dissenting:
The issue presented in this case is whether, when an insured stands beside his parked vehicle and reaches into it to unload a firearm, the vehicle is in “use,” within the meaning of that term as it is found in section 42-7-413, 17 C.R.S. (1984). The majority concludes that the vehicle is in “use,” and therefore the insurance company is potentially liable for injuries caused by the discharge of the firearm. I believe that this resúlt is reached by applying an incorrect analysis and contrary to our prior cases. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority states that a claim is covered by automobile liability insurance if, “the injury that forms the basis of the claim is causally related to a conceivable use of the insured vehicle that is not foreign to its inherent purpose” and that “the requisite causal relationship” may be established by showing “that the accident would not have occurred but for the vehicle’s use.” Maj. op. at 135. The majority thus holds that a causal relationship between the vehicle and the accident can be satisfied by showing that “but for” the use of the vehicle, the accident would not have occurred.
However, in Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf, 183 Colo. 188, 195, 515 P.2d 1123, 1126 (1973), we stated, “we do not hold that the ‘but for’ doctrine should apply when there is a laek of relationship between the [vehicle] and the accident.” After Titan, we stated that this relationship must be a “causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the injuries sustained_” Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227, 230 (Colo.1984). Thus, merely satisfying the extremely broad “but for” test is not enough; there must be a causal connection between the vehicle and the accident.
The inquiry then is not whether the accident would not have occurred “but for” the use of the automobile, but whether there was a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of the vehicle.1 Azar v. Employers Casualty Co., 178 Colo. 58, 495 P.2d 554 (1972) (hunting from automobile not “use” of vehicle for purposes of automobile liability insurance coverage).
Although the inquiry into whether there is a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of the vehicle must be done on an ad hoc basis, Titan, 183 Colo, at 195, 515 P.2d at 1126, examination of past “use” cases (both those involving firearms and those that do not) shows that where, as here, the incident merely happened to occur in or near a vehicle the vehicle was not being “used” for purposes of section 42-7-413, 17 C.R.S. (1984).
II.
In Mason v. Celina Mutual Insurance Co., 161 Colo. 442, 423 P.2d 24 (1967), the *139insured had driven four other high school boys to target practice with some firearms. On returning to school, the insured and one other boy went back to class. The insured allowed three boys, including Donald Mason, to remain in his parked car, with the weapon, while he went to class. Mason negligently handled the weapon, and it accidentally discharged, killing another boy in the vehicle. The deceased boy’s father sued Mason, who in turn brought in the insured’s automobile liability carrier claiming that he was protected by the insured’s car insurance policy.
In holding that the car was not being “used,” even though the boys were seated in it at the time, we stated that “no causal connection between the discharge of the pistol and the stopped vehicle was shown, as is required to afford coverage under such a policy.” Implicit in Mason is the realization that the negligent mishandling of a firearm was the cause of the accident. The fact that the boys happened to be seated in a car at the time had no bearing on the accident.
The same is true of the present case. Weaver was about to unload his gun— something he could have done as easily before starting the return trip or after arriving home. The fact that he chose to do so in the interim does not establish that the vehicle was in any way causally connected to the accident.
The majority attempts to distinguish Mason by stating that “Weaver’s actions were intimately related to his use of the vehicle as transportation for himself and his rifle from a mountain hunting area to his home in Canon City.” Maj.op. at 137. Unless the insured in Mason lived at the school where the accident occurred, then he, too, was using his vehicle as transportation for himself and his weapon from the target range to his home. The fact that the interim stop at school was longer than the interim stop at the gas station in the present case cannot serve as a meaningful distinction.
We next considered the question of discharge of a weapon from a car in the insurance context in Azar v. Employers Casualty Co., 178 Colo. 58, 495 P.2d 554 (1972). Azar involved two men hunting from an automobile. Azar, the insured driver, was about to fire a shotgun through his automobile window when a car approached from the opposite direction. He then brought the shotgun back into his automobile, where it accidentally discharged, injuring his passenger.
In holding that the automobile was not in “use” for the purposes of insurance coverage, this court stated,
No contention was made that the vehicle in anyway contributed to or was connected with the accidental discharge of the firearm. The only relationship of the vehicle to the accident was the presence of the tort-feasor and the injured person in the automobile at the time of the infliction of the injuries.... In our view, it cannot reasonably be said that the discharge of the weapon in this case originated from, grew out of or flowed from the use of the vehicle. Rather, the injury originated from, grew out of or flowed from the use of the firearm. Use, as contemplated by the automobile liability policy, means use of the vehicle as such, not a use foreign to its inherent purpose, to which the vehicle might conceivably be put.
Azar, 178 Colo, at 60-61, 495 P.2d at 555 (emphasis in original).
