(dissenting)—I dissent for the following reasons: (1) Appellant assigns error to that portion of the trial court’s finding of fact No. 3 (relating to the fitness of the respondents) which states “that said petitioners are fully able and qualified to support and care for said children,” and also to the following portion of finding of fact No. 4: “that petitioners, Howard Pelland and Edythe Pelland are proper persons for the adoption of said minor children.”
In an adoption proceeding, the determination of the parental fitness of adoptive parents is a factual one. Each of the respondents was a witness. Their testimony established, inter alia, that they had had Janette in their home for nearly fifteen months; that she was a three-weeks-old sick baby when she arrived at their home and they had nursed her from sickness to health; that they had learned to love her as their own; that their three children shared their love for Janette; that for five years their home had been a qualified foster home in Pierce county; that they had ample home facilities for the twins; that they were both in good health and had sufficient means to raise and support the Reinius twins, and that they were willing that the twins should become their legal heirs and have their names changed accordingly.
The report of the court-appointed next-of-friend estab*133lished the good character and reputation of the respondents, and otherwise corroborated their testimony.
Appellant’s witnesses had not investigated the home of the respondents in connection with their petition for adoption. Appellant offered no testimony to refute the report of the court-appointed next-of-friend relative to the good reputation which the respondents have in the community in which they reside for clean, wholesome, upright home life, or discredit their character of morality and virtue.
The appellant bases its objections to the court’s findings upon the evidence that respondents were forty-three and forty-four years of age respectively; that they had been married twenty-five years and had grown children; that the adoptive mother had bursitis; that there was a conflict in the religious belief of the mother of the children with that of the adoptive parents, and that, therefore, the respondents are unfit adoptive parents for the infants, Janette and Nanette Reinius.
The trial court, in its memorandum opinion, considered and rejected each of appellant’s objections for the following reasons:
“Now, first as to the matter of religion. Without going into the field of theology I am doubtful if the three-week-old child as a matter of law could be deemed to have a religion. Certainly when the natural mother relinquishes her own children to the state and to an agency she does not consider religion of sufficient importance as to have any bearing on the ultimate adoption of the children. I think most religions have some age of confirmation at which the subject voluntarily expresses his or her intent to become a member thereof. So I would rule that it is immaterial, where people of good moral character and of circumstances enabling them to act as proper parents, who may be of the Catholic faith, seek to adopt a child of the Protestant faith, of the Jewish faith, or whatever other faith the child may be, and the same ruling would apply where people of the Protestant faith seek to adopt children of the Catholic or Jewish faith, where the child is of that age, and all other factors being equal, that the religious background would be immaterial.
“Secondly, as to the age of the petitioners. The petitioning husband here is 44 years of age. He is young in appearance; *134athletic looking; appears to be a man of full physical vigor. His wife appears to be in good health. She has suffered apparently from a minor ailment such as bursitis, but as of the time of this hearing her health is good. The petitioners are much in the same position as any family which has a widespread age group from the standpoint of having children of this age. There are many families where the youngest child is born to the family during the mid-forties of the parents. . . .
“As to the income the case for the petitioners is very strong. The history of 16 years continuous employment, and the rearing of a family, while it points perhaps to a greater age on the part of the petitioners nevertheless shows that this is a stable marriage, that it supplies evidence which can never be supplied with younger couples. Here is a stable marriage that has existed for all these years through the normal vicissitudes of family life, and nothing in the reports or in the evidence would indicate that the petitioners are other than the finest type of people or that they would do anything but give these children the finest type of environment.”
We are committed to the following rules: We will not disturb a trial court’s factual determination, if there is substantial evidence to support the finding. Berger Engineering Co. v. Hopkins, 54 Wn. (2d) 300, 308, 340 P. (2d) 777 (1959), and cases cited; Drake v. Smith, 54 Wn. (2d) 57, 60, 337 P. (2d) 1059 (1959), and case cited; Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn. (2d) 162, 166, 332 P. (2d) 454 (1958), and cases cited; Williams Tilt-up Contractors v. Schmid, 52 Wn. (2d) 429, 430, 326 P. (2d) 41 (1958), and case cited. We will not try factual matters de novo. Abel v. Abel, 47 Wn. (2d) 816, 819, 289 P. (2d) 724 (1955). We will not substitute our judgment in factual disputes for that of the trial court. Wenzler & Ward Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Sellen, 53 Wn. (2d) 96, 101, 330 P. (2d) 1068 (1958), and case cited. See Henson v. Henson, 47 Wn. (2d) 866, 878, 289 P. (2d) 1034 (1955); Abel v. Abel, supra, p. 819.
