state of facts can reasonably be conceived to exist which would justify the legislation. If the courts can reasonably conceive of such a state of facts, they must presume that such facts actually did exist and that the statute being tested was passed with reference to them.
The issue is whether the open-ended classification of cities over 400,000 is special legislation. Without exception, this court has upheld classification by population so long as the classification did not create a closed class, i.e., a class which by definition could involve only certain cities at the time of the enactment of the statute and in the future. E.g., where the city is actually named (Denver v. Spokane Falls, 7 Wash. 226, 34 P. 926 (1893); Terry v. King Cy., 43 Wash. 61, 86 P. 210 (1906); Miller v. Pasco, 50 Wn.2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957)) or population is otherwise closed ended (Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wn.2d 211, 163 P.2d 594 (1945), which made certain primary election statutes applicable only to cities with a population between 100,000 and 150,000 "as shown by the 1940 census").
The classification here is open ended. By these terms both statutes will apply to any city which attains that population in the future and neither would apply to Seattle should its population fall below 400,000. An open-ended classification based on population has been consistently upheld by this court and has never been held to be special legislation. The 400,000 population criteria is not unusual. A number of statutes apply only to cities with populations of more than 400,000. E.g., RCW 3.58.010 — district court *684judges paid as much as superior court judges; RCW 28A-.57.313 — school directors serve 4-year terms; RCW 28A.57-.358, .425, .435 — other special provisions for election of school director; RCW 35.21.780 — state agencies expressly authorized to promulgate rules applicable exclusively to those cities; RCW 82.39.010 — only cities over 400,000 may impose an excise tax on the sale or distribution of motor vehicle fuel and special fuel.
Even if the majority now chooses to ignore nearly 100 years of settled law and find open-ended classifications invalid, the City still has failed to meet its burden of proof. In its statement as to why the statutes are special legislation, the majority simply says it disagrees with the arguments made in support of the legislation. While these are interesting conclusions on the part of the majority, they have absolutely no relevance to the test for special legislation. The conclusions reached by the majority may be accurate; the test, however, is not whether the court agrees or disagrees with the reasons for the classification. Rather it is whether any state of facts could reasonably be conceived to sustain the classification.
It is not the court's function to decide whether the statute is sound or unsound, wise or unwise, effectual or ineffectual — but only whether it is within the legislature's constitutional powers to enact it.
State v. Laitinen, supra at 133.
While the majority may choose to disagree, there are reasons and a rational basis for the statutes to apply to cities with a population of over 400,000. For example, large cities which offer more public services may be more likely to experience pressure for annexation; large cities are more likely than small cities to be surrounded by large property-owning industrial concerns which may be adversely affected by annexation; annexation to a large city often results in greater increased tax burdens than annexation to a smaller city. The City has not refuted the argument that in the matter of annexation large cities are different than small cities. The Legislature may choose to treat cities over *685400,000 differently than smaller cities. Where it chooses to draw the line is a matter of legislative discretion, not the judgment of courts. State ex rel. Lindsey v. Derbyshire, 79 Wash. 227, 235, 140 P. 540 (1914). The City has not met its burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that treating large cities differently in annexation matters is unreasonable, inequitable, or unjust.
In its opinion, the majority arrogates to itself the prerogatives of the Legislature. While the court may disagree with legislative policies, it must remember its role is judicial not legislative. The trial court in finding the City had not sustained its burden stated it was "mindful of the separation of powers of the three branches of government". This is a sound position for this court as well.
Because of my views expressed on standing and on whether RCW 35.13.165 and RCW 36.93.180(10) are special legislation, it is not necessary to comment on the issues of severability or whether RCW 35.13.165 is a violation of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
In summary, I would hold: (1) Plaintiff has no standing to bring the action that RCW 35.13.165 is unconstitutional; and (2) neither RCW 35.13.165 nor RCW 36.93.180(10) are unconstitutional special legislation.
I would affirm the trial court and thus dissent.
Brachtenbach and Andersen, JJ., concur with Dolli-ver, J.
Reconsideration denied April 12, 1985.