The same is true of the present case. No contention is made that the vehicle in any way contributed to the accident, other than the fact that the weapon was inside the vehicle at the time of its discharge. Weaver was standing beside the vehicle, reaching in, and all the victims were outside. Again, the fact that Weaver chose to unload his weapon while it was in the vehicle, rather than immediately after the hunt or after arriving home, does not establish a “causal relationship” between the use of the vehicle and the accident.
The majority attempts to distinguish Azar from the case at bar “because the accident [here] was not coincidental to the use of the automobile.” Maj. op. at 137. *140I am at a loss to see how a vehicle reached into for purposes of unloading a weapon can be “intimately related” to the accident, id., while a vehicle in which the tort-feasor, victim and weapon are all situated and from which shots are intentionally being fired is “coincidental” with the accident. Id. Accord Hutchins v. Mills, 363 So.2d 818 (Fla.App.1978) (use of pickup truck bed as stand from which to hunt not a covered use), cert, denied, 368 So.2d 1368 (Fla.1979); Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 264 Ark. 743, 574 S.W.2d 265 (1978) (camper from which pistol was fired not covered); Norgaard v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co., 201 N.W.2d 871 (N.D.1972) (use of parked vehicle as a gun rest not a covered use); National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642, 139 N.W.2d 821 (1966) (causal relation must exist between the injury and use of vehicle to come within ambit of use of vehicle; vehicle transporting hunters home after hunting trip not in “use” when firearm, being unloaded in vehicle, discharged) (cited with favor in Azar, 178 Colo, at 61, 495 P.2d at 555).
III.
Our prior non-firearm automobile insurance cases interpreting the term “use” also indicate that this tragedy is not within section 42-7-413. Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Drum, 193 Colo. 519, 568 P.2d 459, (1977), involved an accident that occurred while one vehicle, being towed by another, was involved in an accident. In holding that the towing vehicle’s insurance covered the accident, we stated that a “use” could be found, “where the vehicle was dealt with in a manner that created or had the potential of creating an unreasonably dangerous situation.” Dairyland, 193 Colo. at 522, 568 P.2d at 462 (emphasis added).
In the present case, the vehicle was not dealt with in an unsafe manner, the firearm was. It is a crime to carry a loaded rifle in a car.2 Had Weaver unloaded his weapon prior to transporting it, as prudence and the law required, the discharge would not have occurred in the vehicle. This strengthens my conclusion that the “use” of the automobile was in no way causally connected with the accident.
Most recently, we examined the question of “use” for liability insurance purposes in Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227 (Colo.1984). There, we found coverage when the awning of a food vending truck collapsed and injured a customer. We held that the injuries would not have occurred, “except for the use of the truck for the sale of refreshments.” Id. at 231. The majority implies that the same reasoning applies here — that the accident would not have occurred except for the vehicle’s use to transport the weapon. Maj. op. at 135, 136, and 137. This ignores the fact that accidental discharges occur during gun unloading and cleaning in households, cabins, and in the field every year.
Thus, our previous cases indicate where the activity that caused the accident could have as easily occurred outside the vehicle, the vehicle is merely a shell in which the accident occurred and is not “causally connected” with the accident. In such cases, the vehicle is not in “use” within the meaning of section 42-7-413.
Even if we did not have these previous cases to guide us, common sense indicates that unloading a firearm is an act that is dangerous no matter where it occurs. Accidental discharges during unloading of a firearm, many of them tragic, happen regularly, regardless of where the weapon, tort-feasor, and victim happen to be situated.
*141In my view, this case involves negligent handling of a firearm, not use of the vehicle as such. Azar, 178 Colo. at 61, 495 P.2d at 555. The automobile was not being “used” within the meaning of automobile accident liability coverage. To hold the injury here to be one arising out of the use of the automobile inappropriately enlarges the statutory language by judicial construction. The trial court and the court of appeals were correct in holding the insurance company was not liable.
Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice KIRSHBAUM and Justice VOLLACK join in this dissent.
. The vehicle does not have to be moving or even have the engine on to find a "use” within its inherent purpose. See Trinity, 690 P.2d 227 (customer, injured when the awning of a truck used to sell sandwiches collapsed, was covered because truck was in "use" at time); Titan, 183 Colo. 188, 515 P.2d 1123 (liability insurance on cement mixer truck covered injuries caused by brick knocked off building by pump attached to chute on truck).
. Section 33-6-125, 14 C.R.S. (1984). The difference in potential for danger between an unloaded firearm, no matter how unsafely used, and a loaded firearm, no matter how carefully handled, is so great that it is worth considering a special rule to govern cases where a firearm is discharged from within an automobile. Compare 12 G. Couch, Insurance § 45:56 (discussing firearm discharge cases separately from all other "use" cases; “a great deal of litigation arisjes] out of transportation of firearms in insured motor vehicles where the gun discharges injuring passengers or third parties. The better position is that such accidents are not covered under an automobile liability policy.").