(dissenting in part): The question is whether the notice of the election was published twenty-one days prior to the date of election. I do not believe ¶¶ 1 (2) (3), and 2 of the syllabus and the corresponding portion of the majority opinion correctly decide that question.
As indicated in the majority opinion, the notice of election was first published November 26, 1956, and the election was held December 17, 1956. If it is proper to count the day of first publication as one of the days of notice, there were twenty-one days notice of the election prior to December 17, in compliance with G. S. 1955 Supp. 72-3541, and lawful notice of the election was given; if it is not, lawful notice of the election was not given, and it must be declared illegal and set aside. The majority opinion holds that proper notice was not given; that the first day of publication may not be counted as one of the days of notice, and concludes there must be “twenty-one clear days” between first publication of the notice and the day of election.
In 1951 the regular session of the legislature enacted a comprehensive school code clarifying and codifying many existing laws governing common schools, rural high schools, community high schools and boards of education of first and second class cities (L. 1951, Ch. 395). Among the many statutes amended and codified was G. S. 1949, 72-3502, the prior law of our present statute G. S. 1955 Supp. 72-3541, which required that notice of the election be given “at least twenty-one days prior to the date of such election . . . by publishing the same twice in some newspaper published in each county. . . .”
In Slate, ex rel., v. Miami County Comm'rs, 168 Kan. 723, 215 P. 2d 631, this court held that notice of election given pursuant to G. S. 1949, 72-3502 was sufficient when the notice was first published on December 13, calling the election to be held January 3, “and counting it (December 13) as the first day of notice there were nineteen days in December and two days in January or twenty-one days notice of the election on January 3.” (p. 737.) That holding *597was in conformity with previous decisions (State, ex rel., v. Comm'rs of Sherman Co., 39 Kan. 293, 18 Pac. 179; State, ex rel., v. Wallace, 112 Kan. 264, 210 Pac. 348; City of Aurora v. French, 126 Kan. 393, 268 Pac. 93; City of Wichita v. Robb, 163 Kan. 121, 124, 179 P. 2d 937; Piper v. Moore, 163 Kan. 565, 572, 183 P. 2d 965) that in computing the period of time a notice is required to be published, the first day of publication is to be counted as one of those days.
As indicated in the majority opinion, the only change made when G. S. 1949, 72-3502 was amended by G. S. 1955 Supp. 72-3541 was the addition of the phrase “the first publication to be not less than twenty-one days prior to the election.” That phrase is identical with language contained in our general bond statute G. S. 1949, 10-120 (excepting the words “such” and “the” before the word election) relating to bond elections and providing that “notice of such election shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality . . . the first publication to be not less than twenty-one days prior to such election.” (Emphasis supplied.) This court has consistently held that in computing the period of time with respect to bond election notices, the first day of publication is counted as one of the twenty-one days the notice is required to be published prior to the election (State, ex rel., v. Comm'rs of Sherman Co., supra; State, ex rel., v. Wallace, supra; City of Aurora v. French, supra; City of Wichita v. Robb, supra; Piper v. Moore, supra). The failure of the legislature to change G. S. 1949, 10-120 following judicial construction for a long period of time amounts to legislative approval and ratification of that construction (State v. One Bally Coney Island No. 21011 Gaming Table, 174 Kan. 757, 761, 258 P. 2d 225).
Generally speaking, all statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing conditions of the law, and if a special meaning is attached to certain words in a prior act, there is a presumption of some force the legislature intended that they should have the same significance when used in a subsequent act in relation to the same subject matter. The rule is stated in 82 C. J. S., Statutes, § 370, pp. 851, 852, as follows:
“Where words or phrases employed in a new statute have been construed by the courts to have been used in a particular sense in a previous statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they are presumed, in the absence of a clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to be used in the same sense in the new statute as in the previous statute. . . .”
*598See, also, 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, § 265, p. 255, § 272, p. 260; 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d ed., § 6102, pp. 157, 158, 159.
The phrase “the first publication to be not less than twenty-one days prior to the election” as used in G. S. 1955 Supp. 72-3541 pertains to the same subject as G. S. 1949, 10-120, i. e., the publication of notice of a special election in a newspaper having general circulation in the municipality. When the identical language of G. S. 1949, 10-120 was incorporated into G. S. 1955 Supp. 72-3541, and where, as here, that language has acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction over a long period of time, it is presumed the legislature in enacting G. S. 1955 Supp. 72:3541 accepted the construction previously given that language by the court. Moreover, there is no clearly expressed intent to construe the language of G. S. 1955 Supp. 72-3541 in a manner different than the construction given it in G. S. 1949, 10-120. Indeed, to not count the day of “first publication” as one of the twenty-one days prior to the election is to disregard the plain terms of the statute. It is the “first publication” which shall be not less than twenty-one days prior to the election — not “twenty-one clear days” as stated in the majority opinion — and the day of “first publication” is one of those twenty-one days.
In the instant case, counting December 16, as the last day prior to the day of election, December 17, and counting back each day to November 16, twenty-one days notice of the election was given when the notice was first published on November 16.
In my judgment lawful notice of the election was given. I concur in the majority opinion that the allegations of the petition were not of sufficient gravity to vitiate the organization of the school district. In view of the foregoing, I would enter judgment for the defendants.