Plaintiff Alpine County appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered pursuant to an order sustaining defendant counties’ demurrers to the amended complaint without leave to amend. By its complaint Alpine seeks a judicial determination of the boundary between it and defendant counties, and to restrain those counties from exercising jurisdiction over certain territory alleged to be situated within the boundaries of Alpine. Each of the defendants demurred on the grounds that the complaint does not state a cause of action, that the court has no jurisdiction of the persons of the defendants or of the subject of the action, and that there is another action pending between the parties for the same causes alleged in the complaint. We have concluded that the complaint states a cause of action for judicial interpretation of an unclear boundary line statute, that the court has jurisdiction over the matter, that the complaint does not show that any other action is pending between the parties on a similar cause, and that the judgment of dismissal should therefore be reversed.
The boundaries of Alpine County are defined in section 23102 of the Government Code as follows: “Beginning at the north corner, at a point where the state line crosses the east summit of the Sierra Nevada Mountains . . .; thence southwesterly along said summit to a point two miles west of James Green’s house, in Hope Valley, called Thompson’s Peak; thence southwesterly in a direct line to a point on the Amador and Nevada turnpike road in front of Z. Kirkwood’s house ...; thence south across the north fork of the Mokelumne River to the road leading from West Point, in Calaveras, to Big Tree road, near the Big Meadows; thence easterly along said West Point road to the Big Tree road; thence easterly in a direct line to where the Sonora trail strikes the middle fork of the Stanislaus River; thence easterly along said trail to the summit of the Sierra Nevada Mountains; thence northerly along said summit of the dividing ridge between the West Walker and Carson Rivers; thence northeasterly along said dividing ridge to the state line . . .; thence northwest along said state line to the place of beginning. ’ ’
*791By resolutions dated June 16, 1950, and July 21, 1950, the Board of Supervisors of Alpine County petitioned the State Lands Commission to investigate and survey the problem of a disputed boundary common to Alpine and Tuolumne Counties, and by resolution dated July 6, 1953, the same board made the same request with respect to Alpine’s common boundaries with Amador and Calaveras Counties. The only source of authority of the State Lands Commission to act in a matter of this type is section 23171 of the Government Code read together with section 6204 of the Public Resources Code. Section 23171 provides that “All common boundaries and common corners of counties not adequately marked by natural objects or lines, or by surveys lawfully made, shall be definitely established by surveys made jointly by the surveyors of all the counties affected, and approved by the boards of supervisors of the counties, or by a survey made by the State Lands Commission, on application of the board of supervisors of any county affected.” Section 6204 of the Public Resources Code states that “The [state lands] commission shall when required, survey and mark the boundary lines of counties and cities.”
According to the subject pleading, the dispute as to the boundaries here involved arose from two sources: (1) uncertainty as to the terminal point of the line running south from Z. Kirkwood’s house “to the road leading from West Point, in Calaveras, to Big Tree road, near the Big Meadows”; and (2) uncertainty as to the location of “the Sonora trail,” as those terms are used in the statutory boundary description of Alpine.
Pursuant to the above mentioned requests of Alpine’s Board of Supervisors, the State Lands Commission undertook investigations and conducted hearings in an effort to determine the true boundary line. Subsequently, certain findings adverse to the position of Alpine were approved by the commission. Alpine then instituted the present action, and the commission suspended its proceedings pending the outcome of this litigation.
In its complaint Alpine alleges that ‘ ‘ there is, and for many years last past has been, dispute and disagreement and uncertainty existing between” Alpine and Amador, Calaveras, and Tuolumne Counties due to the above mentioned uncertainties in statutory boundary descriptions; that the exact location of the boundary lines in question “is in dispute and has never been actually or judicially determined”; that no survey mark*792ing the lines at the disputed points “can be made until the [uncertainties in location are] judicially determined”; that defendant counties have been encroaching in certain specified respects on the jurisdiction of Alpine County, over the protest of Alpine, on certain portions of Alpine lying to the east and north of the true boundary line; and that Alpine “has no adequate remedy at law or by administrative process.” Alpine prays for a judicial determination of the western and southern boundary lines of the county, and for a decree enjoining defendant counties from asserting jurisdiction over the land areas lying east and north of the court-determined line and from receiving or using funds from the United States Forest Service based on acreage of national forest lands within the disputed areas. As noted earlier, demurrers of Amador, Calaveras, and Tuolumne Counties to this complaint were sustained without leave to amend, and Alpine appeals from the judgment of dismissal thereafter entered.