Applying these rules to the instant case, the record abundantly sustains the trial court’s findings of fitness and its opinion that
“Whereas here the petitioners have had the one child in their custody and under their care, where they have *135learned to love this child, and urge that they will have the same love for her twin sister ... I am satisfied that the two infant children can enter this home and receive all of the love and the attention and the care to which they would be entitled from their natural parents.”
(2) The majority hold that the trial court was arbitrary and abused its discretion when, during the hearing on this case, it denied, as immaterial, the appellant’s offer of proof of the standards it used generally in the selection of placement homes, and limited its proof to the standards it actually used in selecting the “M” family home.
The appellant was permitted to prove that it had been in eleemosynary work since 1869; that it had qualified as an approved agency under the adoption statutes (RCW 26.32), and that it processes approximately three hundred adoptions annually. The evidence disclosed that, with reference to Janette and Nanette Reinius, the appellant’s specially qualified field representatives interviewed various prospective adoptive parents and visited their homes. Sometime prior to the date of the hearing, the field representatives determined that, of the various homes visited, the “M” family were best qualified and, in their opinion, met the appellant’s standards as adoptive parents. Although the “M’s” had never seen the twins and had not petitioned for their adoption, the field representatives testified fully as to the standards they had used in selecting the “M’s” as prospective adoptive parents, and why they beileved them to be more suitable than respondents. Appellant’s field representatives did not interview respondents as prospective adoptive parents.
Under the facts of this case, the court was not concerned with the general standards used by appellant in selecting placement homes. The court was concerned only with the standards employed by appellant in its selection of the “M” family, and, with reference to those standards, appellant’s witnesses testified fully. The court considered appellant’s offer of proof and ruled thereon as follows:
“It [appellant] has a splendid record of activity on behalf of children in this state, but yet the grounds urged in the *136case at bar I think are insufficient to warrant the requirement of their consent to this adoption.”
The proffered evidence was immaterial and was properly refused.
Assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in excluding the evidence, the error was harmless and does not merit a reversal, where, as here, the evidence on the merits preponderates in sustaining the adoption decree. See Hearron v. John Severyns & Co., 159 Wash. 486, 489, 293 Pac. 458 (1930). The primary concern of the court in an adoption proceeding is the welfare of the child. State ex rel. Van Cleave v. Frater, 21 Wn. (2d) 231, 236, 150 P. (2d) 391 (1944). See, also, Henson v. Henson, supra, p. 871. The exclusion of the offered evidence relative to the general standards appellant used in its selection of placement homes was not prejudicial to appellant and had no decisive or crucial bearing upon the court’s primary concern—the welfare of the child.
(3) The majority opinion, in reversing the judgment, requires the use of standards which limit the trial court in the exercise of its discretion, in that, on the retrial, the trial court will be governed by the standards adopted by the Child Welfare League of America, Inc., of New York City.
With this requirement, I do not agree for two reasons:
(a) Adoption proceedings are statutory. The legislature has given to the trial court the unlimited right to exercise its discretion, both in the granting of an adoption petition and in waiving the consent of an approved agency. If, in the exercise of its discretion, the court is to be limited by certain standards, it is the province of the legislature to prescribe the standards by which the court is to be guided. Amendment 7, state constitution; Senior Citizens League v. Department of Social Security, 38 Wn. (2d) 142, 152, 228 P. (2d) 478 (1951). Our function, as an appellate court, is limited to a review of the trial court’s exercise of its disT cretionary powers and to ascertaining, from the record, whether the exercise of that discretion has been abused. Wenzler & Ward Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Sellen, supra; Abel v. Abel, supra, p. 819.
*137(b) We cannot reverse the trial court for failing to follow the placement standards of the Child Welfare League of America, of New York, when those standards were never presented to it for consideration. These standards were mentioned for the first time in the argument at the en banc hearing, and, by leave of this court, were permitted to be filed with this court for its consideration. If these New York placement standards were worthy of consideration in this adoption proceeding, the appellant should have offered them in evidence at the trial court level. This the appellant failed to do.
