dissenting.
I.
I dissent. I do not agree with the majority that an exchange of land is a sale simply because a value is assigned to one or all of the properties. I believe the plain meaning of the word “exchange” is the same as used in A.R.S. § 37-604 (Exchange Statute) and in the Enabling Act.
II.
The majority states that “an exchange only occurs if no value is assigned to either of the exchanged properties.” The majority cites nine cases in support of this statement. I do not believe these nine cases support the proposition that assigning a value to land transforms an exchange into a sale.
In Gruver v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 142 F.2d 363 (4th Cir.1944), a tax case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a transaction is a sale or an exchange and stated:
If no price is set for either property, it is said to be an exchange; but if each is valued and the difference is paid in money, it is a sale.
Gruver, 142 F.2d at 366.
The court in Gruver held that a sale of property requires not only a “fixed price,” but also the difference paid in cash. Id. In Fain, there is no “fixed price” and no cash difference. Arizona law requires only that state lands to be exchanged must be of “substantially equal value or lesser value than the land offered by the applicant.” A.R.S. § 37-604(C)(l). The appraisal of land does not mean that there is a “fixed price.” The court in Gruver cites to Corpus Juris Secundum which states:
However, technically speaking the words “exchange” and “sale” express logically different transactions. It has been stated broadly either specifically or substantially, that where there is a transfer of property for property other than money the transaction is an exchange, and that where the transfer is for money the transaction is a sale, and this is the meaning usually ascribed when a question of power or authority to sell is involved.
Gruver, 142 F.2d at 366 (citing 33 C.J.S., Exchange of Property, § 1 at 5 (1942)). The transaction in Fain is a “transfer of property for property,” not a transfer for money. Therefore, the transaction is an exchange.
The majority next cites Ashton v. Ashton, 89 Ariz. 148, 359 P.2d 400 (1961), for the proposition that a transaction is a sale if price is mentioned in the transfer of property. Ashton, a divorce case, involved tax issues concerning the transfer of stock from one party to the other; it was not a real property matter. Ashton, 89 Ariz. at 154-55, 359 P.2d at 404. Apparently, the parties were concerned with assigning a dollar value to the property. The Arizona Supreme Court held that this was a tax-free exchange. Moreover, we note that definitions for the purpose of taxation can be deceiving when applied to transfers of real property because legislation in tax *604matters is unique and reflects the legislative intent to raise revenue.
In Ashton, this court stated the general rule that a sale is “where the consideration for a transfer of property is expressed or valued in money terms and treated as a specified amount of money.” Ashton, 89 Ariz. at 153, 359 P.2d at 403 (citing 33 C.J.S. Exchange of Property § 1 at 4) (emphasis added). The proposed Fain transaction is not a sale because an exchange of land in Arizona does not require a specified amount in consideration. See A.R.S. § 37-604. The lands to be exchanged are required only to be substantially equivalent to each other. Id.
In Herring Motor Co. v. Aetna Trust & Savings Co., 87 Ind.App. 83, 154 N.E. 29 (1926), the seller delivered a group of shock absorbers on consignment. When the buyer was unable to dispose of the products, the buyer and seller entered into an agreement under which the seller agreed to take back the shock absorbers and give other merchandise in exchange as the buyer needed it. Upon receiving notice of shipment of the shock absorbers the seller said, “Just as soon as this shipment comes in we will send you a credit memorandum per our agreement, for which you are to take wheels or other products covering the entire amount.” Herring Motor, 154 N.E. at 31. This was held to be a sale and not an exchange. I do not disagree with Herring Motor. However, the facts in Herring Motor are distinguishable from the facts in Fain.
The court in Herring Motor found that there was a “definite value fixed by the parties on the shock absorbers returned.” Id. A “definite value,” however, was not present in Fain. The State of Arizona, via the State Land Commissioner, stated only that the “offered private land and the selected state lands are substantially equal in value.” See Decision and Order, Application to Exchange, 61-92301. As the court in Herring Motor noted:
[W]here property is transferred for property, no price being set upon either piece, the transaction is an exchange, and the distinction has been recognized in the case of a transfer of personal property for other personal property, or of real property for other real property.
