concurring.
I join in the court’s opinion, which, as I understand it, stands for the limited proposition that a person suffering from paranoid schizophrenia cannot be permitted to waive counsel when the person’s delusional system encompasses defense counsel and thus influences the decision to proceed pro se. This proposition finds support in the case law. See, e.g., People v. Burnett, 188 Cal.App.3d 1314, 234 Cal.Rptr. 67 (1987); *1207State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848 (Minn.1976).2
Our decision should not be read to suggest that the standard for. determining competency to waive procedural rights such as the right to counsel differs from the general standard for determining competency to proceed. The Alaska Supreme Court has expressly disavowed the existence of such a dual standard. See Dolchok v. State, 639 P.2d 277, 293 (Alaska 1982).
In the present case, the psychological evaluation suggested that Adams was mentally competent to proceed and to waive counsel. Judge Pegues relied on this psychological evaluation to find that Adams had voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Adams has not alleged that he was incompetent to proceed with trial—that is, that he was unable to assist in his own defense. This court’s opinion, while finding that Adams did not properly waive counsel, has not questioned his competency to stand trial. Given a single standard for determining competency to proceed and competency to waive procedural rights, the fact that Adams’ competency to proceed remains unchallenged may seem inconsistent with our conclusion that the trial court erred in finding a valid waiver of counsel. However, the inconsistency is apparent, not real.
The issue of competency is necessarily abstract, requiring a determination of an individual’s theoretical capacity to make informed and intelligent choices. The psychological evaluation in Adams’ case addressed competency in this abstract sense, indicating that Adams had the mental capacity to assist in his own defense and was capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving counsel.
While competency, in this abstract sense, is a necessary component of a valid waiver of counsel, it is not in and of itself sufficient. Before finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, a court must determine not only that the accused is capable of waiving the right to counsel, but also that he has in fact entered into a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right. In the present case, upon determining that Adams was mentally capable of making a knowing and intelligent decision as to counsel, it was incumbent on the court to go further and determine whether his decision to represent himself actually was knowingly and intelligently made. To the extent Adams’ mental illness affected his decision to waive, the court was required to consider that fact, just as it was required to consider Adams’ mental illness in deciding the broader question of general competency. Instead of separately determining the issues of competency and actual waiver, however, the trial court merged these issues into a single determination of competency.
Our decision reversing the trial court is based not on the conclusion that Adams was mentally incompetent to waive counsel, but rather on our finding that Adams did not actually make a knowing and intelligent waiver in this case, since his decision to waive counsel was affected by his mental illness. A review of the record leaves little doubt that Adams’ refusal to accept representation in this case was the product of his distorted perception that counsel was among those conspiring against him.
It is noteworthy, moreover, that, in addressing the issue of competency to waive counsel, the trial court essentially deferred to the professional judgment of Dr. David J. Sperbeck, the examining psychologist. In relevant part, Judge Pegues stated:
[T]he mental health professional says that you are qualified to do this and competent to make this choice so I have to abide by it.
(Emphasis added.) The determination of competency, however, is ultimately a legal matter for determination by the court, not a medical matter for determination by an expert witness. In my view, the superior *1208court’s deference to Dr. Sperbeck’s opinion amounted to a failure to exercise judicial discretion and, as such, would independently require reversal. See, e.g., Cano v. Anchorage, 627 P.2d 660, 663 (Alaska App.1981).
I find two other aspects of this case sufficiently troubling to deserve mention, even though neither has captured the attention of the parties on appeal. First, it does not appear that Adams ever received an adequate psychiatric evaluation for purposes of determining his competency to proceed or to waive counsel. After a preliminary examination of Adams by Department of Corrections psychologist Robert Roland yielded inconclusive results, Judge Pegues referred Adams to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute for a psychiatric evaluation in accordance with AS 12.47.100. Adams was evaluated by Dr. Sperbeck, another psychologist. However, AS 12.47.100 expressly requires an evaluation by a “qualified psychiatrist,” not by a psychologist. The two disciplines are not interchangeable, and the failure to comply with the statutory mandate in this case could, in my view, be deemed plain error.3
Second, I am concerned that the Alaska Public Defender Agency’s representation of Adams in moving for a new trial may have violated the agency’s duty to avoid representation of conflicting interests. Pri- or to trial, the assistant public defender representing Adams took the active and affirmative position that the superior court should accept Adams’ waiver of counsel as knowingly and intelligently entered. Counsel prevailed in convincing the court of this view. At the conclusion of trial, however, the same attorney moved for a new trial, advancing an argument diametrically opposed to the view he had previously (and successfully) urged upon the court.
It is difficult for me to understand how Adams’ trial counsel could have maintained any semblance of credibility with the trial court in advocating a position that was in open conflict with the position that he had actively and successfully advocated before the jury reached its verdict. I thus question whether Adams’ trial counsel was capable of effectively representing Adams’ interest in moving for a new trial. Given our decision to reverse on the waiver issue, it is unnecessary to resolve the conflict issue. However, I have strong reservations concerning the propriety of the public defender agency’s continued representation of Adams under these circumstances.
. The state cites several decisions for the proposition that other courts have allowed paranoid-schizophrenics to waive counsel and proceed pro se. None of the state’s cases, however, involves a situation in which the defendant’s decision to waive counsel was the product of the mental illness. See, e.g., People v. Wright, 171 Ill.App.3d 573, 121 Ill.Dec. 858, 525 N.E.2d 1165 (1988); State v. Hahn, 106 Wash.2d 885, 726 P.2d 25 (1986); State v. Evans, 125 Ariz. 401, 610 P.2d 35 (1980).
. The broad language of Alaska’s guilty but mentally ill statute, AS 12.47.070, might also be read as authorizing competency determinations. That statute would permit the determination to be based on an examination by "at least two qualified psychiatrists or two forensic psychologists certified by the American Board of Forensic Psychology.” Adams' evaluation was no more proper under this provision than it was under AS 12.47.100. Although Adams was seen by two psychologists, the record establishes that only Dr. Sperbeck was a board certified forensic psychologist. Dr. Roland was not, and, in fact, expressed a lack of familiarity with the applicable competency standard.