specially concurring in the judgment only:
I agree with the majority’s conclusions that “the Petersons owed no duty to the plaintiffs,” and that “the summary judgments for the defendants were proper.” Maj. op. at 380. I disagree, however, with the majority’s application of section 390, governing entrustment of chattels to known incompetents, and the majority’s holding in dicta that lenders of money or credit can be suppliers of chattels with respect to liability for negligent entrustment.
I.
In the companion case to the present action, Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 (Colo.1992), this court recognizes the doctrine of negligent entrustment, noting that it is followed in a majority of jurisdictions. Casebolt, 829 P.2d at 357-59; see also Casebolt (Vollack, J., dissenting), 829 P.2d at 370. In the present case, the majority reiterates that section 390 “establishes a useful framework for resolution of the issues of duty and adherence to the standard of care applicable to a supplier of chattels.” Maj. op. at 377; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965). I disagree.
Section 390 [hereinafter “section 390”] of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) [hereinafter “Restatement ”] is a more narrow application of the general doctrine of negligent entrustment set out in section 308 of the Restatement. See Casebolt (Vollack, J., dissenting), 829 P.2d at 371. In my dissent, I detail the manner in which section 390 has consistently been applied in accord with its narrow purpose. Casebolt (Vollack, J., dissenting), 829 P.2d at 370-72. I need not repeat that discussion here. I write separately here because I believe the present case does not come within the ambit of section 390 for two reasons: because Tamara Peterson cannot be considered a “person known to be incompetent,” and because lenders of money or credit can never be suppliers of chattels.
II.
On January 16, 1988, Tamara Peterson (Tamara) drove her Ford Bronco, while intoxicated, and collided with Barry Halsted’s vehicle. Tamara and two passengers in Halsted’s car died as a result of the collision.
Tamara was then twenty-five years old. Other than infrequent overnight visits, Tamara had maintained her own residence apart from her parents, the Petersons, for approximately seven years, since she graduated from high school. During that seven-year period, Tamara was financially independent from the Petersons, with the exception of having accepted one $700 gift which she used to make payments on her car.
Eight years before the collision, in 1980, Tamara received a ticket for driving under the influence. Tamara completed a level I counseling program as a consequence of the ticket. The Petersons were aware of both the ticket and of Tamara’s participation in the counseling program.
*381On February 13,1985, Tamara purchased the Bronco. Donald Peterson co-signed with Tamara the Colorado retail installment contract, a Ford Motor Credit Company Application, and the odometer mileage statement. Both Tamara’s and Donald Peterson’s names, and Donald Peterson’s address, appeared on the vehicle title.
From 1985 until 1988, Tamara made all payments on the Bronco. At times, the Bronco was insured under Donald Peterson’s policy, but later Tamara insured the vehicle. While Tamara kept extra copies of her car keys, she did not allow either Donald or Penelope Peterson to have and maintain spare car keys.
The Halsteds brought suit against the Petersons on theories of negligent entrustment and the family car doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Petersons on the negligent-entrustment claim, noting that no matter how the Bronco was technically titled, the Petersons did not have control over it..
In my opinion, Tamara Peterson cannot logically be categorized as a person known to be incompetent under section 390. She was older than sixteen years of age, was licensed to drive, and suffered no obvious physical or mental impairments when she purchased the Bronco. The Petersons could not have concluded that Tamara was incompetent based on their knowledge of her one DUI conviction five years prior to the purchase of the Bronco.
The majority states that “[t]he evidence leaves no room for dispute that Tamara had an alcohol problem of several years[’] duration.” Maj. op. at 376. The majority further states that “her parents evidenced awareness of that difficulty.” Id. I am not convinced, however, that the Petersons’ awareness of Tamara’s conduct rises to the level of knowledge required for liability under section 390. The Petersons did not testify that they were aware of a problem ‘of several years’ duration.’ Mrs. Peterson did state that she once consulted Tamara about obtaining treatment. Mrs. Peterson’s testimony does not, however, establish the context in which this single statement was made. Accordingly, section 390 should not be used to analyze liability in this case.
III.
The majority is “persuaded that the circumstances in which money or credit may be lent to facilitate the purchase of a vehicle are so many and varied as not to be readily adaptable to the simplified resolution of the duty question that results from the application of negligent entrustment analysis.” Maj. op. at 378. This statement strips section 390 of its essence: that a supplier is someone who has “possession or right to possession of a chattel at the time of entrustment and who directly supplies] the chattel” to the entrustee. Maj. op. at 378 (emphasis added). Someone who loans money or credit clearly does not have possession or a right to possession of a chattel.
In my view, the majority’s opinion imposes a new duty on lenders to make indepth inquiries as to an applicant’s persona, at the time of the loan, in order to avoid future liability when the applicant procures a chattel at some indefinite future moment. Creation of such a duty stretches the application of section 390 beyond its intended scope. Section 390 imposes liability where a “supplier knows or has reason to know” that an entrustee is likely to misuse a chattel. Restatement § 390 (1965). Section 390 does not affirmatively require lenders to delve into potential users’ lives to discover any of the myriad characteristics which may render a user unfit. Thus, the majority correctly notes “that the community at large is not willing to recognize a responsibility that is of such a magnitude and that lasts indefinitely.” Maj. op. at 379.
I do not imply, by excluding lenders of money or credit from liability under section 390, that lenders can never be liable for negligence. Lenders may be implicated in a chain of causation and found liable under a general case of negligence. See generally Ekberg v. Greene, 196 Colo. 494, 588 P.2d 375 (1978).
*382Based on the foregoing discussion, I would affirm summary judgment in favor of the Petersons.