dissenting in part.
I concur fully with Division 1. However, I must respectfully dissent to Division 2, in which the majority affirms the imposition of criminal contempt against attorneys Britt and Ramseur. The record reveals that during a hearing held on February 2,2007, the trial court expressly recognized that a conflict of interest had arisen in the case that so affected the representation of Sanders provided by Britt and Ramseur that it was necessary to appoint Sanders a third attorney to advise him on the conflict. Nevertheless, at a hearing held four days later, while resolution of that conflict of interest was pending, the trial court ordered counsel to proceed in their representation of Sanders and reach the merits of motions filed in this death penalty case. Counsel respectfully declined to do so because of the conflict of interest. The trial court held them in criminal contempt of court because of their refusal.
Although the majority acknowledges that counsel faced a conflict of interest at the time they declined to follow the trial court’s order, it nevertheless upholds the trial court’s contempt ruling on the basis that the conflict of interest did not justify counsel’s refusal to proceed. The basis for the majority’s holding is that counsel’s conflict of interest involved “collateral” matters that were “ ‘wholly unrelated to the basic issues to be decided in (Sanders’) criminal case’ ” and that *752affected “only ‘one or two’ of all of the... motions” that could have been addressed at the hearing. Majority Opinion, p. 749.
The importance of ensuring that defense counsel is not subject to any conflict of interest that might dilute loyalty to the accused has been long and consistently recognized: “[t]he right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client. [Cit.]” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708, 725 (68 SC 316, 92 LE 309) (1948). “This Court has stressed that ‘(u)ndivided loyalty is an essential element of the right to counsel.’ [Cit.]” Howerton v. Danenberg, 279 Ga. 861, 862 (1) (621 SE2d 738) (2005). “Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. [Cits.]” Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 271 (101 SC 1097, 67 LE2d 220) (1981). Thus, in order for Britt and Ramseur to provide Sanders with effective assistance of counsel, their representation had to be “untrammeled and unimpaired” by conflicting interests, Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 70 (62 SC 457, 86 LE 680) (1942), not “diluted by conflicting interests or inconsistent obligations.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Howerton, supra at 864 (1).
Furthermore, this is a case in which the State is seeking the death penalty. We have recognized that even a “slight conflict of interest [is] not permitted” in death penalty cases. Sallie v. State, 269 Ga. 446, 448 (2) (499 SE2d 897) (1998). That is true even where the conflict may be irrelevant to a death penalty defendant’s guilt or innocence. Fleming v. State, 246 Ga. 90, 93 (270 SE2d 185) (1980). In accordance with this position, this Court has determined that conflicts of interest wholly unrelated to the basic issues to be decided in the criminal case were sufficient to preclude counsel from effectively representing death penalty clients. See Howerton, supra, 279 Ga. at 862 (1) (defense counsel ineffective based on conflict created by concurrent representation of death penalty client and prosecutor in unrelated federal case); Sallie, supra, 269 Ga. at 447 (2) (defense counsel ineffective based on conflict created by simultaneous employment as counsel for defendant and as law clerk within judicial circuit). See also Chapel v. State, 264 Ga. 267 (443 SE2d 271) (1994) (attorney disqualified in capital case due to conflict of interest over his representation of county and its officials in unrelated legal matters).1
*753The majority would compel an attorney to compartmentalize his loyalties and proceed with representation of his client as long as the matter at hand did not directly involve the subject matter regarding which counsel’s loyalties were divided. The majority’s holding thereby ignores this Court’s recognition that no conflict of interest is permissible for counsel in death penalty cases and is directly contrary to the rule that a criminal client’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel requires that counsel’s loyalty be undivided by conflicts of interest. Nothing in the cases cited by the majority supports the result it reaches here. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (95 SC 584, 42 LE2d 574) (1975) (counsel could not be held in contempt for advising client in civil case not to produce evidence counsel believed would incriminate client even though trial court had not yet ruled on admissibility of evidence); Matter of Balter v. Regan, 63 NY2d 630, 631 (1984) (defense counsel’s belief, unsupportedhy any court ruling, that conflict of interest existed did not justify counsel’s refusal to obey court’s order to proceed).
Moreover, even if a division of an attorney’s loyalties were ever feasible, it would not apply to the conflict of interest faced by counsel in this case because the conflict arose out of payment of counsel’s fees for the services to be rendered in their representation of Sanders. It is well established that potential conflicts of interest may exist between counsel and client based on an attorney’s private pecuniary interests. E.g., United States v. Magini, 973 F2d 261, 264 (4th Cir. 1992) (conflict of interest arising from forfeiture provision affecting attorney fees). A conflict over the fees counsel seeks to be paid for those services he may render his client would necessarily permeate every aspect of counsel’s representation of that client.
“Counsel’s function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. [Cit.]” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 688 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
“[T]he right to counsel’s undivided loyalty is a critical component of the right to assistance of counsel; when counsel is burdened by a conflict of interest, he deprives his client of his Sixth Amendment right as surely as if he failed to appear at trial.” Bonin v. California, 494 U. S. 1039, 1044 [(110 SC 1506, 108 LE2d 641)] (1990). . . . When an attorney has a conflict of interest, that attorney violates his duty of loyalty to his client and “fails to provide effective assistance of counsel.” [Cit.]
United States v. Edelmann, 458 F3d 791, 806-807 (8th Cir. 2006). I would recognize that counsel here acted in compliance with Sanders’ *754Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when they declined to ignore a court-recognized conflict of interest and that they thus properly refused the trial court’s order to proceed with divided loyalties at the motions hearing in this death penalty case. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the majority that the trial court properly held counsel in criminal contempt of court.
Decided November 21, 2007 Reconsideration denied December 13, 2007. Koehler & Riddick, Christine A. Koehler, for Walter M. Britt. Chandler, Britt, Jay & Beck, Walter M. Britt, pro se. Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Jeanette F Shaw, Richard A. Vandever, Thomas J. Ludlam, Assistant District Attorneys, for the State. Rogers & Hardin, Robert B. Remar, Thomas J. Mew TV, Robert L. McGlasson, for Georgia Public Defender Standards Council. Chandler, Britt, Jay & Beck, Walter M. Britt, Gary Parker, for Sanders. Brian Steel, for Ramseur.I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins this dissent.
As a matter of interest, I would note that one of the two attorneys appealing the contempt citation issued here for counsel’s refusal, due to a conflict of interest directly related to this case, to represent Sanders, is the same attorney held disqualified, due to a conflict of interest unrelated to that case, from representing the death penalty defendant in Chapel.