Id. (quoting 23 C.J. 185). Where no definite value or price is set, as in Fain, an exchange occurs.
In Griswold v. Tucker, 216 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Ct.App.1948), a buyer traded his 1942 truck plus some cash for a 1947 model truck. The buyer believed he purchased a 1947 model when in fact he was sold a 1946 model worth less money. The buyer sued the seller for breach of warranty. The court held that the transaction was a sale stating:
There is a recognized difference between an exchange and a sale. The test seems to be if one party passes his property to another and in turn receives from the latter his property without having an agreed value placed on both, it is deemed an exchange. Upon the other hand, a transaction is a sale although made for something other than money, where the property of each is transferred at an agreed or market value. This is likewise true if the property of one is transferred to another at an agreed price in part payment of the agreed total cash value of the other.
Id., at 278. The transaction in Griswold involved two trucks with two definite market values and one specific cash amount. It therefore was a sale. In Fain, we deal with two parcels of land with an equivalent, but unnamed value. Again, no agreed upon dollar value was placed upon either Fain’s land or the State’s land.
The majority asserts that a transaction in which money is used as the “basis for measuring the value of the property transferred” is not an exchange. The majority then cites four cases that I believe actually contradict their contention that the proposed transaction in Fain is a sale. The majority first cites Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir.1945), in which the court stated:
“Exchange” is a word of precise import, meaning the giving of one thing for another, requiring the transfers to be in *605kind, and excluding transactions into which money enters either as the consideration or as a basis of measure.
Id. at 36. Of course, the proposed land transaction in Fain does not involve using money as a basis of measure. The Fain transaction involved only a proposed transfer in kind of real property.
In Badgett v. United States, 175 F.Supp. 120 (D.C.Ky.1959), the court noted:
The word “exchange” is to be given its ordinary meaning. It is a word of precise import meaning the giving of one thing for another, requiring the transfers to be in kind and excluding transactions into which money enters either as a consideration or as a basis of measure. (Citation omitted) An “exchange” is a reciprocal transfer of property as distinguished from the transfer of property for a money consideration only.
Id. at 126. The proposed transaction in Fain is such a “reciprocal transfer of property” as opposed to a sale.
In Gill v. Eagleton, 108 Neb. 179, 187 N.W. 871 (1922), the court considered a transfer of 68 acres of land valued at $5100 in exchange for a tractor plow outfit worth $1000, $1600 in cash and a $2500 note. The Nebraska Supreme Court held (correctly, I believe) that this transaction was a sale because the land was transferred at a fixed and agreed upon price for a set sum of money and a tractor outfit worth a set price. Id. 187 N.W. at 873. The court noted:
At common law an exchange of land was a mutual grant of equal interests, not necessarily in value, but in dignity, as a fee for a fee, the one in consideration of the other, and differed from a sale in that no fixed money price or value was placed on either of the properties exchanged.
Id. at 872 (emphasis added). In Fain, we are dealing with a proposed mutual grant of equivalent interests in land with no fixed price.
In Hoovel v. State, 125 Tex.Crim. 545, 69 S.W.2d 104 (1934), the defendant was tried and convicted of property theft. His criminal acts consisted of an exchange under false pretenses of 100 shares of City Service Preferred Stock for 300 shares of City Service Common Stock. Although this case involved criminal law issues, the Hoovel court stated:
The word “exchange” has a well-defined meaning and should be construed and given the usual and generally accepted meaning. “ ‘Exchange’ means the giving of one thing for another. To constitute an exchange in the legal sense, the mutual transfers must be in kind, and any transaction into which money enters, either as the consideration furnished by one party or as a basis for measuring the value of the thing transferred, is excluded.” (Citation omitted)
Id. 69 S.W.2d at 108. This, case cited by the majority, does little to support the contention of a sale in Fain. In Fain, the parties agreed to a “mutual transfer” of property in kind with no money involved which constitutes an exchange.
