with whom MOORE, Justice, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent from the court’s conclusion that the Board’s recommended discipline must be rejected. In my view there are sufficient, significant mitigating factors to warrant acceptance of the Board’s recommended sanction of a five-year suspension.1
During the period of his misconduct, Buckalew was suffering severe emotional and psychological problems. A psychiatric report prepared by Deborah Geeseman, M.D., in connection with the federal prosecution against Buckalew concluded that he was suffering from mental illness.2 Dr. Geeseman stated that Buckalew “has been chronically depressed to some level over many years. At times, the depression has deepened to the point of becoming a major clinical depression, which has incapacitated his ability to function, both professionally and personally.” Prior to the events in question, Buckalew had suffered periods of severe depression (beginning in 1979) and had attempted suicide, in April 1980. He had experienced marital difficulties for several years and was divorced in July 1982.3
Dr. Geeseman suggested that Bucka-lew’s misconduct might be seen as a “professional suicide attempt,” reflecting sub*57conscious anger at the high, unattainable expectations that he had experienced his entire life. Dr. Geeseman elaborated:
It is believed that there are probably very complex intrapersonal dynamics and interpersonal dynamics that may have affected his ongoing behavior, in a way that would ultimately force him out of his legal practice. In a distorted and covert way, this would then allow him to act out against the structure of expectations under which he has been living his life. On the one hand, this is giving [sic] the appearance that he is a very competent attorney, and able to do well. On the other hand, when the truth is found out, he has cut his own throat, figuratively speaking, to fight back against the pressures he is under, though he may not acknowledge feeling them, from himself, his family, and the community.
Admittedly, these problems do not excuse Buckalew’s behavior; on the other hand, they do indicate motivations other than pure greed or evil intent on his part. See ABA Standards § 9.32(b), (c), (h).
Also of significance are the following factors: first, Buckalew was admitted to the Alaska bar in 1978 and had no record of professional misconduct prior to the events in issue. See id. § 9.32(a). Second, he fully disclosed his wrongdoing, and his law firm made restitution of the funds he embezzled shortly after discovering his conduct. See id. § 9.32(d), (e). Buckalew fully cooperated with law enforcement authorities, he recognizes the depth of his wrongdoing, and is remorseful. See id. § 9.32(e), (1). Finally, Buckalew has been sentenced by the United States District Court for the crime of embezzlement by a trustee, the same conduct that led to these proceedings.4
On the basis of the record before us, I am of the view that a five-year suspension will fully serve the purposes of lawyer discipline proceedings. Here a five-year suspension provides the public with the same protection as does disbarment, since a disbarred attorney may apply for reinstatement after five years. If at that point Buckalew wishes to be reinstated, he will have to demonstrate that he has the moral qualifications, competency, and knowledge of the law required to practice in this state, and that his resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive of the public interest.5
I do not view a five-year suspension in this case as providing inadequate deterrence or as undermining confidence in the legal system. The sanction I would impose is a severe one; it has the same functional effect as disbarment. I recognize that “disbarment” has a more severe connotation than “suspension,” and certainly Buck-alew’s conduct would generally deserve that stigma. The mitigating circumstances present here, however, warrant the imposition of a sanction that is short of the ultimate sanction of disbarment. I would therefore adopt the Board’s recommendation that Robert J. Buckalew be suspended for a period of five years.
.I concur in the majority's reference to the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions as an appropriate model for determining sanctions for lawyer misconduct in Alaska. ABA Standard § 9.32 provides:
Factors which may be considered in mitigation.
Mitigating factors include:
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) character or reputation;
(h) physical or mental disability or impairment;
(i) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(j) interim rehabilitation;
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(/) remorse;
(m) remoteness of prior offenses.
. Dr. Geeseman diagnosed Buckalew as suffering from the following under the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual — III: dysthymic disorder, chronic, severe; major depression, recurrent, with melancholia; alcohol dependence, in remission; caffeine dependence, continuous; mixed personality disorder.
. Buckalew also had alcohol dependence problems, particularly during a severe one-year “binge" from July 1982 to June 1983. Buckalew entered alcohol rehabilitation treatment in June 1983. He completed a six-week treatment program and, although he was discharged from a follow-up program for nonattendance, he has not since experienced major problems with alcohol.
. In this respect I would also note that Bucka-lew did not use any of the money for his personal consumption.
. Alaska Bar R. 29(c)(1).