concurring. I applaud the majority for reaching the just and proper conclusion in this case — i.e., that Jennifer is entitled to a writ of certiorari. This court has recognized that the principal justification for contempt lies in the need for upholding public confidence in the majesty of the law and in the integrity of the judicial system; when we have found these ends will be met despite a reduction or even a remission of a jail sentence for contempt, it has been our practice to modify the judgment. See Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998); Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993) (citing Garner & Rosen v. Amsler, 238 Ark. 34, 377 S.W.2d 872 (1964)); see also Page v. State, 266 Ark. 398, 583 S.W.2d 70 (1979); Dennison v. Mobley, 257 Ark. 216, 515 S.W.2d 215 (1974). Given the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s attempt to reduce Jennifer’s sentence from one year to six months — albeit by a void amended order — shows that he recognized that the sentence should be reduced. Because our court has the authority to modify the lower court’s sentence to meet the ends of justice, this court should remit Jennifer’s jail sentence to time already served.
I also write separately to state my disappointment that our court refuses to suggest to the trial court the employment of an attorney ad litem in this case. This is precisely the type of custody battle the General Assembly envisioned when that body created and funded Arkansas’s attorney ad litem program. Frankly, I believe it to be an abuse of this court’s discretion to not recommend the appointment of an attorney ad litem.
In Kimmons v. Kimmons, 1 Ark. App. 63, 613 S.W.2d 110 (1981), the court of appeals emphasized that an attorney ad litem may be appointed to represent the children’s interest in custody litigation. The Kimmons court stated as follows:
By virtue of their inherent powers, courts have appointed guardians ad litem in custody cases where the evidence is either nonexistent or inadequate to determine the comparative fitness of the parents and to determine where the best interests of the child lie, or in cases where it is apparent that the dispute is centered on the desires of the parents rather than the best interests of the child. Koslowsky v. Koslowsky, 41 Wis.2d 275, 163 N.W.2d 632 (1969).
The case at bar presents a classic example in which the child’s welfare and interest should not solely depend upon the parents’ attempts to justify why they should be awarded custody. The court should not be limited to the often biased and distorted picture which can be depicted by evidence strategically introduced or not introduced by the mother and father in a hotly contested custody fight.
Kimmons, 1 Ark. App. at 68, 613 S.W.2d at 113. Since the Kimmons decision, the General Assembly has enacted Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(d)(1) (Supp. 2005), which authorizes the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts to establish an attorney ad litem program to represent children in circuit courts in cases where custody is an issue. That program had been established and funded under Act 2096 of 2005. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it would appear that an attorney ad litem would be of great benefit to all in this ongoing controversy. I would recommend that the trial judge — whoever it may be that presides over this custody matter — consider making such an appointment.