The crucial question presented is whether the courts have any jurisdiction over the controversy in its present state, or whether Alpine is precluded from judicial relief until the administrative agency (the State Lands Commission) has finally determined the issues tendered to it. We have concluded, for reasons hereinafter stated, that primary jurisdiction in this case rests in the courts, and that the courts are not required to delay their proceedings until the commission has concluded its hearings.
Defendant counties contend that under the above quoted provisions of section 23171 of the Government Code and section 6204 of the Public Resources Code, the State Lands Commission is granted the power to settle boundary disputes by surveying and marking the true boundary line, and therefore Alpine cannot seek judicial relief until the administrative proceedings requested by Alpine are concluded. It is true that in sections 23171-23175 of the Government Code the law provides a special remedy for the determination by survey of inadequately marked boundary lines. Such a survey, when properly made and finally approved, is conclusive of the subject lines and corners. (Gov. Code, § 23175; People v. Boggs (1880), 56 Cal. 648.)
However, it is to be noted that sections 23171-23175 are located in Government Code, title 3, division 1, dealing with ‘ ‘ Counties Generally. ’ ’ Article 2 of chapter 2 of that division defines the boundaries of the several counties and is followed by article 3 which relates to “Settlement of Boundary Dis*793putes.” Section 23171 is found in article 3 and, as herein-above mentioned, provides that “All common boundaries and common corners of counties not adequately marked by natural objects or lines . . . shall be definitely established by surveys . . and section 23173, also in article 3, declares that “Upon the reports made by the county surveyors the State Lands Commission shall finally determine and establish the common boundaries and corners, if it can collate a satisfactory description therefrom. If the reports are insufficient for the purpose, it shall cause surveys to be made, and when approved by it, the surveys establish the common boundaries and corners.” It is manifest that the language of the sections above quoted relates to the “determination” of disputed boundary lines only through the making of surveys to mark the boundary lines defined by the Legislature in article 2, not to define those lines by interpreting legislative language which leaves uncertain the point where the survey shall start or the courses it must follow.
In respect to disputes of the latter character (i.e., those which involve not merely running a survey to mark legally defined lines but, rather, conducting a proceeding to legally define the lines so that thereafter they can be marked on making a survey) it is clear from the language above quoted, read in the context of related provisions, that the legislative plan contemplates resolution by judicial proceedings. In this connection, it is noted that section 23178 of article 3 provides that “Whenever a common boundary . . . has been legally established in accordance with Article 3 of this chapter, or by judicial proceedings,” etc. Furthermore, we find that in title 5, division 1, chapter 5, of the same code, dealing specifically with “Boundaries” and proceedings to establish them, section 51000 provides that “When the location of a boundary line of a local agency[1] is indefinite or uncertain, or the boundary line has been obliterated from any cause, it may be determined, defined, and established pursuant to this chapter.” Section 51001 declares that “The legislative body of the local agency having an indefinite, uncertain, or obliterated boundary may cause a proceeding to be brought in the name of the local agency to have the boundary line determined, defined, and established.” In the proceeding thus instituted, “The [superior] court shall determine the location of the boundary line *794by courses and distances or by giving such other definite description as is necessary or desirable.” (Gov. Code, § 51007.) After the court has determined the boundary line, a copy of its judgment is filed with the Secretary of State (Gov. Code, § 51008), and “From the date of filing, the boundary line is established and fixed for all purposes and constitutes the true and official boundary line of the local agency” (Gov. Code, § 51009). Sections 51000-51009 of the Government Code were derived from a statute first enacted in 1921 (Stats. 1921, chap. 838, p. 1607) which contained almost identical language. In City of Crescent City v. Dodd (1933), 131 Cal.App. 153 [21 P.2d 140], it was held that this latter statute “furnishes a full and complete remedy to cities [and counties], and by its provisions allows a full and complete investigation as to indefinite or uncertain boundaries; allows the introduction of testimony and maps, and gives a direct method of determining the true boundaries of cities, towns and counties,” and under such circumstances “a complete remedy is afforded” in the courts.