In Casco Co. v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Thurston County, 37 Wn. (2d) 777, 784, 226 P. (2d) 235 (1951), we said:
“ . . . This court is a reviewing court, and, on appeal, considers only such evidence as was admitted in the trial court. On appeal of the case to this court, it would be very unfair to the trial judge to consider evidence in this court which was not before him when he entered his decision in the case. ...”
(4) The majority do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that in adoption matters the law gives sole and exclusive power, not to approved agencies (public or private), but to the courts.
The trial court’s conclusion that courts, and not the agencies, have exclusive power to grant or deny adoption petitions was correct. Upon petition of the chief probation officer for Pierce county, Janette and Nanette Reinius, on September 10, 1957, were found, by the superior court for Pierce county, “to be dependent children, made a permanent ward of the Pierce County Juvenile Court for the purpose of adoption.”
The powers and duties of a qualified placement agency in adoption matters, in so far as they relate to children who become wards of the court, are defined by statute. Such qualified agencies do not have the power to grant adoption petitions. Their authority as to custody and care begins and ends at the discretion of the superior court. RCW 26.37.010 provides, in part, that “. . . The custody or *138control of any such child by any such . . . society . . . may be inquired into, and, in the discretion of the court, terminated at any time ...” (Italics mine.)
A qualified agency does not even have the authority to accept a relinquished child for placement without court approval. Any attempt by an agency to accept relinquishment direct from a parent “shall be void.” RCW 26.36.010. The law does give to the agency, after the court appoints it as its placement agent, the right to consent to the granting of an adoption petition. RCW 26.37.010, supra; RCW 26.32.030.
RCW 26.32.020 provides, in part, that
“. . . any husband and wife, jointly . . . may petition the superior court of the county in which the petitioner is a resident or of the county in which the person to be adopted is domiciled, for leave to adopt, and to change the name, if desired, of any person.”
The statute does not limit prospective adoptive parents to only those who have the approval of a qualified agency. The statute grants to any husband and wife who reside in the jurisdiction the unqualified right to petition for the adoption of any child that is a subject of adoption. The law further provides “ . . . That if the approved agency refuses to consent to the adoption, the court, in its discretion, may order that such consent be dispensed with.” RCW 26.32.030, supra.
The statutes are clear that it was the intention of the legislature, in the enactment of our adoption laws, that, when a dispute arises between an agency and prospective adoptive parents as to the qualifications and fitness of the latter, the court, and not the agency, has the sole and exclusive power to resolve that issue.
(5) The majority hold that, because the respondents had previously been foster parents, the trial court was arbitrary when it ordered the agency’s consent dispensed with and granted respondents’ petition for adoption. RCW 74.14.120 defines “foster home,” and RCW 74.14.130 authorizes the state department of public assistance to certify certain homes as foster homes and to revoke a foster home license *139if its rules are violated. There is nothing in the act which forbids the operators of foster homes to petition the court to become adoptive parents. RCW 26.32.020, supra, authorizes the respondents to petition for adoption of the Reinius twins. There is nothing in the law that in any manner disqualifies them as adoptive parents because of their operation of a foster home.
If, as found by the majority, there was some oral understanding between the parties or administrative rule that foster parents cannot become adoptive parents, the breach of the oral agreement or violation of the rule does not disqualify such person from petitioning for adoption under the law.
Assuming, arguendo>, that such an understanding would legally disqualify respondents as petitioners in an adoption proceeding, the record in the instant case does not support the majority’s conclusion that such an agreement was orally entered into between the appellant and respondents. Janette was not placed in the Pelland home by the appellant. The Pierce county branch of the state department of public assistance arranged for Janette’s foster home care with the respondent Pellands. If it can be said that some agreement or rule was violated, it was an agreement with or a rule of the department of public assistance, acting through its Pierce county branch office. The department is not complaining, and is not a party to this proceeding.
Although the appellant, without the knowledge of respondents, had been given authority, by an ex parte court order dated September 10, 1957, to arrange for the placement of the Reinius twins, it made no arrangement whatsoever with the Pellands for the foster home care of Janette. Appellant did not even contact the Pellands until October 11, 1957, and then only to inform them that it had been advised of their adoption petition and would actively resist their adoption of the twins, and would refuse to consent thereto.
There is no proof in the record before us of an oral agreement with appellant by which respondents agreed not to *140petition to adopt the twins. In fact, it was not known at the time the foster home care was arranged for by the Pierce county welfare officer that the mother would relinquish the twins for adoption, or that, if and when she did, the court would select the appellant as its placement agent. Respondents’ petition to adopt was filed October 7th. The appellant’s first contact with the respondents was on October 11th, and, hence, no rule of appellant’s could have been violated.
