A final judgment and decree of divorce, incorporating a settlement agreement, was granted to appellant Grant Fred Page (“husband”) and appellee Jennifer Renae Baylard (“wife”) in 1988. There was one child born as issue of the marriage; wife was awarded custody and husband was obligated for child support.
In 2003 wife brought a petition for contempt alleging, inter alia, that husband refused to reimburse her for certain “health service expenses” incurred by the minor child, for which husband was obligated under the final decree. The trial court entered judgment in wife’s favor and ordered husband to reimburse her $23,375, representing his share of the cost of “treatment” for the child at a long-term residential preparatory school, plus $6,040.11 in attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-2. We granted discretionary review and, for the reasons which follow, we reverse.
The evidence at an evidentiary hearing on the contempt petition established that during the child’s adolescent years, she became unruly, ran away from home, abused drugs and alcohol, and was the subject of delinquency proceedings in juvenile court. During that time, wife obtained outpatient treatment for the child at Peachford Behavioral Health System of Atlanta, as well as other psychological counseling. One such counselor recommended a residential long-term treatment facility. Over the next several months, wife researched various such residential programs. In 2002, the child was admitted to Peachford for several days where she received drug detoxification and further evaluation. Upon her discharge from Peach-ford, wife enrolled the child at ABM Family Preparatory, a residential long-term treatment facility in Westmoreland, Tennessee. It is without dispute that wife had been in communication with the director of ABM over the previous several months while making the decision as to when to enroll the child, and that husband was not consulted prior to the child’s admission. In fact, he did not learn of the child’s whereabouts until the child had been attending ABM for 16 months.
ABM’s director testified that the program consisted of “the basic core curriculum that [a student] would receive in high school... five hours a day of schooling.” In addition, the child received a total of 50 to 60 hours of individual counseling over the 17 months that she participated in the program. Wife paid ABM $2,750 per month in tuition during the relevant time period, for a total cost of $46,750. The trial court ordered husband to reimburse wife for half that amount as a “medical expense” under the agreement.
1. The relevant provision of the settlement agreement states as follows:
*587As an additional portion of child support, husband will maintain the child under any dental care and hospitalization program available through his place of employment, and will pay one-half (1/2) of all reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses incurred on behalf of the child, which are not covered by insurance. In the event that a major expenditure is to be incurred, husband will be consulted prior to services rendered, except in an emergency situation.
Wife asserts that the cost of the child’s attendance at ABM is a medical expense within contemplation of the agreement. Even assuming this to be true, the agreement clearly specifies that husband is to be consulted before a major medical expenditure is to be incurred. Wife acknowledges that she did not consult husband in the months that she was compiling information about residential facilities, or at any time prior to the child’s enrollment at ABM. Clearly, the monthly tuition of $2,750 was a major expenditure, and although the child’s emotional status was urgent, it had been an ongoing problem for a period of several months. Thus, there is no evidence that it was the type of emergency which would relieve wife of her obligation to consult with husband.
A settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree is construed according to the same rules that govern contractual interpretation in general, with the cardinal rule being to ascertain the intention of the parties. Where any contractual term of a settlement agreement incorporated into a decree is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one interpretation as written, the provision’s plain meaning must be strictly enforced.
(Footnotes omitted.) Hall v. Day, 273 Ga. 838, 839-840 (1) (546 SE2d 469) (2001). The relevant provision of the decree is unambiguous — “[i]n the event that a major expenditure is to be incurred, husband will be consulted prior to services rendered, except in an emergency situation.” This language creates a condition precedent which must be performed “before a contract becomes absolute and obligatory upon the other party.” Hall v. Ross, 273 Ga. App. 811, 813 (616 SE2d 145) (2005). The failure of this condition precedent prevents wifefrom enforcing any right of reimbursement for expenses paid to ABM on behalf of the child. Id. In ruling otherwise, the trial court abused its discretion.
2. In view of our ruling in Division 1, we need not address husband’s remaining enumerations of error.
*588 Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Melton, J., who dissents and Hines, J., not participating.