Two procedures for determining boundary lines are thus provided in the Government Code. However, while section 23171 provides that the State Lands Commission may make a survey, on request, when a common boundary is “not adequately marked by natural objects or lines, or by surveys lawfully made,” section 51000 provides for a judicial determination when the boundary is “indefinite or uncertain, or . . . obliterated.” It thus appears that the legislative plan contemplates that the two methods are not necessarily alternative in a given case; rather, that the provisions of sections 51000-51009 may be invoked where the language of the boundary statute is unclear as well as where the line has been obliterated, while the remedy provided by sections 23171-23175 is to be availed of only where the language of the boundary statute is clear and only ministerial action on the part of the surveyor in adequately marking the line is required. In other words, where the language used by the Legislature is “indefinite or uncertain,” construction of such language is a matter exclusively for the courts, and the location of the boundaries is a question of fact to be judicially determined. (County of Sierra v. County of Nevada (1908), 155 Cal. 1, 13 [99 P. 371].) The foregoing construction is in accord with the generally recognized rule that while the fixing and defining of county boundaries is a legislative function, the interpretation of a statute so fixing such boundaries is a judicial func*795tion, to be exercised by the courts. (Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. v. Baird (1954), 225 La. 14 [71 So.2d 865, 868]; Ballard v. W. T. Smith Lumber Co. (1953), 258 Ala. 436 [63 So.2d 376, 378 [3]]; 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 261, §7.05.)
In the case of County of Sierra v. County of Nevada (1908), supra, 155 Cal. 1, there was a dispute as to the boundary line between Sierra and Nevada Counties. The boundary statute there involved provided in pertinent part that the line ran “west to the source of and down the South Fork and Middle Yuba River.” The dispute related to the location of the “source of the South Fork.” (P. 4 of 155 Cal.) No official survey of the boundary between the two litigating counties had ever been made. The trial court determined the location in question and this court affirmed the judgment as based upon substantial evidence.
It was contended in the Sierra case that under the provisions of sections 3969-3972 of the Political Code (now Gov. Code, §§ 23171-23173, 23175) a mode was “fixed by the legislature whereby the boundaries of counties must be ascertained; that this legal remedy must be exhausted before the matter of conflicting boundaries can be presented for judicial determination in a court of equity. (People ex rel. Borrell v. Boggs [(1880), supra], 56 Cal. 648.)” (County of Sierra v. County of Nevada (1908), supra, 155 Cal. 1, 12.) The court in rejecting such contention held (pages 13-15): “[I]t is obvious that the question presented in the case at bar, and the matter before the court in the case cited, call for the application of different principles of law. In the ease cited the court grounded its conclusion on the fact that the statute defining the boundary had fixed the boundary line of the counties as the summit of the dividing ridge, and that the act which the code section directed the surveyor-general [the predecessor of the State Lands Commission] to do with reference to the establishment of said boundary, was simply to go on the ground and in his ministerial capacity run his lines along the ridge. Of course, where the legislature has fixed a boundary along a ridge, a well-defined course readily determinable and ascertainable, there is no action on the part of the surveyor-general called for but to run his survey line thereon on the ground. Where the language of an act so clearly defines the line that there is nothing to be done but run a survey along it, there is no room for question, but the sections of the code relied on by appellant furnish a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for the establishment of the *796line, and that a court of equity cannot be called upon to do what the law in the first instance provided for having done. But this legal remedy can only be availed of where the language of an act defining a boundary is clear. Where it is not clear, and where the description of the boundary is of doubtful import, or where it requires the interpretation of a court to ascertain what is meant by the language of the statute when mentioning localities, natural objects, or sources of streams as matters of boundary, the sections of the code have no application. . . . When the courts have interpreted the language of the act, and declared what the boundaries in dispute are as a matter of law, then only can surveyors or the surveyor-general act, and they act then in establishing the line on the ground solely in a ministerial capacity . . . What the source of the South Fork is is not definitely fixed or determined by the act, and could only be determined by judicial inquiry to ascertain its location. It is only upon its ascertainment that the line therefrom to the state line could be run, or a surveyor be able to locate by survey the line called for. If it could be said that it was purely a ministerial act of the surveyor-general to ascertain from the language used in the act this source and make his survey accordingly, it would be difficult to conceive of a case where the language of an act could be so uncertain or indefinite as to boundaries of a county, or with reference to any point from which boundaries were to be measured, so that a court of equity could be ever invested with jurisdiction to construe the language of an act and determine as matter of law what the boundaries intended to be fixed by it were.”
The Sierra case appears indistinguishable from the case at bar as to the pertinent issues involved. The record in this case discloses that there are four possible locations of the “Sonora trail,” that the location of the “West Point road” is similarly uncertain, and that the uncertainty as to the true location of these points is the cause of the present boundary disputes. Which of the several possible locations of these markers was intended by the Legislature to delineate the boundaries of Alpine County is a fact question to be determined by the courts. It follows from the foregoing that the State Lands Commission is not empowered to settle the boundary disputes in this case, and that Alpine’s action is tenable. The complaint alleges the cause and nature of the disputes, Alpine’s interpretation of the language in question, and the acts of defendant counties which are claimed to con*797stitute infringements on Alpine’s rights; such complaint states a cause of action for the relief sought.