Had such an agreement actually been made and breached, or a rule violated, by the respondents, what was the orally agreed or implied penalty? Under the statute by which foster homes are established, the only legal penalty, if the department of public assistance elected to inflict it, would be a revocation of respondents’ foster home license. In view of the statute which grants to the respondents the right to petition to adopt the twins, the only possible penalty that the appellant could inflict upon the respondents would be its right to have its day in court, to refuse its consent to the adoption, and openly to resist the granting of the petition. This penalty the appellant elected to inflict.
If the alleged agreement or rule was violated, such fact, if it is a fact, does not affect the fitness of foster parents to be adoptive parents. In the 1958 Annual Report of the appellant society, published in March, 1959, it had this comment in praise of foster parents:
“ . . . no amount of money could possibly pay for the loving and understanding nurture which must be unselfishly given 24 hours a day. The reward for caring for a child must be measured in terms of the fun and satisfaction of watching him grow not only in body, but in his capacity for happiness and usefulness. . . . Theirs is indeed a real service.”
Further, according to the standards adopted by the Child Welfare League of America (by which standards the majority require the court to be governed on a retrial), p. 38: “A home originally approved as a boarding [foster] home may be considered as an adoptive home if it meets the needs *141of a particular child.” Respondents’ home admittedly meets the “needs of a particular child.”
The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to deny the adoption petition of the Pellands simply because they were formerly foster parents.
(6) The majority hold that the trial court, in ordering appellant’s consent dispensed with, acted arbitrarily because the law grants to the agency “sole and exclusive power” to refuse consent, the agency being, in effect, “the custodial guardian” of the children or in loco parentis. I do not agree.
RCW 26.37.060 provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall entitle any such society to act as guardian ... of any minor child.” (Italics mine.) That it was the intent of the legislature that the society not act as guardian of the person of such minors could not be more clearly expressed.
Does the act give the appellant a status of in loco parentis? There is nothing in the statute that gives approved agencies any right or authority other than that which the words indicate. Where, as in this case, the infants are adjudicated to be wards of the court, the agency it authorizes to find placement is a servant of the court, not its master. State ex rel. Van Cleave v. Frater, supra, p. 236. The law places in the court the authority to grant an adoption petition. The status of in loco parentis, if it can be said to exist, is in the court.
The court does not have the administrative personnel to provide care and housing for its wards during the interim period awaiting placement; nor does it have the personnel to investigate and find families who are fit prospective adoptive parents. The statute, therefore, authorizes the court to appoint qualified agencies to carry on these duties for the court. The law has clothed the agency with authority to find and recommend to the court persons it has found to be proper prospective adoptive parents. However, the statute is plain and unambiguous that the “principal” (the court), after hearing the objections of its “agent” (the society) to an adoption and its recommendations relative thereto, is *142not duty bound to follow its agent’s recommendations, but may order the agent’s consent dispensed with. Since the law gives to the court the right to order adoption, it is the court, and not the agency, which stands in the status of parents, if any such status was intended to be established by the act.
(7) What does the majority intend to accomplish by the retrial?
(a) Is the trial court to reopen the case simply for the purpose of permitting the appellant to introduce into evidence for the court’s guidance the standards adopted by the Child Welfare League of America, Inc., of New York? These standards differ from those used by the appellant in selecting the “M” family, therefore the “M” family is not qualified, and, if the Pellands likewise do not qualify, is the court directed to dismiss the Pellands’ petition for adoption, as well as that of the “M’s”, should the latter elect in fact to petition the court for adoption of the twins? Justice and reason require that the posed question be answered in the negative.
(b) In appellant’s argument on appeal, this court was advised that the “M” family have accepted another placement and are not now interested in adopting the Reinius twins.
Upon the retrial, are the Pelland’s qualifications as adoptive parents for the twins to be matched against those of any other family the appellant is able to produce? This will, of necessity, be the practical result, since the issue of fitness as adoptive parents between the Pellands and the “M” family is now moot.
(c) Is it the intent of the majority that this case should be sent back for retrial simply to give the appellant an opportunity to make a better record relative to the real issue that it wants decided, namely, the power of the trial court to waive consent of an agency in an adoption proceeding? If so, why should these unfortunate children be used as pawns, and their welfare and happiness jeopardized, in the appellant’s attempt to determine the limits of its authority, when that issue could be properly litigated in a declaratory judgment action without involving helpless children.