Finally, the majority cites Hawn v. Mal-lone, 188 Iowa 439, 176 N.W. 393 (1920), for the proposition that a transaction is a sale if there is a fixed value and that a sale occurred in Fain because Arizona requires a determination of the land’s “true value” prior to disposition. Enabling Act, § 28. In Hawn, however, the court noted:
The test for determining whether there has been a sale or exchange of property is whether there was a fixed price at which the exchange was to be made. If there was a fixed price, the transaction is a sale; if not, an exchange, (citation omitted)
Hawn, 176 N.W. at 395. In Fain, there was no fixed price for any of the land involved in the proposed transaction, nor was a fixed price required by either A.R.S. § 37-604 or the Arizona Constitution. As in the other eight cases cited by the majority, Hawn does not support the majority’s contention that Fain involved a sale of land with the state.
III.
At best, the majority can make the argument that the transaction in Fain is like a sale. This, however, ignores the specific *606use of the word exchange in both the Enabling Act and A.R.S. § 37-604(A). We will use the plain meaning of a word in a statute unless it appears that a different or contrary meaning was intended. State v. Wise, 137 Ariz. 468, 671 P.2d 909 (1983); McIntyre v. Mohave County, 127 Ariz. 317, 620 P.2d 696 (1980). A sale and an exchange are two different concepts with different legal significance attached to each; otherwise, the words would be synonyms for each other with no legal difference.
The cases cited by the majority address various fact patterns, such as tax issues, personal property purchases and deals involving cash. Nowhere does the majority cite authority dealing with an exchange in kind of private land for public land. In fact, the majority ignores Watson v. Caldwell, 160 Fla. 398, 35 So.2d 125 (1948), cited by petitioner, which is exactly on point.
IV.
In Watson, the Attorney General of the State of Florida sought to cancel two deeds. One deed from the State Board of Education (Board) conveyed school land to the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund (Trustees). The other deed conveyed swamp lands from the Trustees to the Board. The Attorney General argued that the Board and the Trustees did not comply with Florida law, which stated that no lands “shall be sold, conveyed or disposed of by the said trustees or by the said board of education” unless advertisement, notice and auction requirements were followed. Id. 35 So.2d at 126-27 (citing Fla.Stat.Ann. § 270.07) (emphasis added). The Florida Supreme Court held that the statute did not apply to exchanges and stated:
This was not a “sale” but an exchange in kind to effectuate a definite legislative purpose which we shall now discuss more fully.
Id. at 127. The court further found that no laws required an exchange to be advertised. Id. (Emphasis added). The court added:
An exchange in kind to aid the Park project is involved here. There is not the slightest suggestion that the land received in exchange by the Board was not of equal value to the lands disposed of, so the school fund was not in the slightest depleted.
Id.
The facts in Fain are similar to the facts in Watson. Fain attempted to exchange land pursuant to an Arizona statute permitting such exchanges. See A.R.S. § 37-604. The State Land Department refused to complete the exchange arguing, in part, that the exchange does not comply with the requirement that state lands “shall not be sold or leased, in whole or in part, except to the highest bidder.” Ariz. Const, art. 10 § 3 (emphasis added). I see no reason why the outcome in Fain should be any different than the outcome in Watson. An exchange of land is not the same as a sale or lease of land.
V.
We also note that the majority ignores a North Carolina Court of Appeals case concerning an exchange of land which stated:
Here, plaintiff originally and expressly sought to have the entire transaction— the “exchange”—declared void. Defendants resisted on the grounds that an exchange should not be subject to the statutory procedures governing sales by the Redevelopment Commission under N.C.G.S. 160-464 (now N.C.G.S. 160A-514). Until the action was remanded, none of the parties ever regarded the exchange as other than a single transaction or occurrence. To “exchange” has been defined as “[t]o part with, give, or transfer for an equivalent.” Black’s Law Dictionary 671 (4th ed. rev. 1968). In an exchange, specific property is given in consideration of property other than money, although one of the parties may pay a sum of money in addition to the property.
Campbell v. First Baptist Church, 51 N.C. App. 393, 276 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1981) (emphasis added).
VI.
