dissenting:
I have no disagreement with the proposition that the central inquiry in determining the legislative or administrative character of an initiated ordinance is whether the ordinance “announces a new public policy or is simply the implementation of a previously declared policy.” Maj. op. at 1254. Nor do I quarrel with the two guidelines enunciated by the majority to resolve this issue: first, whether the governmental action at issue relates to subjects of a permanent or general character, in which case it should be considered legislative in nature, or relates to matters that are temporary in operation and effect, in which instance it is to be deemed administrative in nature; and second, whether the governmental action constitutes a declaration of public policy, and is thus legislative in character, or is necessary to carry out an existing legislative policy and purpose, in which case it is properly characterized as executive or administrative. See Witcher v. Canon City, 716 P.2d 445, 449-50 (Colo.1986); Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297, 303 (Colo. 1981); City of Aurora v. Zwerdlinger, 194 Colo. 192, 196, 571 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1977). My disagreement is with the majority’s analysis of the record in light of these guidelines.
I.
A summary of the pertinent facts is helpful to a proper understanding of this case. In 1977 the City of Idaho Springs enacted a municipal ordinance imposing a three percent sales and use tax on all tangible personal property, commodities, and services for the purpose of funding certain capital improvements, including “City kHall construction.” The sole reference in the 1977 ordinance to the city hall is in section IV, which states in pertinent part:
Funds [are] to be deposited solely in the capítol [sic] improvement fund to be used in the priority of: sewer plant and/or water transmission lines, followed by City Hall construction, unless necessity dictates another unknown capí-tol [sic] improvement use. If this ordinance is approved, for the increase in retail sales and use tax, it shall become effective on the 1st of May, 1978.
It is thus obvious that the “policy decision” articulated in this 1977 ordinance with respect to the city hall is the inclusion of “City Hall construction” as a priority for which the sales and use tax revenues were to be used.
The minutes of the city council meeting on January 23, 1984, more than six years after the enactment of the taxing ordinance, contain the following references to the city hall project:
There was some further discussion regarding moving the Grass Valley School.
Councilman Jones pointed out that it may be possible to cut the cost of the moving and renovation by having the City remove the old building and prepare the area for the foundation. He felt that the rehabilitation costs could also be cut. It would be necessary to meet with Mr. Ryberg to see if he will agree with this proposal.
*1256Tom stated that the property could be paid for by Conservation Trust Funds and we could possibly issue Bond Anticipation notes at a later time.
Jones felt that the cost could be cut to about $135,000 but the Council should discuss this with Mr. Ryberg first.
Ralph Shepherd was present and he was not in favor of the City moving the old building. He pointed out that there is a lot of property now in the City which is used for Governmental purposes and therefore we do not receive any property tax from it. He felt that the Public Service building could be purchased for considerablly [sic] less.
* * * * *
After further discussion it was moved and seconded by O’Neal and Jones that the City proceed with the purchase of the Skaff-Sweet property at 17th Avenue and Miner Street, and the moving of the Grass Valley School onto this property, provided that moving and renovation of the building can be accomplished for $135,000 or less, and all contracts and documents associated with this project be reviewed and approved by the city Attorney.
The motion carried by roll call vote as follows:
Paul Stephenson Yes
Bruce O’Neal Yes
Robert Jones Yes
Michael Miller Yes
Irving Krueger Yes
Mayor Kyler Yes
These minutes show that the city council acted on a motion that was based on a multi-faceted discussion concerning the use of Conservation Trust Funds, and possibly bond anticipation notes, in the amount of $135,000 for the purchase of the Skaff-Sweet property as the city hall site, the relocation of Grass Valley Schoolhouse to the new site, and the remodeling of the schoolhouse into the city hall. The ordinances proposed by the appellants would prohibit the city from incurring any debt or using monies “from the City of Idaho Springs Conservation Trust Fund” for the purpose of moving or relocating the Grass Valley schoolhouse or for the purpose of acquiring land on which to relocate the schoolhouse.
II.
I read the court’s opinion to say that the ordinances are beyond the constitutional power of initiative because they dó not deal with subjects of a permanent or general character and because they merely carry out the preexisting legislative policy to build a city hall. In contrast to the majority, I am convinced that the proposed ordinances satisfy both of these guidelines.
Implicit in the majority’s resolution of this case is the assumption that the actions taken by the city council during the meeting on January 23, 1984, did not announce new policy matters with respect to the city hall project but were merely administrative measures undertaken to implement the preexisting policy enunciated in the 1977 tax ordinance. If this assumption is incorrect, as I believe it is, then clearly the majority’s conclusion must also fall, since the proposed ordinances would directly prohibit the execution of the decisions made by the city council at the meeting on January 23, 1984.
The proposed ordinances, in my view, are legislative in nature because they relate to subjects of a permanent or general character and constitute a declaration of a new public policy separate and distinct from the policy enunciated in the 1977 tax ordinance, which established “City Hall construction” as one of the municipal priorities to be funded by sales and use tax revenues generated by the ordinance. The minutes of the council meeting on January 23,1984, show that the city council did not even consider utilizing sales and use tax revenues for the city hall project. The discussion which preceded the motion, as reported in the minutes, indicates that the only funds under consideration for the initial phase of the project were Conservation Trust Funds. Moreover, during a *1257hearing on the city’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the city treasurer testified that the money for the city hall project would not come from the capital improvement fund, as required by the 1977 tax ordinance, but from a building fund which was derived from the sale of other city property. Although it is unclear whether this building fund referred to by the city treasurer is the Conservation Trust Fund referred to in the minutes of the council meeting of January 23, 1984, there can be no doubt that the fund to which the treasurer referred was a fund separate and distinct from the capital improvement fund created by the 1977 sales and use tax ordinance. A decision establishing the source of public monies to be used for a project of this type has traditionally been viewed as legislative in character. See, e.g., Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 150 P. 977 (1915); 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 15.04, at 45 (3d ed. 1981).
The city council’s action at the January 1984 meeting related to a subject that was no less permanent or general in character and no less declarative of public policy than the subject matter of the 1977 ordinance itself. Furthermore, the council’s action went far beyond the mere implementation of the policy enunciated in the 1977 tax ordinance. Simply stated, the city council on January 23, 1984, was not attempting to execute or implement the prior legislative policy enunciated in the 1977 tax ordinance but was making a new policy decision regarding the funding source for the city hall project.
III.
I would hold that the proposed ordinances, which would prohibit the city from incurring any debt or using any monies from the Conservation Trust Fund for the purpose of acquiring land and relocating the schoolhouse to that land, relate to matters that are fundamentally legislative in nature. As such, the proposed ordinances are within the constitutional power of initiative guaranteed to the people by article V, section 1 of the Colorado Constitution. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. State Department of Social Services, 644 P.2d 1, 6 n. 6 (Colo.1982); McKee v. City of Louisville, 200 Colo. 525, 530, 616 P.2d 969, 972 (1980); Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 4, 13, 156 P. 1108, 1111 (1908). I would therefore reverse the judgment and remand the case to the district court with directions to order the city council, pursuant to section 1-40-116, IB C.R.S. (1986 Supp.), to submit the ordinances to a vote of the electorate.1
I am authorized to say that LOHR, J., joins me in this dissent.
. A written stipulation of facts, dated August 24, 1984, and filed in the district court, states that the initiative petitions were approved by the city clerk "as to form,” that the requisite number of signatures were obtained on the petitions, that the authenticity of the signatures was not disputed, that no protest to the petitions was filed, and that the City of Idaho Springs has indicated that it will not hold an election on the ordinances unless the court finds in favor of the petitioning citizens.