*143I am confident that, after the trial judge is compelled to consider the additional standards (which were not used by the appellant in its selection of the “M” family), he will again award the twins to the Pellands. The result of a retrial, in my opinion, will accomplish nothing but further delay, further heartaches, and further injustice.
(8) The majority opinion is concerned with the alleged lack of proper standards used by the trial judge in granting the Pellands’ petition to adopt the Reinius twins. In the standards testified to by the witnesses for the appellant, and in the suggested standards of the New York corporation, the most important of all standards, namely, parental love of the adoptive parents for the child or children to he adopted, is not mentioned at all. The words “morality” and “wholesome, clean living” on the part of the prospective adoptive parents were standards which appellants witnesses did not even mention to the trial judge. Likewise, the respondents’ proven ability to raise children to be morally clean, upright citizens was not a standard of any concern to the appellant.
Against the standards of appellant, the court weighed the standards of moral fitness, wholesome, clean living, ability to raise children, proven ability to care for these twins in particular, and the genuine love for the twins of the Pellands. They had for two months nursed Janette from sickness to health. They had a birthday party for the twins on the occasion of their first birthday. At the time of the hearing, the Pellands had had Janette for more than fifteen months (now for nearly three years), and, in open court, expressed genuine love for her.
Although the statute grants the appellant the right to consent or object to an adoption petition, appellant made no inquiry as to the moral and social fitness of respondents, or as to the adequacy and cleanliness of their home.
The standards used by the trial judge are, in my opinion, paramount in determining parental fitness.
The writer of the concurring opinion offers the following additional suggestions for reversing the trial court:
*144(a) The Pellands did not request the appellant society to consent to their petition for the adoption of the twins.
RCW 26.32.020, supra, does not require that consent of the agency be obtained or refused as a condition precedent to filing a petition for adoption. Furthermore, in this case, the society intervened and was given its day in court on its objections to the petition and its reason for refusing to consent. Where, as here, the society has a child for placement and a petition for adoption is filed, the society owes a duty to the court to investigate the petitioners and their home before determining whether its consent will be granted or denied. In the instant case, the appellant society declined to consent, without making any investigation of the respondents or their home. Since the law places no duty upon the petitioners in an adoption proceeding to seek or obtain the society’s consent to their petition, if there was any breach of duty in this case it was on the part of the appellant society, when it refused to consent to the adoption without ever investigating the respondents as adoptive parents.
(b) The writer of the concurring opinion voices concern that the society will be “put on the defensive every time parties who desire to adopt the child or children win a race to the court house and start adoption proceedings,” and suggests that the trial court decided this case “in favor of the qualifications of the fleet of foot.”
Although I do not think it seemly or proper to compare the serious matter of an adoption proceeding, which deals with the destiny of human beings, to an athletic contest, if it can be said that there was a race, the society’s entry was on the starting line at the time the gun was fired. Its contestant had had no experience in raising a child, yet this entry represented the society’s plan for the future life of the twins. The judge, standing at the finish line, selected as the winners the entries who were experienced in raising children and who had proved their ability to care for and love the twins.
The society was not put on the defensive during the trial of this case. It was afforded every opportunity to establish *145affirmatively why it believed the “M” family to be fully qualified, and the respondents to be “unfit.” The judge found, from the evidence as he weighed it, that the welfare of the twins would best be served by granting the respondents’ petition.
(c) The writer of the concurring opinion states:
(1) “The trial court found the Pellands to be fit and proper adoptive parents, and able to support and care for the children; and, on those findings, entered its decree of adoption. There is no finding one way or the other as to the desirability of the society’s plan.”
In making this statement, the writer of the concurring opinion failed to include the crucial part of the court’s decree concerning the welfare of these children, which states:
“ . . . and the court further finding that the petitioners are fit and proper persons to adopt said children and that said petitioners are fully qualified to adopt said children and that said adoption is for the best interests of each of them, ...” (Italics mine.)
