dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that a trial court has discretion to determine whether its judgments and orders have been violated, a trial court nevertheless may not hold someone in contempt for conduct that falls outside the scope of and is not prohibited by a previous judgment. Because I conclude that is what occurred in this case, I dissent.
1. The trial court’s November 1999 judgment stemmed from litigation in which the appellants had relied solely on various ordinances to deny Eller Media’s application to construct and operate advertising signs. In that judgment, the trial court ruled that the appellants could not rely on those ordinances to deny Eller Media’s application, and the court thus ordered the appellants to permit Eller Media to “construct and operate” the signs. The present contempt action, on the other hand, arises not from actions taken under any city ordinance to prohibit Eller Media from constructing and operating the signs, but from separate and distinct actions taken by the mayor to contact advertisers and discourage them from advertising in the city. Because this conduct simply is not prohibited by and exceeds the scope of the trial court’s judgment involving the litigation over the city’s ordinances, I conclude that the conduct cannot properly be the subject of a contempt action on that decree.2 For this reason, I dissent to Division 1 of the majority opinion and to the judgment.
2. In addition, I dissent to Division 3 of the majority opinion, as I agree with the appellants’ assertion that the trial court violated the appellants’ First Amendment rights in the contempt order by enjoining the appellants from making any effort whatsoever to contact advertisers using Eller Media’s signs. In this regard, the appellants have a constitutional right to express their views to advertisers regarding advertising within the City of Roswell, so long as the appellants do not threaten some form of punishment or adverse *382action against the advertisers.3 Because the trial court’s injunction does not prohibit only such threats by the appellants, but prohibits constitutionally protected speech, it is overbroad, and I dissent to the majority’s affirmance of the injunction.
Decided July 11, 2002 Reconsideration denied July 26, 2002.3. In its November 1999 judgment, the trial court ruled that the mayor enjoyed qualified immunity from damages sought by the plaintiffs under 42 USC § 1983. In its contempt order, however, the trial court ruled that the mayor was no longer entitled to qualified immunity from damages because of his conduct in contacting advertisers. On appeal, the mayor contends that the trial court erred in this ruling, but the majority holds that the mayor’s contention is moot because the trial court did not award damages.4 However, because the contempt ruling removed a significant barrier to awarding damages and as the trial court left open the possibility that it would award damages at a later time, . I cannot agree that the issue is moot.
In addition, the trial court had no authority in ruling on the contempt motion to modify the provision in the final judgment providing that the mayor was entitled to immunity. First, the modification came after the term of court in which the final judgment was entered.5 Second, and more importantly, a trial court does not have the authority in a contempt action to modify the terms of a final judgment.6 The fact that the trial court did so demonstrates that Eller Media’s contempt motion and the trial court’s contempt order exceeded the scope of the parties’ litigation. In essence, in its contempt motion, Eller Media is seeking damages for actions of the appellants that were never the subject of its complaint against the appellants and that occurred after the litigation over the sign ordinances had ended.
4. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent to Divisions 1, 3, and 4 of the majority opinion and to the judgment.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Fletcher and Justice Benham join in this dissent.
*383Carothers & Mitchell, Richard A. Carothers, William M. Coolidge III, for appellants. Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, Peter C. Canfield, Sean R. Smith, Edward A. Webb, for appellee.See Harris v. U. S. Development Corp., 269 Ga. 659, 661-662 (502 SE2d 721) (1998); George v. George, 232 Ga. 389, 392-393 (207 SE2d 26) (1974); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 231 Ga. 334, 337-338 (201 SE2d 429) (1973).
See Rattner v. Netburn, 930 F2d 204, 208-210 (2nd Cir. 1991); Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F3d 74, 82 (2nd Cir. 1998).
See Division 4 of the majority opinion.
Bagley v. Robertson, 265 Ga. 144, 146 (454 SE2d 478) (1995) (trial court only has the inherent authority to modify a judgment during the same term of court in which the judgment was rendered).
Boyett v. Wester, 265 Ga. 387 (456 SE2d 504) (1995).