Because I believe this is an exchange and not a sale, we need only determine if our *607constitution prohibits an exchange. It appears that there are no prohibitions. The Enabling Act specifically allows exchanges. See Enabling Act § 28. Article 10, § 3 of the Arizona Constitution specifically allows exchanges between the state and federal government. In addition:
No lands shall be sold for less than three dollars per acre, and no lands which are or shall be susceptible of irrigation under any projects now or hereafter completed or adopted by the United States under legislation for the reclamation of lands, or under any other project for the reclamation of lands, shall be sold at less than twenty-five dollars per acre; Provided, that the State, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, shall from time to time relinquish such of its lands to the United States as at any time are needed for irrigation works in connection with any such Government project, and other lands in lieu thereof shall be selected from lands of the character named and in the manner prescribed in Section Twenty-Four of the said Enabling Act.
A.R.S. Const, art. 10, § 5.
I find nothing in our constitution which prohibits the legislature from providing a method whereby exchanges may take place. Article 10, § 3 restricts only the sale or lease of lands, not the exchange of land. The exchange statute (A.R.S. § 37-604), on the other hand, requires permission from the State Land Department and notice to other entities and provides for the protection of the trust lands in the same manner as in other states by requiring an appraisal before the exchange may take place.
VII.
There is a presumption that statutes are constitutional unless shown to be otherwise. We will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the act conflicts with the federal or state constitutions. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 431, 641 P.2d 1275 (1982). In looking at the common and ordinary definition of the word exchange, we note that Congress believed an exchange of land was not a sale. It is, therefore, arguable that the Congress of the United States amended the Enabling Act to specifically provide for an exchange under the safeguards provided by the legislature.
I find no state, federal, or constitutional provision providing that an exchange of state land is a sale. Alaska, for example, provides for exchange of state lands after determination of fair market value. Alaska Stat. § 38.50.020 (Value of Properties Exchanged). See also Cal. [Pub. Res.] Code § 7303. (Exchange of lands in place reserved from sales); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 323.010 et seq. (Authority of state land registrar to exchange state lands for lands of equal value); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 171-50 (Exchanges).
VIII.
The majority makes several other arguments with which I cannot agree. One argument is that, pursuant to Deer Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 537, 760 P.2d 537 (1988), the Arizona Constitution requires that school trust land may be disposed of only after public notice and public auction.
Our constitution does prohibit certain methods of disposal, sale or lease. See Deer Valley, 157 Ariz. at 541, 760 P.2d 537; Ariz. Const. art. 10 §§ 1-4. This does not necessarily mean that an exchange of land is prohibited. Indeed, if our constitution prohibits exchanges, there is no reason for the majority to spend so much time and effort trying to prove that an exchange is a sale.
IX.
The majority also contends that the Exchange Statute (A.R.S. § 37-604) does not afford as much protection to state lands as does Article 10. The majority argues that the purpose of Article 10 is to “ensure that the trust receives the most benefit possible from sale or other use of the trust lands” and that this benefit is assured through the public auction requirement.
*608I believe the Exchange Statute provides ample protection to benefit the trust lands. There are, on the other hand, some drawbacks to the public auction requirement. For example, parties in the private sector have more flexibility in financing and can raise capital in ways unavailable to the public sector. A private party would be able, therefore, to outbid a public agency at a public auction. See Comment, Arizona’s Enabling Act and the Transfer of State Lands for Public Purposes, 8 Ariz.L.Rev. 133, 135-36 (1966).
The majority also speculates that it “is conceivable that someone might bid more than the appraised price at a public auction.” Even if the state’s goal is to profit as much as possible, nothing prevents the State from realizing such benefits or profits through exchanges of state lands. The exchange statute makes clear that an applicant’s land must be at least of “substantially equal value,” if not more, to the value of the state land. A.R.S. § 37-604(C)(l). The State Land Department has the power to determine if the proposed exchange would actually benefit the trust land. A.R.S. § 37-604(B)(3). The exchange statute provides for public notice and provides that any person may protest the proposed exchange. A.R.S. § 37-604(0(7).
The majority argues “there is no constitutional authority to exempt sales of trust land simply by calling them exchanges and allowing the state to accept payment in kind instead of cash.” I believe the majority misses the point. Certain legal consequences attach to an exchange (tax consequences, for example) and payment in kind is different than payment in cash. To hold otherwise would strip away any legal significance of the term “exchange” and we may as well label all transactions “sales” or “disposals.”
X.
I would allow the proposed exchange under our constitution.