Nor is that portion of the statement that “There is no finding one way or the other as to the desirability of the society’s plan” supported by the record before us. On p. 53 of the statement of facts is the court’s oral decision, in which the court rejected “the desirability of the society’s plan” as it applied to the facts and circumstances of this case, as follows:
“. . . I think that the Washington Children’s Home Society has acted in accordance, of course, with its true concept, that it always has the interest of the child at heart. It has a splendid record of activity on behalf of children in this state, but yet the grounds urged in the case at bar I think are insufficient to warrant the requirement of their consent to this adoption.” (Italics mine.)
This is not a proceeding to test the sufficiency of the plan used by the appellant society in selecting prospective adoptive parents. If such a test is desired, there are legal procedural methods by which it can be accomplished, without involving the welfare of specific children. The material issue in this case is the welfare of the children. We have frequently announced the rule that the trial court is not re*146quired to include evidentiary facts in its findings, but need only find the ultimate facts upon the material issues. Wentz v. T. E. Connolly, Inc., 45 Wn. (2d) 127, 132, 273 P. (2d) 485 (1954), and cases cited. Upon this issue, the court found “that said adoption is for the best interests of each of them.”
(2) “ . . . the basic thesis of the majority opinion is that, in such a situation, where the approved child-placement agency selected by the court refuses to consent to the adoption, and urges that it has developed its own plan for the future of the children, the burden should be upon the petitioners to show that the ultimate welfare of the children will be furthered by abandoning the plan developed by the court-appointed agency and in permitting the adoption by the petitioners. If that burden is sustained, the trial court is warranted in dispensing with the consent of the agency to the adoption.”
Assuming, arguendo, that refusal to consent places upon the petitioners the suggested additional burden of proof, that burden was squarely met in the instant case. Here the court weighed the facts that Janette had been in the home of the respondent petitioners for more than fifteen months; that it was an early placement direct from the hospital, and that petitioners had raised a family of their own and knew what responsibility must be assumed and sacrifice made by accepting in their home two infants of tender years, against the qualifications of the “M” family who lacked experience and proved ability to raise children. The trial court then exercised its judicial discretion and granted respondents’ petition for adoption.
We have defined judicial discretion as follows:
“ . . . a sound judgment which is not exercised arbitrarily, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and which is directed by the reasoning conscience of the judge to a just result.” State ex rel. Clark v. Hogan, 49 Wn. (2d) 457, 462, 303 P. (2d) 290 (1956).
Further, we have said:
“ . . . To justify interference by a reviewing court, in cases where it is alleged that a trial court abused its judicial discretion, proof that the discretion exercised was clearly *147untenable or manifestly unreasonable is required. [Citing case.] Abuse of judicial discretion is, therefore, never presumed.” Abel v. Abel, 47 Wn. (2d) 816, 819, 289 P. (2d) 724 (1955).
(d) The writer of the concurring opinion concludes that “to abandon the test of the welfare of the child or children . . . is to bring chaos into the field of child placement and adoption.”
The statement implies that the trial court, in the instant case, abandoned the “welfare of the child” test, when, in fact, the record discloses that it was the only test the trial court applied. Under the facts of this case, chaos would be created only by arbitrarily substituting the judgment of this court for that of the trial court. That chaos would result from a reversal was admitted by appellant’s own counsel during oral argument at the en banc hearing. The attorney for appellant society, in answer to a query by one of the judges of this court as to the possible result of a retrial, said:
“That is one of the real unfortunate things. With ‘M’ family out of the picture, if the decision of the trial court should be reversed, this matter would go back and then the Children’s Home Society would start to search for a new home and, in the meantime, the child has been in this home with these people [respondents] since, I think it was, October of 1956, and I don’t believe it is going to do that youngster any good to throw this thing back into a vacuum and do it all over again.” (Italics mine.)
It would do more than that—it would be a real tragedy in the life of Janette, if the love that she has received from the respondents since she was three weeks old were to be permanently severed by a court order awarding her to strangers. Further, the previously unblemished, upright character of the respondents will be unjustly maligned by adjudicating them “unfit” to be parents, and the sorrow of the Pellands will be tantamount to that of natural parents who lose a beloved child in death. Such a result is not a just reward for the five years of “real service” furnished by the Pellands that “no amount of money could possibly pay for.”
Finally, the twins should be loved, cherished, and raised *148together. Before the hearing, the appellant kept them in separate homes and they are still separated. Since the appeal to this court, they have been kept apart by an injunction granted at the request of the appellant. The Pellands love both of them. The trial court agreed that the twins should be loved and raised together in the same home, and so ordered.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Mallery and Donworth, JJ., concur with Ott, J.