Defendant counties further urge that one of the duties of the State Lands Commission is to determine whether a boundary line has been fixed because of mutual use and recognition within the meaning of either section 231702 or section 231773 of the Government Code, and therefore that the courts cannot in any event act in this case until the commission has compléted its determination on this matter. This argument also is untenable.
To begin with, the commission is not empowered to determine the applicability of the mutual recognition statutes. An administrative agency can act only as to those matters which are within the scope of the powers delegated to it. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1942), 20 Cal.2d 264, 266 [2] [125 P.2d 42] (Industrial Accident Commission); Wheeler v. City of Santa Ana (1947), 81 Cal.App. 2d 811, 816 [1] [185 P.2d 373] (Civil Service Commission); 2 Cal.Jur.2d 30, § 16.) The powers delegated to the State Lands Commission deal generally with title to and usage of public lands, minerals and oil and gas on such lands, and navigable waters of the state. (Pub. Resources Code, § 6216.) Aside from section 6204 of the Public Resources Code (ante, p. 791) no reference to city or county boundary lines is made in the statutes establishing the commission and defining its powers, and no power to fix or ascertain such boundaries with reference to usage and custom is expressly or impliedly conferred. (See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 6101-6223; see also California Administrative Code, tit. 2, div. 3, ch. 1.) The sole power conferred on the commission with respect to boundary lines is to “survey and mark” them; the power to make a prior determination that the statutory line has been altered by mutual use and recognition is neither expressly nor impliedly included in the powers conferred, for such determina*798tion is not a necessary part of the ministerial function of surveying and marking.
The mutual recognition statutes represent a codification of the common law doctrine of acquiescence. (See 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 274-276, § 7.09; Starry v. Lake (1933), 135 Cal.App. 677, 682 [28 P.2d 80].) That doctrine is properly invoked in fixing a boundary line where, as here, the true location of the line is uncertain. (City of Alameda v. City of Oakland (1926), 198 Cal. 566, 576 [2] [246 P. 69].) But, as noted hereinabove, where the location of a boundary line is in dispute because of uncertainty or indefiniteness in the statutory description, primary jurisdiction over the dispute is in the courts rather than the administrative agency. Since the State Lands Commission has no primary jurisdiction in the case of a disputed boundary line where the dispute is based upon an unclear definition in a boundary statute, and since the applicability of sections 23170 and 23177 of the Government Code in this case is merely a facet of a boundary dispute of the type mentioned, it follows that the commission has no power to make any initial determination of the true boundaries here involved, whether based on the mutual recognition statutes or otherwise.
Defendants rely on the established rules that “where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought before the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941), 17 Cal.2d 280, 292 [6] [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715]), and that “it lies within the power of the administrative agency to determine in the first instance, and before judicial relief may be obtained, whether a given controversy falls within the statutory grant of jurisdiction” (United States v. Superior Court (1941), 19 Cal.2d 189, 195 [3] [120 P.2d 26]). But these rules are inapplicable where, as here, the agency is given no jurisdiction to make a judicial determination of the type involved. Alpine’s erroneous request to the commission to determine the disputed boundaries could not invest the commission with jurisdiction beyond that conferred on it by law or estop Alpine from pursuing its proper remedy.
Once the court has determined the boundaries here involved, based either on a legal interpretation of the allegedly uncertain language contained in section 23102 of the Government Code, or on the terms of the mutual recognition statutes if such statutes are found to be applicable, and the facts as the *799court may find them, then the State Lands Commission may well have jurisdiction, if called upon, to proceed with its survey and to mark the true line as judicially determined. However, in accordance with the principles hereinabove enunciated, the initial determination of the boundaries in question must be made by the courts, and it was error for the trial court to have sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to overrule the demurrers and permit the defendants to answer, if they be so advised, within such reasonable time as the court may fix.
Shenk, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.The term “local agency” as used in the subject portion of the code refers to “county, city, or city and county” (Gov. Code, § 50001).
Government Code, section 23170, provides as follows:
‘ ‘ Every common boundary between counties which has been mutually recognized and used by the counties adjacent thereto for the purpose of assessment and collection of taxes for a period of 25 years continuously prior to July 30, 1927, is confirmed, validated, and declared to be legally established. ’ ’
Government Code, section 23177, provides as follows:
“Every common boundary between counties which has been mutually used by the counties adjacent thereto for the purpose of the assessment and collection of taxes for a period of 15 years continuously prior to the effective date of this section [September 22, 1951] is hereby confirmed, validated, and declared to be legally established.”